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The development of advanced anti-access/area denial (A2AD) threats by potential 
adversaries presents a significant challenge to the United States Navy. The proliferation 
of these threats makes operating an aircraft carrier from contested waters a high-risk 
endeavor. If a carrier must be withheld from the battle or is put out of action, the entire 
capability of the air wing is lost.  
The Systems Engineering process was applied to this problem by exploring a 
concept called the “Distributed Air Wing” (DAW). This high-level concept includes 
various methods to distribute and disperse naval air capabilities from their centralized 
location on an aircraft carrier.  
This study outlines the development and analysis of three conceptual designs that 
fall under the concept of the DAW: a dispersed land and sea basing concept that utilizes 
carrier-borne Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, a seaborne unmanned aircraft courier 
system, and a carrier-based unmanned air-to-air vehicle. The analysis within shows that a 
mixture of these alternatives in varying degrees delivers the Fleet’s most critical 
capabilities—Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Offensive/Defensive 
Counter Air, and Surface/Land Strike—with less risk than the current Carrier Air Wing 
(CVW) force structure and operational doctrine. 
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The U.S. Navy is currently the preeminent naval power in the world with the ability to 
control the seas and project power across the globe. However, as the service looks to the 
future, it must overcome two substantial challenges.  
First, it must continue to operate against threats, symmetric and asymmetric, that 
aspire to surpass the United States’ capabilities in the maritime domain. Today, these 
adversaries are employing weapons such as submarines, cruise missiles, and long-range 
anti-ship ballistic missiles to prevent access into critical areas and limit freedom of action 
once there. This strategy is known as anti-access and area denial (A2AD) (Department of 
Defense 2012). These actions drastically increase risk to the fleet as it performs its core 
missions. 
Second, the U.S. Navy must meet this threat while operating within an 
increasingly difficult fiscal environment. Therefore, it must take a systematic look at its 
current force structure and devise new and innovative ways to operate more effectively 
and efficiently; reducing risk and fulfilling its mission of preserving freedom of the seas. 
The Systems Engineering Analysis cohort class 20B (SEA-20B) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) approached this challenge by exploring a concept called the 
“Distributed Air Wing (DAW) (Grund 2013).” This high level concept includes various 
methods to distribute and disperse naval air capabilities from its centralized location on 
an aircraft carrier. According to definitions presented to the team by the CNO’s Strategic 
Studies Group (SSG), distribution involves taking the capabilities inherent to the air wing 
and distributing them among multiple platforms (Strategic Study Group Executive 
Member 2014). Dispersion involves taking the individual aircraft that make up an air 
wing and geographically dispersing them to multiple locations (Strategic Study Group 
Executive Member 2014). Both options offer viable methods to reducing risk.   
SEA-20B offers the U.S. Navy three alternatives that fall under the concept of the 
DAW; the Dispersed Air Wing Operations (DAWO) concept, a seaborne unmanned 
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aircraft courier system (Sea Scout), and a carrier/land based unmanned air-to-air fighting 
vehicle (MTX).  
These alternatives were evaluated using a model developed by the Team called 
the South China Sea Basing Optimization Model. The model optimizes the quantity and 
locations of Aircraft Carriers (CVNs), UAV Carriers (Sea Scouts) and Expeditionary 
Airbases (EABs) to cover specified mission sets in the South China Sea for minimal risk. 
Analysis shows that a combination of these alternatives in varying degrees will deliver 
the fleet’s three most critical capabilities (ISR, Offensive/Defensive Counter Air, and 
Surface/Land Strike) at less risk than the current CVN/CVW force structure. Risk is 
measured in the exposure to enemy weapons’ effects scaled by the number of personnel 











CVNs Only  2        21.9  3846  100% 
CVN + Sea 
Scouts  1     1  11.6  1480  38% 
EABs Only     22     31.0  1488  39% 
EABs + Sea 
Scouts     10  3  16.0  724  19% 
CVN + EAB + 
Sea Scouts  1  10  1  25.7  675  18% 
Table 1. Optimal solutions for baseline mission requirements. 
 
There are three efficient solutions for the model. One CVN and one Sea Scout 
offer the least expensive alternative to achieve a significant reduction in risk. For 
approximately $5 billion more, ten EABs and three Sea Scouts offer an even greater 
reduction in risk. Finally, for an additional $10 billion only a minor further reduction in 
risk can be achieved. Therefore, the first two alternatives offer the greatest return on 
investment. The force structure with only CVNs and the force structure with only EABs 
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are not efficient solutions because a greater reduction in risk can be achieved for a lesser 
total cost. 
 
Figure 1.  Cost vs. risk efficiency of alternatives. 
 
Next, each of the three concepts, DAWO, Sea Scout, and MTX are briefly 
described and the key insights from analysis presented. 
 
DISPERSED AIR WING OPERATIONS 
DAWO involves dispersing the aircraft from the carrier air wing to land bases 
when it is operationally advantageous to do so. The use of dispersed basing complicates 
the enemy’s targeting and greatly amplifies the resources required for the enemy to put 
the entire air wing out of action. Operating the CVW in this way reduces risk and allows 
the full spectrum of Naval Air capabilities throughout the battle space. 
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These basing options include small-scale Expeditionary Airbases (EABs) for 
Marine Corps STOVL aviation combat elements, Tactical Strike Bases (TSBs) which use 
dual-purpose highways as runways for conventional takeoff aircraft from the carrier air 
wing, and Dispersed Hubs consisting of civilian airfields with hardened and reinforced 
defenses. These basing options do not require the procurement of new hardware. They 
only require good relationships with the allied countries in the desired region and 
personnel with the expertise and the training required to construct such bases.   
The pros and cons of each basing concept are analyzed in detail by the SEA-20B 
team. Significant advantages of DAWO are reduced vulnerability, increased deterrence, 
and enhanced partnership opportunities with regional nations. Confounding factors are 
logistical and maintenance complexity and more difficult command and control 
requirements. 
The Team conducted simulations and analyzed the vulnerability and susceptibility 
of these bases to attack. Dispersed airbases are shown to be inherently less vulnerable 
than a CVN. They require significantly more ordnance to achieve neutralization. This is 
primarily a function of dispersed parking. When parked aircraft are separated by a 
distance equal to the lethal radius of the incoming warhead, a single missile can only 
damage a single aircraft. This stands in stark contrast to the damage a single warhead can 
cause to a CVW if it impacts a CVN flight deck. In addition to dispersed parking, 
camouflage and hardening provide additional vulnerability reduction. 
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Figure 2. Monte Carlo simulation results: double row parking with 150 m spacing, 
no camouflage. 
 







Sea Scout is a system-of-systems designed to meet the requirement of distributing 
airborne ISR, Land Strike and Surface Strike capabilities throughout the fleet. The team 
developed the concept by reengineering the Naval Air Warfare Center’s Sea Vex 
concept. Sea Scout is comprised of two main elements: a small UAS courier ship and its 
embarked air wing of unmanned aerial systems. The system’s purpose is to deliver 
persistent distributed capabilities wherever and whenever the fleet needs them the most. 
 
Figure 4. Sea Scout system components. 
The UAS courier vessel, also known as an Escort Carrier (CVE), is about 1/3rd 
the size of a CVN, 1/8th the cost (including acquisition and operation support), and 
requires only 2% of the CVN/CVW crew. Its small size and speed of up to 50 knots, 
coupled with point defense capabilities and soft kill measures, make the vessel more 
difficult to target by A2AD threats. 
As envisioned by SEA-20B, Sea Scout provides full spectrum ISR capability via 
the A160 Hummingbird, a rotary wing autonomous UAS platform currently in 
development by Boeing. While ISR is the Hummingbird’s primary mission within the 
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concept, developing capabilities also include a limited capacity for Direct Attack, 
Communications Relay operations, and Precision Resupply applications. Use of the 
Hummingbird also provides the fleet with over-the-horizon detection and targeting 
capabilities that enable extended range anti-ship cruise missiles and land attack missiles 
to reach their full capability in dynamic targeting scenarios. The Hummingbird’s 
capability is far superior to any platform of its type and weight class boasting a 222 knot 
maximum speed, a 2,500nm range, 20hr endurance, 2,500lb payload capacity and a full 
complement of integrated sensors. 
Strike capability is designed into Sea Scout with the utilization of current and 
emerging state-of-the-art cruise missile technology via the Tactical Tomahawk Land 
Attack Missile (TLAM) and the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). These 
platforms are integrated into the system by the use of 14 Mk 57 next generation Vertical 
Launch Systems. With the Mk 57, Sea Scout brings a tailored mixture of up to 56 strike 
missiles to the fight. 
Modeling shows that Sea Scout’s additional firepower, when added to a Surface 
Action Group (SAG) consisting of three DDGs, results in significant improvement in 
results over a wide range of test cases. Table 2 lists the three test cases that were 
modeled. Case 1 represents a robust surface adversary comprised entirely of DDGs with 
superior area defense capability. Case 2 represents a group of small missile boat 
combatants with point defense only. Case 3 represents a mixed group of missile boats 




Case Red Force Composition 
3 x Arleigh Burke 
DDGs 
1 x Sea Scout 
1   1 x Sovremenny DDG 
  2 x Type 52D DDGs 
  2 x Type 52C DDGs 
2 15 x Type 22 Missile Boats 
3 15 x Type 22 Missile Boats 
  2 x Type 52C DDGs 
 
Table 2. Cases modeled. 
 
 xxx
Figure 5 displays the results of adding Sea Scout to the surface action group. In all 
cases, the additional firepower provided by Sea Scout resulted in an increase of the mean 
number of mission kills (at least 1 hit). In Case 3, the additional firepower overwhelmed 
the DDGs’ area defense capability which tripled the salvo effectiveness. 
 
Figure 5. Sea Scout Strike Asset Effectiveness. 
 
Sea Scout was designed with the capacity for growth. The CVE itself has space to 
integrate more platforms and the Hummingbird has sufficient payload to integrate 
additional sensors or weapons. Therefore, as UAS technologies improve, additional 
capabilities such as Electronic Warfare, Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Warfare can 
be added in later increments of the system.  
 
MTX MISSILE-TRUCK UAV 
The SEA-20B MTX concept is a two-phase incremental system of unmanned 
aircraft capable of carrying air-to-air missiles to accompany manned aircraft on fighter 
missions and providing persistent on-station time for offensive and defensive counter-air 
missions. The MTX can be paired with a manned fighter for OCA or ISR missions or it 
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can be controlled by an operator from the ground for DCA missions. The concept of the 
MTX adds three important elements that will aid in closing the capability gaps that are 
present when the CVN is distant from the fight. First, it reduces risk to personnel by 
replacing manned aircraft with unmanned aircraft. Second, it increases the payload 
available to manned fighters allowing them to engage more targets. Finally, MTX 
increases combat range by reducing weight and adding extra fuel tanks. 
Three options were considered for the MTX concept: an unmanned fighter 
(QF/A-18 or QF-16), an upgraded MQ-9 Reaper (MQF-X), and an X-47B UCAS. The 
unmanned fighter is the quickest and cheapest solution. It can fill the OCA capability gap 
as long as dispersed air bases are available for deployment. The upgraded version of the 
MQ-9 Reaper can fill the dedicated DCA role in protecting high value assets, but it 
requires costly modifications. Finally, the UCAS can provide greater range and 
endurance. Although these capabilities are critical in the A2AD environment, the X-47B 
is more expensive and requires a longer lead-time for procurement. Therefore, a phased-
in approach based on technology readiness and operational necessity should be utilized 
when acquiring these systems.   
To analyze this concept, a Monte Carlo simulation was designed to explore the 
benefits of adding unmanned air-to-air vehicles as a force multiplier to the DCA mission. 
The analysis shows that just two MTX platforms, outfitted with 10 AMRAAM missiles, 
facing an enemy raid of 10 aircraft have a 99.9% chance of destroying three or more 
aircraft, a 97% chance of destroying 5 or more aircraft, and a 75% chance of destroying 7 
or more aircraft. The results of this simulation can be seen in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. MTX DCA Monte Carlo simulation results. 
 
These simulation results demonstrate that a robust unmanned air-to-air missile 
platform can be utilized to attrite a significant number of adversaries as the first layer of a 
defense in depth configuration. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Team concludes that nuclear powered aircraft carriers need not be eliminated 
from the U.S. Navy force structure. They provide unrivaled power projection capabilities. 
However, in order to ensure that their might can be brought to bear on future adversaries, 
the current force structure must be augmented by distributed capabilities that can mitigate 
risk inside of an A2AD environment. The analysis detailed within this report shows how 




A. PROJECT TEAM 
The Systems Engineering Analysis 20B (SEA-20B) team comprises 17 students 
from four countries: the United States, Israel, Taiwan and Singapore. The team members 
have professional backgrounds that span a wide range of fields both inside and outside of 
the military. Specific naval warfare communities include naval aviation and surface 
warfare with platform experience that spans FA-18s, P-3s, H-60s, E-6Bs, cruisers, 
destroyers and amphibious assault ships. The international military officers bring in 
perspective from the Israeli Army Infantry, Republic of Singapore Air Force and 
Republic of Taiwan Army Acquisition Corps. On the civilian side, the Republic of 
Singapore is also represented by technology and acquisition professionals with working 
experience in several major programs and projects abroad. 
 
Figure 1.  Members of team SEA-20B: LCDR Vincent Naccarato, USN; ME5 Joong Yang 
Lee, Singapore; Major Meng Hsi Wu, Taiwan; Captain Ittai Bar Ilan, Israel; LT James 
Efird, USN; LT Benjamin Elzner, USN; LT Darrell Morgan, USN; LT Kayla Tawoda, 
USN; LT Evan Wolfe, USN; Wei Jun Goh, Singapore; Sok Hiang Loo, Singapore; Kok 
Wah Ng, Singapore; Chee Siong Ong, Singapore; Choon Ming Tan, Singapore; Hock 
Woo Tan, Singapore; Chung Siong Tng, Singapore; Kangjie Yang, Singapore. 
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The team also brings onboard the knowledge gained from each individual’s 
specific course of study at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). There are five curricula 
represented by the overall group: Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA), Systems 
Engineering (SE), Operations Research (OR), Modeling Virtual Environments and 
Simulation (MOVES), and Mechanical Engineering (ME). 
 This diverse team with its wealth of knowledge and real-world experience 
provides the expertise necessary to tackle the broad and complex problem assigned by the 
project sponsor, OPNAV N9I (Warfare Integration). However, if subject-matter expert 
knowledge was needed outside of the team, that knowledge was easily accessible through 
the immense network of academic and operational professionals across the entire NPS 
campus. 
One of the first tasks that the team tackled was to develop an organizational 
structure to allow for efficient operations. Aside from the three positions traditionally 
established for the SEA projects, that is, the project manager, lead systems engineer, and 
editor in chief, the team was further organized into three breakout teams with team leads 
in charge of each. Initially, the groups were utilized as breakout groups to focus on 
specific topics and processes within the Systems Engineering process. As the project 
matured, the groups were assigned specialty areas such as computer modeling and cost 
estimation. In the final phase, each group was assigned a solution alternative for focused 
analysis and conclusions. The final team organization is depicted in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2.  Project Team breakdown. 
The organizational chart in Figure 2. depicts a broken line-connector to the SEA-
20A Capstone Team whose focus topic assignment is the Distributed Naval Surface 
Force. This signifies the close relationship between the two projects and the integrated 
nature of fighting in the maritime domain. Throughout the project, integration efforts 
were made in order to acknowledge the fact that the naval surface and air forces cannot 
be successful without cooperation and coordination between the two entities. 
B. CROSS-CAMPUS TOPIC EFFORT 
It is important to note that the study topic assigned to the SEA-20 A and B 
cohorts, “Distributing Future Naval Air and Surface Forces,” was initially part of a 
campus-wide Warfare Innovation Continuum illustrated in Figure 3. This research thread 
garnered a significant amount of attention from several disciplines and organizations 
across the Naval Postgraduate School campus. The effort was developed and coordinated 
primarily through the Operations Research and Systems Engineering departments who 
fostered the interactions, discussions and overall cooperative efforts of both on- and off-
campus stakeholders. The Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education 
and Research (CRUSER) also played a significant role in supporting and organizing 
focused forums on the topic.  
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One of the main benefits of working through the Warfare Innovation Continuum 
was the inclusion of focused and tailored quarter-long courses and activities dedicated to 
the exploration of the “Distributed Naval Forces” research topic. Specifically for the 
SEA-20 cohort, immersion into the problem and solution space began in July of 2013, 
when half of the team was enrolled in the Joint Campaign and Analysis class. It was in 
this class that campaign-level analysis tools and techniques were taught and directly 
applied to the topic within the context of a South China Sea Scenario. The class was also 
repeated during the January 2014 winter quarter, with a focus on an East China Sea 
scenario. Both iterations of the classes resulted in solution alternatives and insights that 
were further applied and developed during the SEA-20B Capstone effort.  
The CRUSER warfare innovation thread, held in late September 2013 during the 
semester break known as Enrichment Week, allowed for further exploration of the 
problem and solution space by including diverse military officer students from across 
NPS curricula. This week-long event began by presenting several new technologies to 
focus groups that could potentially have an impact within the solution space. Groups 
were then divided to tackle the problem by utilizing free-flowing brainstorming sessions 
to apply solutions to the problem. Several aspects of the CONOPS that were first 
conceived during this Enrichment Week activity have been included in the final solution 
of this study. 
During the fall quarter, beginning in October of 2013, the SEA cohort explored 
the problem-space through the OR department’s Introduction to Wargaming course, 
where again, the problem was given focused attention for an entire semester. The 
students developed a wargame that explored the problem and solution space from the Red 
(enemy) force perspective. Subject-matter experts on China from the Naval Postgraduate 
School as well as Commander, Pacific Fleet staff were utilized in the Red cell to help 
understand how China might react to specific solution alternatives. This exercise 
provided valuable information that helped shape the understanding of the second- and 
third-order effects of applied solutions as well as an overall better understanding of the 
problem-space from a potential adversary’s point of view. 
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There were also several research activities within the continuum that SEA team 
members were not directly involved with but were able to gain direct benefits from. This 
includes the Total Ship Systems Engineering class’ focused effort on a CVE design, 
which is an integral part of the Sea Vex system concept that will be discussed in Chapter 
VIII. The resulting product was used as the SEA-20 baseline design and cost estimation 
for the ship aspect of the system. Also, the Joint C4I class focused on Sea Vex command 
and control alternatives, which provided important insight into the control aspects of 
UAS designs developed within this study. 
Appropriately, the SEA-20A and SEA-20B capstone projects that officially began 
in October of 2013 represent the conclusions to this entire cross-campus effort. The 
solutions presented within this document, and that of SEA-20A, utilized the Systems 
Engineering process to explore and leverage diverse facet of the work carried out over the 
last year in regard to developing the “Distributed Naval Forces” concepts. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Warfare Innovation Continuum cross-campus effort timeline. 
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Figure 3. depicts the cross-campus effort that took place over the course of one 
year at NPS. SEA-20B members specifically took part in the Joint Campaign Analysis 
Course (one quarter), the Warfare Innovation Workshop (one week), and the Wargaming 
Course (one quarter) as part of the Systems Engineering Analysis curriculum offered at 
NPS. 
C. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The following approach represents the tailored Systems Engineering Process 
developed and refined throughout the project. 
1.  Approach 
The team’s approach on this project consists of applying the core processes and 
analysis tools learned in the Systems Engineering Analysis curriculum and previous 
educational courses in conjunction with real-world operational experience and hands-on 
research. SEA-20B constructed a tailored systems engineering process to guide the 
progress, analysis, and report deliverables with the final solution being a recommendation 
for a Distributed Air Wing Force Structure and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for 
future integration into a larger system of systems to address the stakeholder’s effective 
need. This effective need is discussed later in the report. 
2. Method 
In contrast to a traditional individual thesis, a capstone project requires special 
attention and coordination among all team members to critically analyze and effectively 
synthesize all the information produced throughout the process. As mentioned earlier, to 
accomplish this, the team designated a project manager and SE team lead, as well as an 
editor-in-chief, who then divided the team up into three major teams and designated a 
team leader for each. In the project’s early stages, the team conducted all-inclusive 
brainstorm sessions and subject matter expert presentations. To keep the research on 
schedule over a course of nine months, the online management tool known as “Redmine” 
(Redmine 2014) was utilized to assign tasks to team members with clear instructions and 
deadlines. For data and information management, the online information “cloud-tool” 
known as DropBox.com was utilized. Weekly meeting minutes were recorded by the 
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editor-in-chief and posted each week to keep the team and advisor up-to-date on the 
progress of the project. In the later stages of the project, each sub-team met weekly to 
complete project tasks and work on deliverables. Milestones for the project were in the 
form of two progress reviews and a final project review that were scheduled, presented, 
and video recorded for the stakeholders, advisors, and fellow students at the NPS. After 
each review stakeholder and advisor feedback was gathered and critically applied to the 
project. Figure 4.  is a snapshot of the project manager Gantt chart that was used to track 
the progress of the project. 
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Figure 4.  SEA-20B Gantt chart.
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3. Tailored Systems Engineering Process 
The systems engineering (SE) process that was implemented for the project was a 
tailored process that was sequenced and iterated to fit the team’s specific project 
approach and requirements but still utilized the traditional SE methodologies learned. 
Figure 5 is a diagram of the team’s Tailored SE Process Model. 
 
Figure 5.  Tailored systems engineering process. 
The team began with a complete Needs Analysis that included a thorough 
stakeholder analysis and problem statement refinement. With the Needs Analysis in 
progress the team also began completing background research on the assigned topic in 
order to facilitate scenario development. With a more defined scope and information on 
the operational environment in which to focus efforts, the team began a complete 
functional analysis of military forces’ missions and capabilities necessary in order to 
achieve Sea Control. After many iterations of this analysis, the team was able to define 
the high-level requirements and measures of effectiveness and performance by examining 
the capability gaps in functional decomposition. Next, the team generated alternatives 
from which three future concepts were explored further to determine their feasibility and 
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suitability in the Distributed Air Wing solution architecture. Numerous qualitative and 
quantitative analyses were conducted to determine multiple different force structures and 
CONOPs that achieve the required mission effectiveness and reduce risk in the scenario. 
From here, the team determined sets of solutions to the effective need by taking into 
account the cost of each force structure alternative. The final recommendation includes 
an integrated force structure that addresses the stakeholder’s effective need with a trade-
space analysis in terms of risk and cost.  
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II. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
A. TASKING STATEMENT 
The tasking statement for the project was provided in a memorandum to the SEA-
20B cohort from Professor James Eagle, Chairman Systems Engineering Analysis 
Curriculum dated 19 July 2013. The specific tasking was formulated from a topic of 
interest by the Naval Warfare Development Command and assigned through OPNAV 
N9I, the curriculum sponsor. The statement reads as follows: 
Design a fleet system of systems and concept of operations to employ 
naval air assets in a range of missions to augment naval operations or 
conduct specified tasking in the 2025–2030 timeframe and beyond. 
Consider manned and unmanned air systems to execute direct support to 
the naval missions across the kill chain spectrum within a distributed air 
wing concept. For example, consider missions of future surface ship 
squadrons operating outside the CVN/CVW umbrella in sea control 
contested environments, and also more traditional strike and sea control 
missions integrating CVW manned and unmanned systems. Generate 
requirements for unmanned and manned aircraft and their sea bases by 
considering a range of future CVN and CVEX alternatives, ensuring each 
strike platform can execute its own kill chain regardless of the EM 
environment. Evaluate the value of distributing the air wing’s capabilities 
across the fleet and land-based facilities, to complicate an adversary’s 
offensive targeting and defensive measures. Consider current fleet 
structure and funded programs as the baseline system of systems in 
developing these concepts of operations, then develop alternative 
architectures for platforms, manning, command and control, 
communication/network connectivity, and operational procedures. 
Address the costs and effectiveness your alternatives. 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Identifying, conversing with, and analyzing the needs of project stakeholders are 
primary tasks within the Stakeholder Analysis process. The stakeholders’ direct 
involvement in the understanding of the problem space added valuable insight to the team 
throughout the entire process. Given the wide scope of the project, the initial list of 
potential stakeholders ranges from high level entities such as OPNAV and NAVAIR, to 
the war fighters and support elements, at the tactical level. Analysis and discussions 
among the team concluded with the development of the following Expanded Stakeholder 
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Diagram and Focused Stakeholder Depiction along with their level of influence on the 
project in Figure 6 and Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Stakeholder diagram. 
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Figure 7.  Focused stakeholder depiction. 
As the graphics above depict, starting with a broad top-to-bottom look at the 
possible stakeholders resulted in a fairly large amount of candidates. While most of the 
stakeholders listed are viable when considering 2nd- and 3rd-order relationships, it became 
apparent that only a few met the criteria of being “key stakeholders”—those holding a 
high level of interest and direct influence in regard to the project topic and the 
SEA-20B analysis and results. Given that criteria, key stakeholders were identified in 
Figure 8 and are summarized below. 
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Figure 8.  Stakeholder Geographical Map. 
1. Key Stakeholders Identified
 NPS – Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA
The Naval Postgraduate School is a key stakeholder in that it is home to the 
Systems Engineering Analysis program as well as the cross campus cohorts who have 
dedicated academic resources to this project. Also, NPS houses a collective of expertise 
that can support nearly every domain of study pertinent to the project. Most importantly, 
NPS provides a robust source of operators and leaders ranging from junior to senior level 
officers with tactical, operational and strategic experience. This allows SEA-20B to have 
convenient access to tip-of-the-spear knowledge across the military spectrum. 
 CRUSER – Monterey, CA
The Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research 
(CRUSER) is an example of one of the outstanding resources available at NPS (Stein 
2003). With its roots seated in being “a collaborative environment for researchers, 
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industry, students, and defense personnel interested in all aspects of employing 
unmanned systems in an operational environment now and in the future,” collaboration 
and sharing information between the CRUSER network of research associates and SEA 
20B was deemed vital to the project given the inclusion of current and future unmanned 
system technology inside of the team’s scope. 
 
 CNAF –  Coronado, CA 
Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) is Type Commander for all U.S. naval 
aviation units (Commander, Naval Air Forces 2014). CNAF is responsible for manning, 
training, equipping and maintaining aviation assets as well as providing operationally 
ready squadrons and aircraft carriers throughout the fleet (Commander, Naval Air Forces 
2014). Given the scope of the Distributed Air Wing topic and the effective need to 
develop a new Naval Air Force structure, CNAF is a key stakeholder in the SEA project. 
 
 NAVAIR – Patuxent River, MD 
As the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) responsible for full life-cycle 
support of naval aviation aircraft and related weapons systems (Dunaway 2012), 
NAVAIR has a high level of influence and insight in regard to the project solution space. 
Given the utilization of alternatives in the early conceptual phase as well as the potential 
to reconfigure current systems in the solution space, the organization was able to provide 
insight and guidance as the team designs air related material solutions. The organization 
is also a valuable body of knowledge in regard to the acquisition process of naval air 
vehicles and weapons systems that comprises the vast amount of possible solution 
alternatives. 
 
 NWDC – Norfolk, VA 
The Naval Warfare Development Command is responsible for coordinating the 
development of concepts, doctrine, lessons learned and experimentation in direct support 
of the Fleet (Navy Warfare Development Command 2014). NWDC presented the 
Distributed Air Wing topic to the SEA-20B team and is directly connected to the project 
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through N9I. As a topic that the command is exploring within its own ranks, NWDC has 
a vested interest in the insights and analysis that will come out of the SEA-20B project. 
 
 OPNAV – Washington, D.C. 
Within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, there are several stakeholders 
that have been identified as potentially having a high interest in the Distributed Air Wing 
project (Global Security 2014). 
OPNAV N9I – OPNAV N9I is responsible for Warfare Integration and is the 
SEA program sponsor. Mission success within the maritime environment relies heavily 
on integration between air, surface and subsurface units and was therefore a paramount 
consideration as the team developed a system of systems that fights in cohesion across 
the spectrum of naval warfare. 
OPNAV N81 – OPNAV N81 is the assessment division within OPNAV 
responsible for conducting capability and campaign analysis throughout the Navy. The 
relationship with N81 undoubtedly helped align the team’s analytical processes with the 
standards, tools and techniques recognized by DOD analysts and decision makers. 
OPNAV N95, N96, N97 and N98 - As previously mentioned, the Navy fights as 
an integrated force. While the primary focus of the project is centered on air warfare 
capabilities, the inclusion of all warfare branches was prudent as the team explored the 
interaction that air capabilities have throughout each branch. Each major naval warfare 
area has had a direct influence on the different force structures that were designed and 
later analyzed to meet stakeholder requirements. Therefore, the inclusion of the OPNAV 
warfare branches OPNAV N95 (Expeditionary Warfare), OPNAV N96 (Surface 
Warfare), OPNAV N97 (Undersea Warfare), and OPNAV N98 (Air Warfare) as key 




2. Stakeholder Interviews and Insights (Military On-Campus) 
Initially, stakeholder interviews were conducted with Naval Postgraduate School 
on-campus personnel. Focusing on this group provided a key benefit in that it allowed 
easy access to highly experienced military professionals without a direct connection to 
the project that could look at the problem with a fresh set of eyes compared to 
stakeholders already heavily invested in the problem and solution. The personnel sought 
out for interview were senior level officers, both active duty and retired with experience 
across three warfare areas; Surface Warfare, Undersea Warfare and Air Warfare. 
In regard to the tasking statement, all stakeholders agreed that the underlying 
problem stemmed from advanced A2AD threats placing High Value Units (HVUs), 
specifically the Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN), at risk of loss in several areas around the 
world. U.S. fiscal volatility was also echoed as part of the problem in that the possibility 
of shrinking defense budgets, if and when that comes to fruition, will likely result in the 
reduction of force size and assets. 
In most cases, discussions that logically started with cost, given the topic of fiscal 
uncertainty, quickly turned into discussions of value. Time and again, it was pointed out 
that while U.S. systems employed today do have a substantial monetary cost, their value 
comprises much more than a price in dollars. This is especially true when considering 
different stakeholder perspectives. For example, while entities who pay for these systems 
view HVUs through the lens of cost, to the warfighter, the capability a system brings to 
the fight is far more important than the system’s price tag. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT DEVELOPMENT 
The team began the SE Process model by defining the problem and refining it into 
the stakeholder’s effective need. After a detailed examination of the tasking letter along 
with clarification received from primary key stakeholders the team framed the 











Figure 9.  The initial Problem Statement. 
Once the team was able to capture the tasking into a more precise problem 
definition, the process of solving began by asking, “Does the U.S. Navy actually need a 
new naval air wing force structure?” Through initial research the team found that the use 
of an Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2AD) strategy by the enemy presents a great threat to 
U.S. forces as they are currently configured (Krepinevich, Watts and Work 2003). This 
strategy threatens the United States’ current maritime superiority as well as the ability to 
protect its national interests. The effect of an A2AD threat to aircraft carriers and the air 
assets it employs is too great to ignore and is a risk that must be mitigated. The lack of an 
effective over-the-horizon targeting asset for aircraft carriers and the carrier air wing is 
also an important factor. This threat is growing during a fiscally challenging time and 
alleviating costs was a critical influence on how the team would attack this problem. All 
of these factors were taken into account and further researched (as discussed in Chapter 
III of the report) when the team defined the problem and further refined it for this project. 
1. Scope 
The tasking statement and subjects researched by the Team include such a wide 
range of subjects that scoping the study effort was required. It was critical to determine 
what was within the scope of the project and what lies outside of the scope.  
 
 
Problem Statement: Design a fleet system of systems and concept 
of operations to employ naval air assets in a range of missions to 
augment naval operations or conduct specified tasking in the 2025-
2030 timeframe and beyond. Consider manned and unmanned air 
systems to execute direct support to the naval missions across the 
kill chain spectrum within a distributed air wing concept. 
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a. In Scope 
The subjects determined to lie within the scope of this project include: 
 2020s timeframe 
 Naval manned aircraft, both current and future designs 
 Unmanned aircraft suitable for naval use. This includes both military and 
commercial UAVs 
 All ships capable of launching or engaging aircraft 
 Marine Corps assets including aircraft and amphibious ships 
 ISR, offensive and defensive counter-air, and strike missions including 
both land and maritime targets 
 Future threats including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, 
submarines, and surface ships 
 Technology with a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) three or higher 
 Cost estimations for force structure alternatives 
 
b. Out of Scope 
The subjects determined to lie outside of the scope of this project include: 
 
 Nuclear conflict 
 Recommendations for U.S. Air Force future force structure 
 Air Force basing recommendations 
 U.S. submarine force structure recommendations 
 Detailed logistic analysis 
 Detailed analysis of cyber warfare threats 
 Specific network requirements for command and control 
 Nonmaterial solutions such as training and doctrine 
 Determining specifically which countries would be political allies or have 
Status of Forces Agreements in the 2020s 
 Ballistic missile defense recommendations 
 Amphibious assaults 
 
 20
Many of these topics are crucial to the success of any naval force structure in the 
future. The Team discussed all of these subjects and their effects on the force structure 
were qualitatively considered. However, due to the time and classification constraints 
placed on the Team not all topics of interest could be addressed thoroughly. The subjects 
listed above are topics that should be addressed in future thesis and capstone work.   
2. The Refined Problem Statement – The Effective Need
Below are the two core aspects of the problem statement that were identified by 
the team to be most important and were used as guiding issues for the rest of the project 
processes. From this refined perspective the team was able to derive the effective need 
for the project. 
1. Emerging advanced A2AD threat capabilities introduce unacceptable risks to
the CVN/CVW system that, if not mitigated, will result in the loss or reduction of naval 
air capability in contested waters. 
2. The volatile U.S. fiscal environment severely constrains the Navy’s ability to
develop and sustain material solutions to this problem. 
Figure 10.  The Effective Need. 
The Effective Need: The U.S. Navy’s effective need is a new 
Naval Air Force structure and concept of operations that 
integrates unmanned air systems (UASs) with current Navy 
systems in a way that maintains or exceeds current mission 
effectiveness while reducing the risk involved with operating under 
an A2AD umbrella. 
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III. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH
A. KEY CHALLENGES OF THE A2AD ENVIRONMENT 
To help fully understand the A2AD threat environment, a threat hierarchy of 
plausible enemy A2AD threat actions and intentions was created. Part of the process of 
identifying capability gaps and developing solutions is becoming more aware of the 
adversary’s perspective and the capabilities they can and would employ to create an 
A2AD threat environment. In 2003, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
(CSBA) defined anti-access as “enemy actions which inhibit military movement into a 
theater of operations,” and area denial operations as “activities that seek to deny freedom 
of action within areas under the enemy’s control” (Krepinevich, Watts and Work 2003). 
The A2AD functional hierarchy defines the major categories of functions and 
tasks that make up a robust anti-access/area denial environment threatening the U.S.’s 
entry into and operation within a specific region.  
First, the primary kinetic capacity to achieve anti-access is a large ballistic missile 
force made up of both DF-21-type and land-based Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) 
designed to attack large critical targets such as the nuclear powered aircraft carrier as well 
as naval and air bases (McCarthy 2010). 
Next, to achieve area denial, the enemy’s capabilities must primarily consist of 
kinetic counter-maritime and counter-air systems such as submarines with torpedo and 
ASCM capabilities and bombers with air-to-surface and air-to-ground capabilities to 
compound the layered area denial threat umbrella (McCarthy 2010).  
In addition, non-kinetic space and cyber systems are ready to be employed that 
are specifically designed to disrupt information flow and U.S. power projection further 
complicating the environment. As stated in a study from the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, “Even more disconcerting is the growing proliferation of 
national and commercial satellite services and missile technology. Increased access to 
these satellite services will allow even regional rogue states both to pre-target key fixed 
facilities and to monitor U.S. deployments into forward bases,” (Krepinevich, Watts and 
Work 2003). 	
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Figure 11 depicts the A2AD Threat Functional Hierarchy created by the team to 
clearly outline what the enemy threat is trying to achieve. 
Figure 11.  The adversary’s A2AD functional hierarchy. 
B. INITIAL FORCE STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the team analyzed the initial problem 
statement critically and iteratively taking into account the inputs from the various 
stakeholders. This iterative process allowed for the team to adjust the boundaries of the 
problem space as more understanding was gained. One issue brought to light throughout 
this process of problem refinement was that although the topic was called “Distributed 
Air Wing,” which sounds singular in nature, this project was not just a simple one-for-
one swap of systems or stand-alone system development project; rather, this project 
represents the development and combination of concepts that the Carrier Strike Group 
 23
(CSG) can incorporate into its force structure in order to combat the A2AD threat 
environment. This is, in part, due to the fact that naval air assets rely heavily on surface 
assets to support their air capability and vice versa.  
What is apparent is that every domain has the potential to affect every part of the 
CVW structure and mission. If an enemy submarine were to destroy and sink the CVN 
that the CVW used as its base of operations, then the air capability as well as the 
significant command and control capability of the CVW would be lost. If the enemy used 
sophisticated Electronic Warfare (EW) against the airborne or space-based 
communications assets that support the CVW, then data links integral for CVW 
operations could be severed. The team considered what effect each domain has on a 
carrier air wing and how adversaries could use those domains directly or indirectly to 
affect the core and supporting elements of the carrier air wing and ultimately the CSG.  
As indicated in the tasking letter and emphasized by the stakeholders, the A2AD 
environment is one of the most complex and challenging environments for U.S forces. 
Most anti-access/area denial threats can be divided into two types: kinetic and electronic. 
Kinetic weapons can be used directly to gain air, land, and sea superiority, or merely the 
threat of their use can be used to deny an area. The specific kinetic threats to the Fleet 
include weapons such as anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles 
(ASCMs) torpedoes, mines, and new anti-aircraft missiles. As will be discussed later in 
the report, the team tailored the CVW integration requirements around this need to 
operate within or close to the A2AD kinetic threat environment. 
The team also focused on evaluating the electronic threats that comprise the 
A2AD environment. Specifically, how increased capabilities to limit the use of 
information transmitted throughout the radio frequency (RF) spectrum, could affect U.S. 
mission accomplishment. The U.S. military, especially the Navy, has recently focused 
many resources on network integration which relies on secure transmissions between air, 
surface, sub-surface, and space assets. However, these transmissions can become 
vulnerable to spoofing, hacking, and jamming by the enemy in an A2AD environment. A 
persistent electronic A2AD threat environment could severely degrade a CVW’s C4I 
capabilities. These electronic threat technologies are becoming more attainable for 
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adversary state actors, and thus need to be accounted for in terms of resilience and 





A. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
Scenario development was a part of the early Systems Engineering process in 
order to demonstrate a variety of situations that could develop across the entire globe in 
which the U.S. would most likely be called upon to assist, defend, deter, and/or strike. 
After the development of the following scenarios each one was analyzed in terms of the 
mission capabilities needed, weapons/warfare required, and finally environmental and 
geo-political factors.  
1. Scenario 1 – A2AD Operations
Summary: Maritime and aerial maneuvers and staging in the South China Sea, a 
recognized A2AD environment, culminating in small marine landings in support of local 
allies. 
Main reason to include scenario in analysis: 
Large Joint Task Force operations in an extreme A2AD environment are a 
continuing crucial element of American power projection when battling away from 
friendly shores. 
Possible scenario:  
The conflict portrayed in this scenario begins by an aggressive move by the 
Chinese government in the South China Sea. This much contested body of water has 
large strategic and economic importance and is bordered by China, Taiwan, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and Singapore, all of which have claims to 
some islands in the ocean. The ownership of some of these islands is contested by China 
and aggressive behavior is a likely source of a military flare-up involving U.S. armed 
forces. 
The scenario begins by China asserting its claims over the entire Spratly Islands 
archipelago, currently claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, The Philippines, Malaysia 
and Brunei. The aggressive expulsion of all non-Chinese military forces from the islands 
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ensues leading to increased tension between China and other local nations. A series of 
small scale naval battles occur between China, Vietnam and Malaysia. The series of 
battles, while being decided consistently in favor of the Chinese, end in the sinking of a 
Type 054A Jiangkai II Frigate by a Vietnamese anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). 
Following the sinking China declares a blockade of the South China Sea. After requests 
from regional allies, the President of the United States decides to intervene to ensure 
freedom of the seas. 
The United States executes war at sea, while maintaining diplomatic efforts to 
assure all sides that wartime action will not be taken against inland targets. Despite 
efforts to forestall military actions, Chinese ASCMs are fired from land-based military 
facilities on the Paracel Islands towards American warships. The U.S. establishes 
expeditionary airbases in allied territory and begins preparations for amphibious landings 
on all major archipelagos in the South China Sea. The scenario culminates in opposed 
amphibious action along with allied nations, while limited scope naval battles are fought 
at sea. Figure 12. depicts the South China Sea and the geographic region where this 
scenario takes place. 
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Figure 12.  South China Sea with Paracel and Spratly Islands outlined (from University of 
Texas Libraries 2014). 
 28
2. Scenario 2 – Precision Strike Campaign 
Summary: Increased tensions over the nuclear weapons program in Iran force the 
United States to conduct a precision strike campaign aimed at strategic and nuclear 
targets throughout Iran. 
Main reason to include scenario in analysis: Medium-scale precision strike 
campaigns have been the most likely form of intervention by the international community 
facing renegade nations. 
Possible scenario: The Iranian government has been developing nuclear weapons 
under the guise of nuclear power research and development for well over a decade. This 
program has caused tension between world powers and Iran, whose strategy has been to 
deny military ties to the nuclear program while biding for time. The tensions in this 
matter have been intensifying as intelligence agencies report that the extreme 
fundamentalist regime approaches its goal of becoming a nuclear power. 
In this scenario the U.S. leads a UN Security Council resolution to blockade Iran 
as final leverage against its advancing nuclear program. A U.S. carrier group in Bahrain 
sets sail towards the Gulf of Oman. All naval and aerial assets in the region are utilized to 
allow safe passage for the carrier group through the Straits of Hormuz. Iran attempts to 
use swarm tactics with small surface boats, submarines, and UAVs to inflict heavy 
casualties.  
Following the costly attack on U.S. ships and the continuing resolution of Iran to 
pursue weapons of mass destruction the President directs forces to commence a full-scale 
precision strike campaign against military anti-air and anti-surface missile installations, 
government and infrastructure targets in major cities, and all known nuclear program and 
ballistic missile sites. 
3. Scenario 3 – Humanitarian Assistance 
Summary: Following a disastrous typhoon in the Philippines and loss of 
government control, U.S. armed services provide humanitarian assistance and military 
peacekeeping to alleviate civilian crisis and heel anarchy. 
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Main reason to include scenario in analysis: As the largest national 
organization capable of overseas operations, the armed services have been, and will 
certainly be, called upon to assist other nations in times of natural disaster. 
Possible scenario:  An especially powerful typhoon strikes the Philippines, where 
nearly 100 million people live in an area of 116,000 square miles. Following the 
catastrophic storm food shortages grow worse in areas cut off from aid and the 
government loses control of the population. International military forces rush to aid the 
beleaguered nation. The missions of all forces are to conduct search and rescue, deliver 
humanitarian aid and enforce orderly behavior while government infrastructure is built up 
to resume control of all sovereign territory. 
4. Scenario 4 – Full-Scale War
Summary: In order to battle domestic civil unrest, North Korea initiates 
aggression against the South, leading to a full-scale war between the United States and 
the communist dictatorship. 
Main reason to include scenario in analysis: Full-scale war against a nuclear 
power must remain a core scenario in any analysis of U.S. armed forces needs in future 
military planning. 
Possible scenario: The nuclear capable state of North Korea is highly volatile and 
has been in a carefully watched cease-fire with its neighbor to the south since the end of 
the Korean War. Tensions between the two countries are a cause for concern for the 
international community. The Unites States is significantly involved in ensuring the 
safety of the South Korean democracy. 
Due to increasing civil unrest, North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-Un, externalizes 
blame for his nation’s stagnant economy and instigates a conflict with South Korea over a 
shared industrial zone. In order to create casus belli, the dictator orders a North Korean 
ship to be sunk near the DMZ, laying the blame on South Korean aggression. The North 
Koreans then launch naval and aerial actions against South Korea. As military actions on 
both sides escalate, the United States is called upon to aid in the defense of its ally.  
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Armed forces mobilize on land bases and at sea for the coming struggle and are 
attacked by North Korean ballistic missiles and small submarines. Despite sustaining 
losses the United States continues to build up extreme military pressure against the 
government and military forces of the northern state. As North Korean leadership feels 
the end is near, weapons of mass destruction are used against American military targets 
in the Pacific and civilian South Korean targets. The U.S. continues to fight through the 
atrocities and finally manages to bring down the dictatorship. 
B. SCENARIO SELECTION 
1. Factor Rankings 
As described above, the four scenarios identified are: 
1) Anti-Access, Area Denial in South China Sea 
2) Precision Strike in Iran 
3) Humanitarian Assistance in the Philippines 
4) Full-Scale War in North Korea 
To determine the likelihood of a scenario happening, key factors were identified, 
ranked and evaluated to identify the highest risk scenario. Risk in this instance, refers to 
the scenario most likely to happen in the next 10–15 years (geo-politically and 
technologically) and poses the biggest threat to U.S. forces. The identification of the 
highest risk scenario allowed the team to concentrate focus and resources on a single 
scenario to evaluate the capabilities of the air wing and supporting force structure 
elements. The process flow is summarized in Figure 13.   
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Figure 13.  Scenario selection process flow chart 
Key Factors: The factors identified were based on stakeholders’ inputs and 
analysis of threats and risks present in the existing environment. After much deliberation, 
three key factors were identified to describe the existing or future capabilities which will 
affect maritime forces. They are as follows: 
 Mission Capabilities
A successful execution of mission is the key to accomplishing the goals of the 
scenarios. In this category, mission capabilities describe the key abilities that are required 
from the air wing to execute a successful mission. Key factors affecting mission 
capabilities are timeliness, communications, intelligence, readiness scalability and 
distribution. The definitions and descriptions of all factors are listed in Appendix A. 
 Weapons/Warfare
Weapons/Warfare describes weapons required to support CSG mission execution. 
Key weapons identified are electronic and cyber warfare, anti-air, anti-missile, ballistic 
anti-missile, deep strike and mine warfare capabilities.  
 Geopolitical
The geopolitical factors describe the political support, inter-governmental 
cooperation, and ease in access to ports location.  
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Summary of Scenario Rankings 
 
Table 1.  Summary of scenario rankings. 
The scenarios were then ranked, analyzed and evaluated. The scenario factor 
rankings confirmed that the A2AD scenario in the South China Sea presents a high risk 
and tests a wide spectrum of capabilities and functions of the U.S.’s future CVW force 
structure and CONOPS. Table 1. provides the high level analysis and ranking. More 
detailed analysis and rankings of these scenario factors can be found in Appendix A. 
With this method the team assessed the A2AD scenario is the most challenging situation 
in which many of the current and future capabilities of the U.S. military will be utilized. 
C. BASELINE SCENARIO 
The following baseline scenario was developed by the team and depicts what the 
Team believes to be a real-world unfolding of events that could take place in the South 
China Sea within the coming fifteen years. This baseline scenario describes the 
operational A2AD environment for which the future integrated CSG force structure and 
CONOPs should be able to adapt to in order to achieve mission effectiveness and reduce 
risk to the CVN. It should be noted that this scenario was detailed for the year 2029 so 
that the team could accurately acknowledge the pace of technological advance and more 
easily bound what could or could not be accomplished. Figure 14 illustrates a regional 
depiction of the South China Sea scenario. 
 
Scenario and Factors 
Score











4.6 3.8 3.7 4.1
Weapons/Warfare 
Requirement Factors
3.3 3.6 1 3.5
Geo-Political Factors 3.8 3.3 4.2 4.5
Average Score 4.2 3.7 3 4
Overall Scenario Ranking 1 3 4 2
 33
2029 South China Sea Scenario: 
Tensions over the Spratly Islands have reached a boiling point. The Joint 
Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU), a tripartite agreement between the 
Philippines, the PRC, and Vietnam, signed in 2004 to explore oil reserves 
in the Spratly Islands (almost exclusively within the Philippine’s EEZ) 
ended in animosity between the three parties. In 2022, the governments of 
Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia published a multilateral 
statement of understanding delineating each country’s claims to maritime 
oil and gas reserves within the Spratly island chain. The PRC vehemently 
protested the agreement, arguing that the JMSU agreement and China’s 
subsequent role in the exploration of much of the area (conducted by 
China Oilfield Services LLC as part of the terms of the JMSU) granted 
them a sizeable stake in the reserves. The United States has remained 
cautiously neutral, stating only that this is a regional matter. A series of 
multilateral talks ensued, each of which broke down acrimoniously, as the 
PRC continued to insist on expanded claims within the Spratly Islands as 
well as demanding a portion of the revenue obtained by the ASEAN 
nations from the deposits. The last round of talks broke down after only 
two days of negotiations in 2028. The next day, the PRC deployed a 
carrier strike group claiming “routine training exercises within the PRC’s 
EEZ.”  The strike group proceeded directly for the Spratly Islands, and 
conducted flight operations as well as gunnery and bombing practice 
against the appropriately named Mischief Reef. The Philippines lodged an 
immediate protest, claiming these operations were conducted well within 
the EEZ of the Philippines, and that they were a deliberate provocation 
aimed at the ASEAN nations’ signatory to the resource sharing agreement. 
The PRC denied these claims, pointing to their historical ownership of 
Mischief Reef, with over 30 years of occupation by the PRC military and 
fishermen.  
The United States expressed concern about the actions of the PRC, and 
moved to discuss the matter in a meeting of the UN Security Council. 
Discussion of the matter was promptly vetoed by the PRC, which claimed 
it was being antagonized by the United States, and reiterating that this was 
a regional matter that would be handled without involvement from the 
United Nations. Following a brief meeting, representatives from the 
ASEAN announced that increased security measures would be undertaken 
to ensure the security and prosperity of the Spratly Islands. Shortly 
thereafter, both the Philippines and Malaysia stepped up maritime patrols 
in the area, and satellite imagery revealed the presence of SA-17 air 
defense batteries in place on Vietnam-claimed Spratly Island (proper). In 
addition to the SAM batteries, space appeared to have been cleared for 
coastal defense cruise missile batteries and preparations for loading SS-N-
26 Yakhont missiles was noted at Cam Ranh. These moves have enraged 
China, who sees the SS-N-26 batteries as a serious threat to its influence in 
the region. The PRC presented Vietnam with an ultimatum, stating in part 
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that it would view deployment of cruise missiles as an untenable challenge 
to the regional status quo, and that any attempt to do so would be met with 
force, if necessary. Vietnam asserted its right to defend it and its allies’ 
territory and interests in the Spratly Islands, and the ship suspected to be 
carrying the SS-N-26 missile batteries set sail from Cam Ranh shortly 
thereafter.  
Approximately 150nm from the coast, this ship was intercepted by a PRC 
Surface Action Group comprising one Type 52D DDG and two Type 54A 
FFGs. The ships hailed the Vietnamese-flagged transport and repeatedly 
instructed it to stop and prepare to be boarded for inspection to verify its 
cargo. The ship refused to comply, and proceeded on course. After over an 
hour of attempted communications, the Type 52D fired multiple shots 
across the bow of the transport ship. At this point the transport ship 
increased speed and began continuous transmissions of Mayday. Moments 
later, the Type 52D exploded violently, breaking in two just forward of the 
pilothouse, with only the stern section remaining afloat. Both Type 54A 
FFG began evasive maneuvers and activated their sonars. A helicopter 
was launched from one, and this began immediately dropping sonobuoys. 
The Vietnamese ship proceeded unimpeded for some time, but just as it 
was disappearing over the horizon a salvo of missiles was fired by one of 
the FFGs. Two ASCMs struck the Vietnamese ship, which exploded 
violently and disappeared beneath the waves with no survivors. A 
Philippine Navy Hamilton-class patrol ship was also fired upon as it 
approached the scene in response to the Mayday calls, and was struck by a 
single ASCM, killing 20 of its crew and leaving it adrift. 
The Philippines, Vietnam, and the PRC now appear poised for war, with 
all countries placing their military forces on high alert. Malaysia and 
Brunei appear to be trying to deescalate the situation, although both have 
also increased the alert status of their militaries. The PRC is adamant that 
a Vietnamese submarine is responsible for the loss of its DDG, which 
Vietnam insists that no submarine was in the area and the explosion was 
caused by either a mechanical fault or sabotage onboard the Chinese 
vessel, also pointing out that the Chinese DDG was in the process of firing 
high-explosive ammunition at one of its ships in international waters in 
violation of the UNCLOS. An emergency session of the Congress of the 
Philippines was invoked shortly after the incidents, and an urgent request 
sent to the United States invoking the 1951 Mutual Defense Agreement. 
United States Pacific Fleet units have been placed on an alert status for 
immediate deployment to the South China Sea.  
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Figure 14.  Regional depiction of the South China Sea scenario (after U.S. Energy 
Information Association 2013). 
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V. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
The functional analysis phase of the systems engineering process allows 
individual component functions of a concept to be determined and then later developed 
further into the means to execute the functions in an operational environment. First, there 
needs to be a development of individual functions into a functional hierarchy describing 
what would need to be accomplished by the entire system of systems to make the solution 
concept valid. Using the current CVN capability structure as the baseline, the distributed 
force structure took that baseline capability and spread it out using multiple alternative 
concept ideas. This development made up a potential architecture framework and testable 
factors for the solution concept the Team termed, the Distributed Air Wing (DAW) – 
which is essentially a concept of concepts to be implemented to create an integrated 
Carrier Air Wing worthy of fighting in an A2AD environment. 
As stated earlier, the South China Sea scenario was developed to help understand 
what possible functions would be essential to the operation of the DAW concept. From 
there, the functions were decomposed in a functional hierarchy necessary for friendly 
forces to counter A2AD threats. Assisting in the development of the DAW individual 
concepts was a functional analysis of an effective A2AD threat environment as described 
earlier. Understanding component functions of the A2AD environment allowed for an 
understanding of what critical A2AD functions needed to be countered by the DAW 
concept. 
When the functional hierarchy for the DAW concept was developed, the functions 
were then implemented into the operational scenario to determine the functional flow. 
The functional flow block diagram (FFBD) shows how component functions are 
implemented in the scenario and determines if there are missing functions that need to be 
developed.  
In addition to the functional decomposition and FFBDs, an N2 chart and IDEF0 
diagrams were also developed. Using a variety of functional analysis tools allowed the 
Team to determine the capability gaps as well at what areas of the mission fell in and out 
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of the project scope. These tools also allowed for the utilization of different perspectives 
in determining the solution space for the force structure needed. 
1. Functional Hierarchy and Flow Block Diagrams
One of the goals of the A2AD environment is to prevent U.S. forces from safely 
operating in the area of operation (AO). This would give an adversary the ability to 
conduct operations in a region that was favorable to its disposition. Starting with Level 0 
Functionality, it was determined that the goal of the DAW concept would be to maintain 
regional stability. This would counter instability created by the A2AD environment by 
not collocating naval air forces in one location, for example the aircraft carrier, and 
would provide a possible kinetic force option to deter adversaries from unwanted actions. 
From there, determining factors for Level 0 needed to include a way for the DAW to 
maneuver into operating locations, provide similar mission capabilities to the CVN, be 
able to sustain forces, and having an ability to maintain flow of information in the battle 
space. Refer to Figure 15 and Figure 16. for the decomposition diagrams. 
One of the Level 1 functions needed to complement the Level 0 function 
(Maintain Regional Stability) is to Maneuver Assets. The DAW concept of distributing 
force capabilities over a regional area, so as to not centralize a location for an attack, 
would require maneuvering assets as necessary to position them advantageously for 
defensive or offensive strikes. For example, the CVN is able to translate their forces 
anywhere on the globe at a moment’s notice. If the CVN or any similar asset is included 
in the solution space for the DAW, it would need assets capable of maneuvering their 
force capabilities from the centralized location to other areas in the region, so that if one 
force is disabled through an attack, the total force capability would not be degraded or 
annihilated. 
Once assets maneuver to essential locations, then those forces would need to be 
able to execute present-day mission-sets. There are many missions conducted by the 
CVN, but the most important missions that the team deemed essential for the CVW to 
conduct operations against A2AD threats would be Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR); Strike, and Defensive/Offensive Counter-Air (DCA/OCA). These 
missions would need to be tailored for large-scale actions conducted against more 
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developed countries and for actions conducted in smaller scale conflicts. The tailoring of 
mission size to a particular size of conflict drove the idea to incorporate flexibility into 
the DAW concept. 
Figure 15.  Maintain regional stability high-level functional decomposition. 
The third function of the functional hierarchy concentrated on the ability of 
sustaining the support functions for the forces associated with the DAW concept. With 
more locations for air assets to operate from, there needs to be the creation of a secure 
logistical network to support DAW operations. One of the challenges with this function is 
that with dispersed forces, the network of logistical lines increases. This fact leads to 
more assets required to support the facilities required to implement the DAW. There will 
also need to be a function to make sure all personnel are trained and qualified to support 
the DAW concept which will represent the readiness of the operational force. 
The last Level 1 function includes functions involved with C4I, which represents 
a complex function set that includes all functions of communicating, collecting, and 
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assessing information in the battle space. The flow of communications is essential in 
today’s threat environment and there needs to be reliable C4I functions that allow for 
such flow. 
 As the Team decided that Logistics (part of Sustain Support) and Command and 
Control (part of Execute C4I) were out of the scope of this particular project, it was 
determined that the first two Level 1 functions (Maneuver Assets, and Execute Mission 
in A2AD Environment) were the most relevant to the project, and therefore the 
following Level 2 and 3 decompositions of these functions are presented in Figure 16.  
 
Figure 16.  Maneuver Assets and Execute Mission in A2AD Environment Level 2 and 3 
functions. 
 
The following describes the functions and sub-functions in hierarchal format with 
the Functional Flow Block Diagram after the description of each Level 1 function. 
 41
1.0 Maneuver Assets: The CSG and integrating concepts must be able to maneuver 
assets. This function has two Level 2 functions: 1.1 Translate Assets, and 1.2 Navigate 
Assets. See Figure 17.  
1.1 Translate Assets – This function provides the system with the ability to translate its 
deployed assets by controlling its direction, translating forward and backward and 
performing evasive maneuvers. 
1.1.1 Control Direction – This function enables the system to control its direction 
as the system moves towards the targeted destination. 
1.1.2 Translate Fore/Aft – This function provides the system with the capability to 
adjust its position by moving forward and backward to reach its commanded 
destination. 
1.1.3 Perform Evasive Maneuvers – This function enables the system to perform 
evasive maneuvers to avoid oncoming hazards during a mission. 
1.2 Navigate Assets – This function provides the system with the ability to maneuver its 
deployed assets to the correct locations. It will determine its current location and 
destination. With that, it will optimize the route and resolve the destination. 
1.2.1 Determine own-ship location – This function provides the system with the 
capability to determine its current location before commencing on its new 
flight mission. 
1.2.2 Determine Destination – This function provides the system with the 
capability to conclude the location of the destination based on the received 
mission command. 
1.2.3 Resolve Destination – This function provides the system with the capability 
to ascertain the location of the destination based on the received mission 
command. 
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1.2.4 Optimize Route – This function enables the system to determine the most 
effective and efficient route that starts from its current location to its 
destination. 
Figure 17.  Translate assets (Function 1.1) FFBD. 
2.0 Execute Mission in A2AD Environment: In order for the new CSG structure to be 
an operationally viable solution for the U.S. Navy, it will have to be able to conduct 
missions necessary to accomplish strategic goals within an environment that is beset 
with A2AD kinetic and electronic weaponry. It has seven level 2 functions to include: 
2.1) Search for Target, 2.2) Detect Target, 2.3) Identify Target, 2.4) Track target, 
2.5) Neutralize Target, 2.6) Employ Deception and 2.7) Perform Escort. Many 
missions have reiterative actions in order to continuously complete mission elements 
and are the reason many of the functions are looped. See Figure 18.   
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Figure 18.  Execute Mission in A2AD Environment (Function 2.0) FFBD. 
2.1 Search for Target- The new CSG structure will need to be able to adequately 
search for adversary targets in the various electromagnetic (EM) spectrums 
and in various domains within a region; the concentrated domains will utilize 
air assets to search for enemy assets operating in the sub-surface, surface, and 
air domain. Two level 3 sub-functions are: 2.1.1) Determine Where to 
Search, 2.1.2) Determine how to search and 2.1.3) Determine what assets 
to use. See Figure 19.  
2.1.1 Determine Where to Search- Understanding the key locations to 
search for adversary assets is a priority for the CSG in order to 
protect itself against A2AD weapons, both kinetic and electronic. 
Measurable aspects of this function could consist of latitude and 
longitude coordinates developed from a variety of navigational 
assets. 
2.1.2 Determine How to Search- Different regions and mission sets 
will require different search patterns and methods. Developing 
patterns consisting of linear or circular search methods with 
respect to a geographic point or with respect to the position of 
assets within the CSG structure, are methods of how (not limited to 
just linear or circular search patterns) search patterns could be 
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employed by the CSG. Measurable elements of this function are 
distances flown with respect to a geographic or other reference 
point.  
2.1.3 Determine What Assets to use- There are many domains, such as 
the air and sea domain, to search for adversary targets and 
matching the proper search asset with the type of search that is to 
be conducted is crucial for operational success. For instance, the 
leadership within the CSG structure will need to know what 
methods of search assets are available and what EM spectrum that 
the search can be conducted in. Different spectrums have 
limitations and benefits for use. Measurable elements that need to 








2.2 Detect Target- The action of detecting a target of interest from background 
noise within a specific search region. This function is broken down into level 
3 sub-functions including: 2.2.1) Employ Sensors and 2.2.2) Process Sensor 
Data. Measurable elements of this function could be the number of found 
targets with a specific time period. See Figure 20.  
2.2.1 Employ Sensors- Includes the activation and operation of the 
specific sensor or sensors aboard a search asset. It can be measured 
by rate of information gathered and coverage area. 
2.2.2 Process Sensor Data- This function is the act of converting 
received data the data into discernable information for the user. 
This function can be measured by whether or not targets can be 
found. 




2.3 Identify Target- Is the function of interpreting the process data from the 
computing source an identifying it for the CSG. See Figure 21.  
2.3.1 Assess Sensor Data against Reference Database- Is the function 
of comparing the received data against a known database of threats 
in the adversary’s arsenal. This database should be continuously 
updated. This can be measured by indicating whether or not the 
data can be assessed. 
2.3.2 Classify Target- Is the function that classifies what the received 
data most likely is. The probability of classifying the target 
correctly is a measurable element of this function. 
 















2.4 Track Target- This is the process of continuously monitoring the target and 
its actions in the region if the decision is made to do so. It is broken down into 
two level 3 sub-functions: 2.4.1) Receive Updated Target Information and 
2.4.2) Assess updated target information. See Figure 22.  
2.4.1 Receive Updated Target Information- Includes the reception of 
target information such as position, heading, speed, and other 
operational aspects. Data flow is a measurable element to this 
function. 
2.4.2 Assess Updated Target Information- Is the function of 
interpreting what the identified target is doing and if it is a threat to 
the CSG. 




2.5  Neutralize Target- Is that act of using force to disrupt or take down an 
adversary target. It has three level 3 sub-functions to include: 2.5.1) Deploy 
Weapons, 2.5.2) Conduct Electronic Attack and 2.5.3) Resolve Target 
Solution. See Figure 23.  
2.5.1 Deploy weapons- Includes the release of kinetic weapons at a 
target classified as an enemy. It can be measured by how many 
kinetic weapons can be delivered in a unit of time. 
2.5.2 Conduct Electronic Attack- Is the function of disrupting EM 
signals utilized by the enemy asset in order to prevent use of that 
asset or to eventually take-down the asset. It can be measured by 
the amount of power generated and amount of signal degradation 
produced. 
2.5.3 Resolve Target Solution- Is the function of determining if the 
target has been effectively neutralized and if not, the process will 
be looped until the target is neutralized. It can be measured by 
probability of whether or not the target was neutralized effectively 
(probability of kill). 
 
 




2.6  Employ Deception- Is the act of deploying deceptive means as defensive 
strategy for the CSG to confuse the adversary in order to gain the initiative. It 
is broken into three Level 3 sub-functions including:  2.6.1) Employ 
Counter-Measures, 2.6.2) Employ Counter-Counter-Measures and 2.6.3) 
Hide Assets. See Figure 24.  
2.6.1 Employ Counter-Measures- Includes employing assets to counter 
adversary threats and to target a specific enemy kill-chain action. It 
can be measured through the times employed versus the amount of 
successful times friendly assets evaded an enemy threat. 
2.6.2 Employ Counter-Counter-Measures- Includes employing assets 
to counter an enemy threat that has a defensive capability against a 
non-redundant counter-measure. It can be measured through the 
times employed versus the amount of successful times friendly 
assets evaded an enemy threat with the initial counter-measure 
defeating capability. 
2.6.3 Hide Assets - Includes actively employing techniques to mask the 
signature of friendly assets. Rate of detection by adversary is a way 
that this can be measured. 
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Figure 24.  Employ Deception (Function 2.6) FFBD. 
2.7  Perform Escort- Is the action of utilizing one set of friendly assets to travel 
with and protect another set of friendly assets from any enemy action. It is 
broken down into two level 3 sub-functions which are: 2.7.1) Perform Escort 
of Sea Assets and 2.7.2) Perform Escort of Air Assets. Both sub-functions 
can be down in conjunction with one another, which is why the “and” is 
included in the sub-function. See Figure 25.  
2.7.1 Perform Escort of Sea Assets- Is the action of protecting friendly 
sea-surface assets. It can be measured by the number of times 
friendly sea-surface assets depart and arrive at an objective 
destination. 
2.7.2 Perform Escort of Air Assets- Is the action of protecting friendly 
air assets. It can be measured by the number of times friendly air 
assets depart and arrive at an objective destination. 
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Figure 25.  Perform Escort (Function 2.7) FFBD. 
3.0  Sustain Support - This function provides the system with the ability to sustain 
operations behind the initial deployment. This function consists of three sub-functions 
that are performed concurrently: 3.1) Manage Materiel, 3.2) Maintain Readiness 
and 3.3) Generate Forces. See Figure 26.  
When a CVW is deployed, initial supply is usually inadequate to sustain the entire 
campaign operations. Hence, it is important to have a robust resupply support system to 
perform sustained operations and these functions allow the CVW to receive external 
resupplies, reinforces and maintain its own personnel and assets, and to project its force 
into battle. 
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Figure 26.  Sustain Support (Function 3.0) FFBD. 
3.1 Manage Materiel – This function provides the system with the ability to receive, 
manage and allocate supplies and essentials for the conduct of operations. See Figure 
27.  
3.1.1 Receive Materiel – This function enables the system to receive external 
resupplies. This function includes interfacing with resupply assets to load 
and unload supplies. 
3.1.2 Administer Materiel – This function allocates supplies and essentials 
from storage facilities to the receiving assets for operational use. 
3.1.3 Manage Inventory – This function provides the system with the 
capability to store supplies, track supplies movement and process 
resupply requests. 
3.1.4 Transport Materiel – This function enables the system to transport 
materiel between inventories and resupply assets. 
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Figure 27.  Manage Materiel (Function 3.1) FFBD. 
3.2  Maintain Readiness – This function allows the system to maintain the 
preparedness of the system to meet the operational requirements. See Figure 
28.  
3.2.1 Maintain Personnel – This function supports the system to 
provide maintenance of physical and mental well-being of 
personnel for operational and non-operational situations. 
3.2.2 Maintain Proficiency – This function allows the system to train 
and maintain personnel’s proficiency in equipment and operational 
scenario handling.  
3.2.3 Maintain Assets – This function provides the system with the 




Figure 28.  Maintain Readiness (Function 3.2) FFBD. 
It is critical that the CVW is always well prepared to perform any designated 
missions. Thus, it is imperative to provide the operating crew with basic essentials like 
food and water, as well as hygienic facilities and amenities for personnel maintenance 
(3.2.1). On top of which, the personnel must be proficient in operating the CVW assets 
and executing battle tactics in order to maximize operational effectiveness. Hence, 
frequent training (3.2.2) is vital to maintain this proficiency. Also, frequent preventative 
and corrective maintenance of assets (3.2.3) is fundamental in achieving high 
serviceability and availability of assets to be called upon for mission execution.  
3.3 Generate Forces – This function allows the system to project assets and 
generate sorties for operations. See Figure 29.  
3.3.1 Launch Assets – This function provides the system with the 
ability to launch assets into the air in accordance to flight 
regulations and procedures. 
3.3.2 Turnaround Assets – This function supports the system to 
provide swift resupplies and battle damage assessment and repair 
to assets during missions. 
3.3.3 Recover Assets – This function supports the system to recover 
assets during operations by performing asset landing preparations.  
 
 55
Figure 29.  Generate forces (Function 3.3) FFBD. 
It is vital for CVW to sustain presence and mission effectiveness over the adversaries 
through constant sortie generation for missions. With Function 3.3 Generate Forces, it 
allows the system to Launch (3.3.1), Recover (3.3.3) and turnaround assets (3.3.2) 
through refuel, re-arm and repair efficiently and swiftly for maximized combat 
effectiveness.  
4.0 Execute Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 
(C4I) - The Execute C4I function will be a looping function that is prevalent in all 
other functions. The Execute C4I function begins with the Communicate Data (4.1) 
function that Receives Data (4.1.5) and the system proceeds to Exploit the Data 
(4.4) or use it to Develop Intelligence (4.3). This processed information is then used 
to support the Command and Control (4.2) function. The output from the 
Command and Control function is a mission order that is then communicated 
through the Communicate Data function to the appropriate elements within the 




Figure 30.  Execute C4I (Function 4.1) FFBD. 
4.1 Communicate Data – This function provides the system with the ability to 
exchange information.  
4.1.1 Transmit Information – This function enables the system to 
transmit information either autonomously or when commanded to 
do so. The function will also enable the system to transmit 
information of various formats, including, but not limited to, text 
and imagery. 
4.1.2 Interoperate with Friendly Forces – This function enables the 
system communicate with friendly and allied forces and provides 
the capability for the system to exchange information with these 
forces. 
4.1.3 Monitor Frequencies – This function provides the system with 
the capabilities to continuously scan any specified frequency band 
for transmissions, both to it and between external systems. 
4.1.4 Manage Frequencies – This function enables the system to 
communicate over a range of frequencies. This provides flexibility 
in communications and also enables interoperability of the system 
with other external systems that may operate in a specific 
frequency. 
4.1.5 Receive Information – This function enables the system to 
receive information transmission either autonomously or when 
commanded to do so. The function will also enable the system to 
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receive information of various formats, including, but not limited 
to, text and imagery. 
Communicate Data has the following sub-functions. Within the Communicate 
Data (4.1) function, the interoperability of the communication system is enabled by the 
Interoperate with Friendly Forces (4.1.2) function. Friendly forces include both U.S. 
and allied forces. The communication system will Manage and Monitor Frequencies 
(4.1.3 and 4.1.4) simultaneously. Depending on the operations, it then Transmit or 
Receives Information on a specific frequency (4.1.1 and 4.1.5) before reverting back to 
frequency management and monitoring functions. See Figure 31. Note: In this figure the 
it should be interpreted that the functions can of Manage and Monitor Frequencies 
(4.1.3 and 4.1.4) can be done simultaneously with Transmit or Receives Information 
(4.1.1 and 4.1.5) – denoted by the “AND” between the figures; while the “OR” represents 
that an entity is either Transmitting “or” Receiving Information. 
Figure 31.  Communicate Data (Function 4.1) FFBD. 
4.2  Command & Control – This function provides the system with the 
necessary capabilities to exercise Command and execute Control. See Figure 
32.  
4.2.1 Establish Situational Awareness – This function enables the 
system to build an overall air/sea/land picture from various sources 
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of inputs and intelligence with the objective of providing the 
operator with the information and intelligence required for 
decision-making. 
4.2.2 Plan Mission – This function provides the system with the 
capability to assist and enable the development and formulation of 
strategies and concepts for operations. 
4.2.3 Determine Mission – This function enables the system to assist 
the operator to resolve the type and scope of the operation to be 
executed. 
4.2.4 Disseminate Orders – This function enables the system to relay 
Commander’s decisions, direction and guidance to the distributed 
forces across and beyond the operational network. 
4.2.5 Assign Assets – This function provides the system with the 
capability to support the identification and assignment of assets, by 




Figure 32.  Command and Control (Function 4.2) FFBD. 
Command and Control has the following sub-functions (4.2). The Situational 
Awareness will be established (4.2.1) using Information from the Communicate Data 
and Furnish Intelligence (4.1.3) functions. With the situational awareness established, 
Mission Planning (4.2.2) is performed. With the mission planned, the Mission 
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Determination (4.2.3) and Asset Assignment (4.2.5) is performed simultaneously. 
Finally, the generated Mission Order is Disseminated (4.2.4) through the 
Communicate Data function to the respective elements.  
4.3 Develop Intelligence – This function provides the system with the capability 
to process data it receives from the various ISR sources and use the data to 
generate intelligence so as to establish SA, aid decision-making and 
operations planning. See Figure 33. 
4.3.1 Receive Intelligence – This function provides the system with the 
capability to receive intelligence in text, image, video and any 
format to be specified.
4.3.2 Process Intelligence – This function provides the system with the 
capability to perform pre- and post-processing of received 
intelligence to enable the management of such received 
intelligence. 
4.3.3 Furnish Intelligence – This function provides the system with the 
capability to transmit intelligence, in either its original format or an 
otherwise specified format to another entity in the same network.
4.3.4 Store Intelligence – This function provides the system with the 
capability to retain in its database all received and processed 
intelligence and provide the operator with the ability to retrieve 
such intelligence as desired.
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Figure 33.  Develop Intelligence (Function 4.3) FFBD. 
Development of Intelligence has the following sub-functions (4.3). Intelligence is 
Received (4.3.1) and Processed (4.3.2). It is then Furnished (4.3.3) on-demand to 
enable the Establishment of Situational Awareness. All Intelligence are Stored (4.3.4) 
for future retrieval whenever necessary.  
 
4.4 Exploit Data – This function enables the system to process the data it 
receives or prior to transmission. The function enables the system to compress 
or decompress, encrypt or de-encrypt such data or extract specific information 
from such data that it may require for the performance of other functions. 
Exploitation of Data (4.4) has the following sub-functions Data Received 
(4.4.1) is Processed (4.4.2) to Decrypt (4.4.4) it. The decrypted data is then 
either Stored (4.4.3) or Displayed (4.4.6). Data Transfer (4.4.5) is also 
achieved through the Communicate Data function mentioned earlier. See 
Figure 34.  
4.4.1 Receive Data – This function enables the system to receive data 
transmitted from other systems within the network. The function 
will also enable the system to receive data of various formats, 
including, but not limited to, text, image and video. 
4.4.2 Process Data – This function enables the system to process the 















system to compress or decompress, encrypt or de-encrypt such data 
or extract specific information from such data that it may require 
for the performance of other functions. 
4.4.3 Store Data – This function enables the system to write data in 
either permanent or transient format, with the capability to retrieve 
such stored data at a later time. 
4.4.4 Decrypt / Encrypt Data – This function enables the system to 
decrypt / encrypt data received or prior to transmission. 
4.4.5 Transfer Data – This function enables the system to transmit data 
between its own-ship subsystems. 
4.4.6 Display Data – This function provides the system with the 
capability to present any requested data in a specified format on a 
display system. 
Figure 34.  Exploit Data (Function 4.4) FFBD. 
B. N2 DIAGRAM 
The N2 Diagram is a tool used to show the input-output relationships between the 
different functions of the system. As the Level-1 functional decomposition contains 
aggregation of high-level tasks, the Level-2 functions were used to show the 




Figure 35.  N2 Diagram. 
High-level analyses of the dependencies between the functions are described 
below. 
The navigation block of the N2 diagram comprises Translate Assets and 
Navigate Assets. Translate Assets together with Navigate Assets function forms a 
group, in that navigation of assets typically involves movement of assets from one 
location to another, i.e., Translation of Asset. The output of the Translate Assets 
function causes a change in the location of assets, the location data (i.e., blue-force 
tracking information) is feed to Command & Control functions to provide a common 
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The mission block of the N2 diagram comprises of the various functions that are 
needed in the process of executing a mission. Search, Detect and Identification of 
Target is grouped together due to the common theme of these functions.  
Part of this function involves sensory functions that comprises of Search for 
Target, which provide the guidance to the Detect Target function. The Detect Target 
feed track information from sensors to Identify Target for target classification and 
classified tracks are then passed over to the Track Target function. The target tracks 
from the Identify Target are fed back to Search for Target to provide data to guide the 
search process. The output from these functions includes detection information that can 
be used for Tracking of Targets or fed as data for Develop Intelligence.  
The functions for Tracking of Target generates track-information (i.e., target 
vectors) that may be used to generate firing solutions to Neutralize Targets or to provide 
the Employ Deception functions to counter hostile targets targeted at the force. In 
network-centric warfare, the track-information may also be shared to other entities within 
the system through the Communicate Data functions. 
Other than outright offensive and defensive operations, the system may also need 
to perform other support functions such as Perform Escort. During Neutralize Targets, 
Employ Deception and Perform Escort, the system is likely to want to continue to 
Track Target until the operation is over, i.e., target is destroyed or incoming threats is 
no longer present. Perform Escort would also involve some form of movement of the 
ships and/or air wing, i.e., these would need to navigate to different locations to perform 
their task.  
To support the operations, it is necessary for the system to be able to provide the 
necessary logistic and maintenance resources for the operations. This is the purpose of 
the Maintenance block, which comprises functions Manage Materiel, Maintain 
Readiness and Generate Forces. The Generate Forces function refers to the sustenance 
of a force, i.e., manpower, equipment that can be deployed in time of needs. The 
Maintain Readiness functions would include maintaining proper assets in time of needs 
and proficiency in the various command and non-combat operations, i.e., in C4I, ISR, 
Attack and defense operations. The Manage Materiel function includes the planning and 
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tracking of assets, inventories and equipment. Hence, any operation that would consume 
resources, i.e., Neutralize Target, Deploy Deception, Perform Escort, Translate 
Assets, would affect and be affected by the function of Manage Materiel. 
These three functions are interconnected, that is in order to Maintain Readiness 
there is a need to maintain a certain level of supplies for use. Manage Materiel is also 
important during non-mission time for the purpose of providing sufficient materiel for 
training needs, which is needed to Generate Force. Likewise, to maintain readiness, it 
may be necessary to consume materiel, which would need to be factored in and managed 
through the Manage Materiel function. Operations to Manage Materiel would all 
involve some form of movement of the ships/air wing, i.e., these would need to transport 
materiel to/from supply bases, etc.   
The Command and Control block comprises of function such as Communicate 
Data, Command & Control, Develop Intelligence and Exploit Data. The 
Communicate Data function forms the backbone of the information flow for the system 
in that any part of the sub-system would need to obtain information for its operation, e.g., 
the Navigate function would need to know the location that it is to navigate to, or what 
target is assigned to a sub-system for its Neutralize Target function, or the movement 
and inventory level for Managing Materiel. Likewise, position of assets and sensory 
information are also fed using the Communicate Data function to the Command & 
Control function to develop the situation picture. 
All the data that are gathered through the Communicate Data function are passed 
to the Command & Control, Develop Intelligence and Exploit Data function for 
planning and processing to generate information that may be used during operations. 
Intelligence data from the Develop Intelligence would be used by the Command 
& Control to provide situation data. The current mission plan from the Command & 
Control function may be used as inputs for Develop Intelligence. Intelligence data 
would be used by the Exploit Data functions to persist, stored or processed. Processed 
data from the Exploit Data may in-turn be used by Develop Intelligence to additional 
information for the situation picture, i.e., intelligence information from generated by the 
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Develop Intelligence may be feed into the Command & Control to update its situation 
picture. 
C. IDEF0 FUNCTIONAL MODELING 
Integrated Definition for Functional Modeling (IDEF0) is a process-oriented 
modeling tool that is popular in industry, especially in the military and government 
sectors. It shows how information flows while displaying the input-output relationships 
throughout a system.  
Most importantly, the IDEF0 is able to communicate all of the model decisions 
and activities that take place within the system. Understanding the inputs, outputs, 
decisions and activities is important when conducting a thorough functional analysis of 
how a system operates or how it should be designed to operate. This is why the team 
selected this tool to perform a functional analysis on the DAW concept. The diagram 
in Figure 36 illustrates the basis of IDEF0 (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). 
Figure 36.  Inputs, Controls, Outputs and Mechanisms definitions.  
After functional decomposition, Levels 0 and 1 were imported into this tool and 
their various Inputs, Controls, Outputs and Mechanisms (ICOMs) were identified. Figure 
37 shows the various ICOMs for Level 0. In order to maintain regional stability, the team
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noted that several major Controls such as Asset Specifications, Location Proximity and 
Resource Availability are required. In total, 10 controls were identified. Together with 
these controls there are three significant inputs and four resources while four outputs 
were generated from level 0. 
 
Figure 37.  IDEF0 - Level 0 for Maintain Regional Stability. 
After Level 0, the team examined the next level of the IDEF0 model. At Level 1, 
there are four main functions: Maneuver Assets, Execute Mission in A2AD 
Environment, and Sustain Operations, and Execute C4I. 
As this model depends on the Functional Hierarchy, any changes will propagate 
downwards to the IDEF0 model. As mentioned previously, the team has undergone 
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The ICOM for the various functions were identified after active brainstorming. 
After several intensive rounds of evaluation and discussion, the IDEF0 model 
illustrated in Figure 38 for Level 1 was developed. 
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VI. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT
A. HIGH LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
The following is a list of high-level requirements based on the gaps identified for 
the current CVW. To address the risks of threats that can potentially disable a CVN and 
its associated air wing in an A2AD environment, three key requirements for the proposed 
solution are: 
1. The system shall be capable of operating in an A2AD environment
2. The system shall help to reduce risk to the operation and human life
3. The system shall maintain sufficient mission capabilities
For these requirements to be measurable, i.e., to be able to be verified, they are 
further refined into more specific level requirements. The following are the refined 
requirements for requirement (1), i.e., to be able to operate in an A2AD environment. 
Possible A2AD environment includes the threat of ballistic missiles capable of disabling 
the CVN and potential communication jamming within the environment. Hence, the sub-
requirements to be able to operate within such an environment include: 
1.1 The system shall be capable of operating in a region with high EM 
interference 
1.2 The system shall be protected against single point of failure (e.g., loss 
of mission capability due to loss of CVN) 
The following are the refined requirements for requirement (2), i.e., the system shall help 
to reduce risk to the operation and human life. 
2.1 The system, as a whole, shall be capable of defending against attacks  
2.2 The system shall reduce the loss of human life 
One identified risk of the CVW is that the CVN is a high-value target. Damage to 
the flight deck can disable the CVN’s ability to effectively launch missions. Holistically, 
this vulnerability may be addressed by either dispersing the assets or protecting the 
critical assets.  
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To reduce risk to human life, the solution should, as a whole, be able to defend 
attacks with equal survivability, i.e., dispersing of forces may weaken the amount of 
protection available for the units; however, this should not mean that the system becomes 
more vulnerable. Hence, any proposed solution that aims to disperse the forces should 
also consider how such dispersion could prevent itself from becoming vulnerable. 
The following are the refined requirements for requirement (3), i.e., to maintain 
sufficient mission capabilities: 
3.1  The system shall have sufficient strike capabilities.  
3.2 The system shall have sufficient ISR capabilities. 
3.3 The system shall have sufficient counter-air capabilities. 
As there is a likelihood that further forces may employ small unit size or 
dispersed forces, the overall solution should still provide sufficient mission capability 
through the synergy of the various components of the solution. 
B. OBJECTIVES, MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS, MEASURES OF 
PERFORMANCE 
Interviews conducted with the respective stakeholders enabled the team to 
identify two key objectives for the future naval air wing. The objectives are: 
Achieve favorable war termination 
Minimize BLUE FORCE losses 
The team explored a spectrum of Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) based on the 
two objectives. The discussions and resulting iterations in determining the MOEs enabled 
the team to crystallize the thinking for the DAW and clarify any misconceptions about 
what the future naval air wing should or should not be. Ultimately, this effort helped to 
define the form and function of the future naval air wing’s force structure. 
Table 2 summarizes the Objectives, MOEs and Measures of Performances for the 




Achieve Favorable War Termination 
MOE Strike Power Defensive/Offensive 
Counter Air 
ISR Power 
MOP Asset Availability, Mission Success Rate, Sortie Generation Rate, Weapons 




Minimize BLUE FORCE Losses 
MOE Combat Attrition
MOP Loss-Exchange-Ration (LER), Engagement Range, Probability (Kill | Hit) 
Table 2.  Objectives, MOEs and MOPs. 
1. Objective 1: Achieve favorable war termination
a. Measures of Effectiveness
This objective exposes the need for the future naval air wing to provide the U.S. 
Navy with the capability to bring about a swift and decisive conclusion to any armed 
conflict in an A2AD environment. The future naval air wing shall provide the USN with 
an appropriate level of capabilities while providing improved operational flexibility for 
the Combatant Commanders. 
To enable a focused approach to the effort, the team identified three critical 
missions that should be organic to the future naval air wing. These missions are Strike, 
Defensive and Offensive Counter Air (DCA and OCA), and Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (ISR). These three missions will guide the development of the 
MOEs and consequently the lower-level requirements. 
The team found that there was no single MOE that adequately and elegantly 
elucidated what the future naval air wing should be to realize the objectives. To this end, 
the team developed unique composite MOEs that endeavor to articulate the capability-
measure that the future naval air wing should meet. 
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For the first objective of achieving a favorable war termination, three composite 
MOEs were developed, with their respective definitions: 
Strike Power 
Defensive/Offensive Counter-Air Power 
ISR Power 
 
(1) Strike Power: 
Strike Power = Assets x Payload x Mission Success Rate x Sortie Generation Rate 
This MOE measures how hard, how fast, and how well we can throw a “punch.” 
The “how hard” is measured by the number of assets and the weapons payload. The “how 
fast” is measured by the sortie generation rate. The “how well” is measured by the 
mission success rate. Of interest is how many weapons can successfully be brought to 
bear on targets in a given amount of time. 
 
(2) Defensive/Offensive Counter-Air Power 
Defensive/Offensive Counter Air Power =  
Assets x Relative Combat Power x On-Station Time x Mission Success Rate x Sortie 
Generation Rate 
This MOE measures how hard, how fast and how well the future air wing can 
fight back from an air-to-air perspective. While it is derived largely from a defensive 
viewpoint, this measure can also be applied for Offensive Counter Air. The use of 
Relative Combat Power (RCP) (Bahram 1995) in this MOE underscores the need for the 
future naval air wing to possess a commensurate or better combat capability than the 
current carrier air wing. 
 
(3) ISR Power 
ISR Power = Assets x On-Station Time x Mission Success Rate x Sortie Generation 
Rate 
This MOE measures how far and wide, how well, and how long the future air 
wing can generate and maintain situational awareness, and develop intelligence. 
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b. Measures of Performance
The Measures of Performance (MOP) that are identified for this first objective 
“Achieve favorable war termination” are: 
(1) Asset Availability 
The percentage of assets that is available at any given time. 
Only assets that are combat-capable are to be considered 
available for tasking. Assets under scheduled and corrective 
maintenance are excluded. 
(2) Mission Success Rate 
The percentage of tasking that is successfully carried out by 
the tasked assets. A success mission is one where the 
tasked asset has accomplished all tasked mission 
objectives. 
(3) Sortie Generation Rate 
The number of sorties that a platform can generate for a 
particular type of asset.  
(4) Weapons Payload 
The absolute weapons payload that an asset can carry into 
combat. 
(5) On-station time 
The time that an asset can remain within the area of 
operations or area of interest. It neither includes ingress and 
egress time, nor time for aerial refueling and navigation. 
(6) Relative Combat Power 
Combat power is a cumulative of the combat capability of a 
particular asset, to include its maneuverability, firepower, 
protection, and leadership, the dynamics of combat power, 
in combat against the adversary. When compared against 
another asset, the Relative Combat Power is derived. A 
RCP of 1.0 means that both assets are identical in the 
combat capabilities that each brings to into combat.  
(7) Percentage Target Destroyed 
The percentage of assigned targets that are destroyed after 
each mission.  
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2. Objective 2: Minimize BLUE FORCE losses 
a. Measures of Effectiveness 
This objective expresses the need for the future naval air wing to enable the 
reduction to a minimum, the expected losses that BLUE FORCE will suffer in the event 
of an armed encounter in an A2AD environment. The future naval air wing shall allow 
the Combatant Commanders to have greater flexibility in decision-making and shall be 
more survivable against A2AD threats. 
For the objective of minimizing BLUE FORCE losses, it is determined that a 
single MOE encapsulated the desired capability and performance of the future naval air 
wing. The MOE is Combat Attrition. 
(1) Combat Attrition 
Combat attrition measures the rate at which a side sustains losses to its personnel 
or materiel. The future naval air wing should be strive to be more survivable in an A2AD 
environment, and thus should result in an overall lower combat attrition for the BLUE 
FORCE. 
b. Measures of Performance 
The Measures of Performance (MOP) that are identified for this second objective 
“Minimize BLUE FORCE losses” are: 
(1) Loss-Exchange Ratio 
Loss exchange ratio is a figure of merit in attrition warfare. 
It is usually relevant to a condition or state of war where 
one side depletes the resources of another through attrition. 
This MOP measures the number of RED FORCE kills for 
every BLUE FORCE loss. 	
(2) Engagement Range 
Engagement range measures the distance at which a shot 
can be fired against an adversary. The intent is to have a 
“First Look, First Shot, First Kill” capability against any 
adversary in an A2AD environment. 
(3) Probability (Kill | Hit) 
The probability that an asset will be killed given that it was 
hit. This is the vulnerability of the asset.  
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VII. DAW SOLUTION PART 1: THE DISPERSED AIR WING
CONCEPT 
A. THE DISPERSED AIR WING OPERATIONS CONCEPT 
To improve the survivability of the Distributed Air Wing concept, one potential 
solution is the Dispersed Air Wing. This concept takes the current or near-future Carrier 
Air Wing and/or components of USMC Air Combat Elements and disperses them 
throughout small air bases in allied countries. This solution reduces risk by eliminating 
the possibility that the entire CVW is put out of action as a result of one missile strike 
against the carrier. Dispersing the aircraft also greatly increases the adversary’s targeting 
requirements and the number of missiles required to achieve the same effects. In the 
context of the South China Sea scenario, the prime locations for dispersed basing are the 
Philippines, especially Palawan Island; Northern Malaysian Borneo; and Vietnam.  
1. Concept Description and CONOPS
To determine the requirements, advantages, and challenges of such basing, it is 
important that the concept be described fully. The dispersed air wing would operate out 
of three fundamental base types, outlined below. 
a. Dispersed Hubs
Hubs constitute the largest and most capable of the base types used in the 
dispersed air wing concept, in the form of regional airports that are temporarily 
repurposed to act as air bases, logistics hubs, and maintenance for Carrier Air Wing 
aircraft. The CVN itself is considered a hub under such a construct. As the physically 
largest of the three base types, they also are likely the most vulnerable, so additional 
defensive measures may be considered, to include SAM emplacements, BMD measures 
such as AEGIS ship stationing or Patriot battery deployment, and hardening and shelters 
to protect aircraft, ordinance, and fuel from attack (Stillion and Orletsky, Airbase 
Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks 1999). As 
illustrative examples in the context of the South China Sea scenario, there are several 
 76
obvious choices for hub bases. In the Philippines, potential bases include, but are not 
limited to: 
 San Jose Airport, Mindoro 
 Francisco Reyes Airport, Coron 
 Puerto Princessa Airport, Palawan 
 
b. Tactical Strike Bases 
The Tactical Strike Base (TSB) is a more limited base than the hub. Its primary 
airstrip, as envisioned, is likely no more than a straight stretch of highway, with limited 
ramp space provided for approximately one squadron of aircraft (10-15 at most bases), 
along with around 300–400 support personnel and pilots. Logistics and maintenance 
support is also considerably more limited than at a hub. Each designated base is provided 
with limited hardening and stores to support wartime operations.  
The advantage of such basing lies in the more dispersed nature of such basing. 
Adversary targeting would be complicated by the requirement to determine where such 
basing exists, and whether or not aircraft are currently utilizing it. This minimizes the 
disadvantage of limited defensive measures being provided for each base. Finding and 
identifying potentially suitable areas for the installation of such basing would include 
cooperation with host nations, perhaps to the extent of providing funding for the 
construction of the bases under the guise of developmental aid. Further, host nation air 
forces could be trained to rapidly disperse to the basing in the event of conflict, bolstering 
their ability to withstand attack and defend their airspace in the event of an overwhelming 
attack. 
c. Expeditionary Air Bases 
The smallest and most limited of the three base types, the Expeditionary Air Base 
(EAB) is simply rapidly cleared areas from which U.S. or allied forces could disperse and 
operate STOVL aircraft such as the F-35B (NWDC 2013). These bases would, at most, 
host a full MEU Air Combat Element of aircraft, typically six aircraft, along with roughly 
100 support personnel and pilots. These bases would be selected based on their relative 
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isolation, but with support roads in place to provide logistics. Later in the report, an EAB 
location optimization problem is explored in minimize the risk to such bases.    
Finally, these bases would provide further advantage in the realm of counter-
targeting, as their dispersed nature and relative isolation would make it difficult to locate 
them. This feature could further be enhanced through the use of camouflage techniques 
and strict emissions control while operational. With few aircraft and personnel assigned, 
hardening and defensive coverage would be reduced or eliminated altogether. Additional 
analyses of EAB susceptibility to satellite targeting and vulnerability to ballistic missiles 
are described later in the report. 
2. Advantages and Challenges 
The advantages to the Dispersed Air Wing concept primarily lay in the difficulty 
the concept poses to the adversary in terms of targeting. Compared to a single aircraft 
carrier, a collection of geographically disparate smaller bases, especially if there is 
confusion as to which ones are operational, makes for a far more difficult targeting 
problem. A further advantage lies in the relationship building with host nations that can 
result as the concept is advanced. Working with host nation air forces and cooperating in 
the construction of bases will pay dividends in the event that conflict breaks out. Not only 
will it reinforce the United States’ image as a force for good in the region, it will provide 
tangible benefits to the armed forces of the host nation as well as to U.S. forces operating 
from the bases or in the region. If potential bases are identified in advance, dispersion can 
take place rapidly, helping to reduce risk to force and counter the area denial threat. 
A further advantage lies in the flexibility provided by such a basing construct. Not 
only can these bases be used in time of outright conflict, they can be used leading up to a 
potential conflict to act as a deterrent. The host nation, or the U.S., actively dispersing its 
air forces throughout the region would provide a powerful message to a potential 
adversary as tensions rise. Simply exercising such ability would provide valuable 
messaging as well, and could deter conflict if adversaries are unsure of their ability to 
decisively defeat the U.S. and their allied air forces in order to gain aerial supremacy 
during conflict. 
 78
Simultaneously, the Dispersed Air Wing concept has a number of drawbacks. 
First and foremost, the dispersed nature of the basing would significantly increase the 
difficulty of providing prompt and sustained logistics support in time of conflict. This can 
be partially mitigated through identifying potential bases in advance and pre-staging vital 
equipment, fuel, and ordnance in the host nation prior to the outbreak of conflict, but 
sustained combat would provide a significant logistical challenge.  
Additionally, Dispersed Air Wing basing is vulnerable to political pressure. 
During wargaming, several Red teams attempted to apply political pressure on nations 
hosting Dispersed Air Bases with mixed results. Such measures, if successful, would 
undermine the ability for the U.S. to project power into certain regions. To mitigate this, 
strong partnerships must be forged with nations where the United States intends to utilize 
such a construct.  
Another disadvantage lies in the vulnerability of such bases to attack. While 
larger bases will have defensive capabilities and hardening measures, they are not as well 
defended as a carrier at sea, and lack a significant defensive advantage the carrier 
possesses: mobility. This limited defense can be partially offset by employing measures 
such as camouflage and emissions control, but vulnerability to things such as HUMINT 
or satellite imaging is harder to counter. 
B. EXPEDITIONARY AIR BASE (EAB) PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
1. Background 
The philosophy of protecting a small, dynamic asset like an expeditionary air base 
is different than the protection philosophy of a CVN. For a small sized EAB, defense 
relies mostly on avoiding enemy detection and reducing risk given a hit. An EAB will not 
have active defense systems, which could reduce the likelihood of being hit given 
detection.  
Reducing the likelihood of enemy detection is accomplished by having a small 
footprint for an EAB. The EABs should rely on as many pre-located assets as possible, so 
that the change to the surroundings is not immediately apparent to the non-local 
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population or from satellite imagery. Probability of detection is further reduced by 
frequent redeployments of the EABs based on the expected time to detect by the enemy. 
Reducing damage inflicted by an incoming missile strike (conditioned on 
detection) must be accomplished without significantly increasing the footprint. For that 
reason damage reduction relies mostly on separating the main assets by a sufficient 
distance so that no incoming missile may damage more than a single asset. 
This section focuses on modeling the expected damage to an EAB’s main assets if 
a missile strike was launched against it. 
2. Exact Model: Upper-Bound for the Probability of an Incoming Salvo
Destroying at Least Two Aircraft
a. Model Description
In the worst case, it can be imagined that the enemy will be able to specifically 
target every aircraft in its designated parking location and fire a salvo when all aircraft 
are present. This implies that the planes can be parked far enough apart so that shots at 
any one aircraft do not affect any other aircraft. In that case the probability of a missile 
hitting an aircraft is determined by the distribution of the miss distances. If the miss 
distance is smaller than the lethal radius of the warhead, the aircraft is destroyed. A 
Raleigh Distribution (Kress and Washburn 2009) was assumed for the miss distances 
with parameter equal to the standard deviation of circular normal miss distance of the 
missiles. For this model it is assumed a salvo of 12 missiles is launched against an EAB 
with two missiles aimed at every aircraft. The standard deviation of incoming missiles is 
assumed to be 100 meters. An illustration of the model may be seen in Figure 39.  
 80
 
Figure 39.  Lethal radius and miss distance diagram. 
 
The probability of a missile to hit closer than the lethal radius, destroying the 
aircraft is 




where Rlethal is the lethal radius of the incoming warhead and σ is the standard deviation 
of the miss distance of the missile. 
The lethal radius is decided according to the type of warhead. In this model we 
take into account two types of warheads: a unitary warhead with a lethal radius of 206 ft. 
and a warhead equipped with dispersible bomblets with a total lethal radius of 575 ft. 
(Stillion and Orletsky 1999).  
The model shows that the probability of an aircraft to be hit is the following 
݌୅/େ	୦୧୲ ൌ 1 െ ݌௕௢௧௛	௠௜௦௦௜௟௘௦	௛௜௧௧௜௡௚ ൌ 1 െ ݌௠௜௦௦௜௟௘	௛௜௧௧௜௡௚ଶ . 
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The total number of aircraft hit is Binomial with 6 trials, 1 for each A/C in the 
EAB and the probability found previously:  
#஺/஼	௛௜௧~ܤ݅݊݋݈݉݅ܽሺ6, ݌஺/஼	௛௜௧) 
 The chance of at least two aircraft being destroyed is given by the following 
݌௔௧	௟௘௔௦௧	ଶ	஺/஼	ௗ௘௦௧௥௢௬௘ௗ ൌ 1 െ ܥܦܨ௕௜௡௢௠௜௔௟ሺ6, ݌஺/஼	௛௜௧) 
b. Results
Design  Spacing  Warhead  Prob.  Of  30%  destruction  with  salvo  of  12 
missiles 
Single   >200 m  Unitary  62% 
Single   >300 m  bomblets  >99% 
Table 3.  Upper bound results for Probability of 30% destruction with 12 missiles. 
These results give an upper bound for the actual probability of destruction with a 
salvo of 12 missiles. These results show that if the enemy is able to target individual 
aircraft using a missile with a miss distance significantly smaller than the lethal radius, 
the enemy may be very effective in aircraft destruction on the EAB. It is important to 
note that this does not mean that the EAB is vulnerable to attacks, as even in this case the 
enemy will be forced to allocate significant assets for the destruction of a small and 
temporary asset. 
3. Exact Model: Lower-Bound for the Probability of an Incoming Salvo
Destroying at Least Two Aircraft
a. Model Description
In the best case, it can be imagined that the enemy will not be able to target any 
aircraft specifically, but rather decides to uniformly distribute their shots within their 
perceived area of the EAB. This implies that the enemy will divide the perceived area of 
the EAB into cells that can be destroyed by a single strike. In that case the probability of 
a missile hitting an aircraft is determined by the probability of an aircraft being present in 
a cell that was picked. The result for this model depends on the perceived size of the 
EAB. For this model it was assumed that the enemy believes aircraft in an EAB to be 
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distributed over an area of 1,000,000m2. For that case the number of cells depends on the 
lethal radius of the warhead (206 ft. for unitary warhead and 575 ft. for dispersible 
warhead). An illustration of the model may be seen in Figure 40.  
 
Figure 40.  Area of EAB as perceived by the enemy. 
The number of cells out of which the enemy chooses targets is: 
#௖௘௟௟௦	௜௡	௘௡௘௠௜௘௦	௣௘௥௖௘௜௩௘ௗ	௔௥௘௔	௢௙	ா஺஻ ൌ ܣா஺஻	௔௖௖௢௥ௗ௜௡௚	௧௢	௘௡௘௠௬	௣௘௥௖௘௣௧௜௢௡ܴ௟௘௧௛௔௟ଶ  
Due to the mathematical result of the model, the number of aircraft hit is 
distributed according the hyper-geometric distribution. 
#஺/஼	௛௜௧~	ܪݕ݌݁ݎ݃݁݋݉݁ݐݎ݅ܿሺ#௢௖௖௨௣௜௘ௗ	௖௘௟௟௦, #௖௘௟௟௦, #௠௜௦௦௜௟௘௦ሻ 
 The probability of hitting at least two targets is given by  




Design  EAB area  Warhead  Prob. Of 30% destruction with salvo of 12 missiles 
Single   1,000,000 m squared  Unitary  3% 
Single   1,000,000 m squared  bomblets 67% 
Table 4.  Lower bound results for Probability of 30% destruction with 12 missiles. 
These results give a lower bound for the actual probability of destruction with a 
salvo of 12 missiles. These results show that if the enemy is unable to target any 
individual aircraft, he may be unable to be effective in attacking an EAB. This favorable 
result shows that it is important to make the enemy believe that EABs are as large as 
possible so that the enemy spreads their shots wide. In these results it is again apparent 
that the enemy warheads’ lethal radius has a significant effect on their effectiveness. A 
dispersible warhead with a lethal radius of 575 feet is most likely effective for attacking 
an EAB, unless some form of quickly deployed barricade is used to protect vital assets. 
4. Simulation Model
a. Description
The presented simulation model is a location-based Monte Carlo simulation for 
locating the incoming strikes in a salvo, and comparing it to the layout of an EAB. The 
model requires, as parameters, the layout of an EAB for the blue force, and the missile 
accuracy, targeting accuracy, aim-point selection logic, lethal radius, and salvo size of the 
red force. Results reported are based on 106 independent trials. 
The model can be used to compare different layouts for an EAB to find which 
will require more missiles to achieve a certain effect. It can also be used to study the 
effect of camouflage on the enemy’s ability to strike an EAB, and to assess the risk at the 
EAB from different targeting sources. 
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Assumptions: 
 The aim-points are selected to aim at the highest priority target visible. 
Target priority is aircraft first, maintenance facilities second, and runway 
last. 
 Salvo size is calculated to ensure that the enemy’s probability of a salvo 
destroying at least 30% of the aircraft is over 80%. 
 Lethal radius for unitary warhead is 206 ft. while the lethal radius for a 
warhead containing dispersible bomblets is 575 ft. (Stillion and Orletsky 
1999). 
 Targeting accuracy is based on human visual observation capabilities of an 
EAB from a distance of 3000 meters. The modeling assumption is that 
ground security forces of an EAB will be able to stop any attempts to 
observe the EAB from a distance of 3km or less. 
 In a salvo of missiles, the enemy will fire all rounds in a nine-point square 
pattern around the aim-point, with spacing equal to the lethal radius of a 
single missile. This assumes that the enemy will know that the vital assets 
in an EAB are physically separated, a conservative assumption. If the 
enemy directs all fire towards the same location actual probabilities of hit 
will be lower. 
 All aircraft are in their designated parking during attack. This conservative 
assumption does not take into account any aircraft that may be airborne 
when an incoming attack occurs. 
b. EAB Layout 
Different layouts of an EAB were tested to determine which is better for the 
protection of vital assets. The comparison of the different layouts was performed 
according to two measures of effectiveness: the number of missiles in a salvo required to 
achieve 30% destruction of two aircraft with an 80% chance; and the probability of 
hitting at least two aircraft with a salvo of 10 missiles. 
Two essentially different layouts were tested. The first was a layout design in 
which planes were parked in two rows along the runway, where the distance between the 
rows and the inter-aircraft spacing in the row was varied to give several different layouts 
from the same design. The second design tested was a single row along the runway. The 
inter-aircraft spacing was also varied in this design to result in several actual layouts to be 
tested. The two layout designs are shown in Figure 41. and Figure 42.  
 85
Figure 41.  Two row EAB design.  
In Figure 41 the blue dots mark the parking space for aircraft, the red square 
marks the maintenance facility, and the green line marks the location of the personnel 
trenches and the black rectangle marks the runway. Spacing between aircraft is 225m. In 
the marking are the same but the spacing between aircraft is 115m. 
Figure 42.  Single row EAB design. 
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In Figure 42. the blue dots mark the parking space for aircraft, the red square 
marks the maintenance facility, and the green line marks the location of the personnel 
trenches and the black rectangle marks the runway. Spacing between aircraft is 115m.  
c. Effect of Camouflage
The model was also used for testing the effect of camouflage. This was performed 
by assuming that it was not possible for the enemy to directly target camouflaged assets. 
The enemy’s targeting was based on the following priority: aircraft first, maintenance 
facilities second and runway last.  
d. Effects of Various Enemy Capabilities
Each layout was tested for two cases of enemy missile capabilities, and for two 
cases of enemy targeting capabilities. With regard to missile capabilities a unitary 
warhead was tested along with a warhead of 1lb bomblets. The unitary warheads weigh 
1,100lbs, and have a lethal radius of 206 feet. The sub munition has a 1,100lbs warhead 
containing 825 1lb bomblets, with a total lethal radius of 575 feet.  
5. Results
Table 5. shows the results from this simulation model. 













Single  50 m  Unitary  HUMINT  A/C 3  5  99%  3 
Single  100 m  Unitary  HUMINT  A/C 3  8  89%  4 
Single  150 m  unitary  HUMINT  A/C 3  12  69%  5 
Single  200 m  unitary  HUMINT  A/C 3  22  47%  6 
Double  50 m  unitary  HUMINT  A/C 2  4  >99%  7 
Double  100 m  unitary  HUMINT  A/C 2  6  97%  8 
Double  150 m  unitary  HUMINT  A/C 2  9  87%  9 
Double  200 m  unitary  HUMINT  A/C 2  13  67%  10 
Single  50 m  unitary  HUMINT  Runway  17  53%  11 
Single  100 m  unitary  HUMINT  Runway  26  37%  12 
Single  150 m  unitary  HUMINT  Runway  36  20%  13 
Double  50 m  unitary  HUMINT  Runway  9  84%  14 
Double  100 m  unitary  HUMINT  Runway  7  92%  15 
Double  150 m  unitary  HUMINT  Runway  9  84%  16 
Double  200 m  unitary  HUMINT  Runway  14  64%  17 
Single  200 m  bomblets  HUMINT  A/C 3  3  98%  18 
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Single  300 m  bomblets  HUMINT  A/C 3  10  81%  19 
Double  200 m  bomblets  HUMINT  A/C 2  2  >99%  20 
Double  300 m  bomblets  HUMINT  A/C 2  5  95%  21 
Double  400 m  bomblets  HUMINT  A/C 2  11  76%  22 
Single  200 m  bomblets  HUMINT  Runway  10  80%  23 
Single  300 m  bomblets  HUMINT  Runway  28  56%  24 
Double  200 m  bomblets  HUMINT  Runway  3  >99%  25 
Double  300 m  bomblets  HUMINT  Runway  5  93%  26 
Double  400 m  bomblets  HUMINT  Runway  12  74%  27 
Table 5.  Monte Carlo simulation results for EAB Layout comparison model. 
A summary of these results and derived insights are described in the following 
section. 
6. Model Conclusions
a. EAB More Protected than CVN
The first and most important conclusion that is drawn from this model is that an 
EAB is inherently more secure against incoming missile strikes than a CVN would be, 
even without active defenses. In order to effectively strike an EAB and stop its operations 
the enemy would be forced to launch a salvo with a size on the order of 10 missiles. Even 
then, based on the previous analyses, the number of aircraft that would actually be 
destroyed is likely to be relatively small, that is, between one and six aircraft. It may be 
stated that use of an EAB will force the enemy to expend significantly more than one 
Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) for each aircraft on the ground, even 
considering that every salvo launched will have a valid targeting solution for an active 
EAB. 
b. EAB Design
The results clearly show that single row parking is preferable to parking aircraft in 
a double row, under the assumptions of the model. In addition, it is clear that larger 
spacing between aircraft allows for significant reduction in the amount of damage 
expected from an incoming salvo. These two results make up the EAB design trade-
space, depending on how plausible it is to operate an EAB that spans a larger distance. 
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However, from a protection point of view it is clear that the larger spacing reduces 
damage. 
In order for the spacing to be effective it should be on the order of the lethal 
radius of the enemy warheads. The results shown here are calculated for a given warhead 
size, but can be extended to any arbitrary warhead according to the expected scenario. 
The effects of camouflaging vital assets (aircraft, maintenance facilities and 
personnel) are important as they significantly impair the enemy’s targeting capabilities 
and reduce their damage model to “area fire.” This will become even more important as 
technology evolves, and enemy missile accuracy and targeting accuracy increase. 
The model has not taken into account the reduced lethality of warheads that may 
be achieved by parking aircraft in quickly erected barricades or hardened facilities to 
reduce blast effects. 
c. Ground Defense 
Assuming that targeting solutions of an EAB will be achieved via HUMINT 
sources, ground defense becomes an important aspect of defense against ballistic missile 
strikes. The distance at which an observer stands from the target has a strong effect on the 
accuracy of targeting that he/she may perform. If ground defense increases the distance at 
which observers stand, the accuracy of targeting will be reduced, which can have a 
significant effect on the total damage caused during a missile attack. A more precise 
quantification of this effect will require follow-on analyses. 
C. EAB SUCEPTIBILITY ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
This study focuses on the probability of an EAB being located by enemy’s spy 
satellites. Based on open source information, China currently has 25 satellites operating 
in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), each operates at an altitude ranging from 600km to 1100km, 
and each completes an orbit in approximately 90 minutes (ITPROSTAR 2014). And, it 
has been reported that China is planning to have 50 satellites by 2020 to increase their 
sources of the earth observation data (ITPROSTAR 2014). 
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As these satellites pose a threat to the deployment of the EABs, this study aims to 
assess the probability of locating an EAB as well as factors that change or affect the 
probability. An analytical model is first developed to derive the upper and lower bound of 
the probability of being located based on the satellites’ orbit. Further analysis is then 
carried out through Monte Carlo simulations to assess the effect on the probability due to 
factors such as decoy usage, and EAB deployment duration. Each simulation is 
performed repetitively to determine the probability of being located, which is obtained 
from the proportion of the number of located EABs to the total number of deployed 
EABs.  
2. Analytical Model
The formulation of the model provides a first-hand insight on the EAB’s 
susceptibility. A group of satellites can be configured to work together as a satellite 
constellation. Such configurations coordinates the movement of each satellite, thus 
increasing the ground coverage. Hence, if China has configured or is planning to 
configure (in the future) a satellite constellation, the EABs will run a higher risk of being 
identified.  
This analysis aims to explore the EAB’s susceptibility, i.e., probability of an EAB 
being swept, when faced with a satellite constellation. The analysis shall first establish 
the probability based on the amount of ground covered by an uncoordinated set of 
satellites (i.e., worst case for China – lower bound). And secondly, to evaluate the 
probability based on the ground coverage on a coordinated (i.e., best case for China – 
upper bound) satellite constellation. These bounds shall also be used to validate the 
results obtained from the Simulation model in the next section.  
a. Sweep Width of China’s Satellites
A commercial satellite, LANDSAT 8, has a sweep width of 185 km (operating at 
altitude of ~705km) and is capable of producing imagery in 30m by 30m pixel resolution 
(Satellite Imaging Corporation 2014). The target to identify in this scenario context is an 
F-35B, which is 11m by 16m; therefore China would require imagery of at least a 3m by 
3m pixel resolution to locate the F-35B.  
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As it is extremely conceivable that China will invest a lot in the optics of their 
satellites’ sensors, the target of acquiring such clear imagery will definitely be achieved 
in the near future. Hence, this study assumes that, with the continual technological 
advances and investments, China will be able to develop and operate with satellites’ 
sensors that have a sweep width of 37km and are capable of producing imagery to 
identify the F35-B. 
b. Probability of Sweeping an EAB 
From a study conducted by Naval Research Laboratory, a satellite operating at an 
altitude of 475.30nmi (~880.25km) which completes 14 revolutions each day, requires a 
minimum sweep width of 722.81nmi (~1430km) to be able to scan the entire earth 
(Eisele and Nichols 1976). 
Hence, the proportion of a swept region is equal to the sweep width of a satellite 
divided by the minimum sweep width. And, this proportion is also equal to the 
probability of sweeping an EAB if it is deployed within the sweep region. Based on the 
assumption made for China’s satellite, with a sweep width of 37km, the probability of 
sweeping an EAB is 2.59% (37/1430) per pass. 
(1) Uncoordinated Constellation (China’s Worst Case - Lower Bound). If the 
satellites in a constellation operate in a random or individual fashion, the probability of 
sweeping an EAB in a pass is 2.59%. In the context of this study, if an EAB is deployed 
for a three day period, China’s 25 satellites will have a total of 75 passes during this 
period. Hence, by treating each pass as a Bernoulli trial with probability p of 0.0259, 
based on the Binomial distribution (Hayter 2012). 
	
PሺSweeping	an	EAB	in	a	3	day	periodሻ	ൌ	Proportion	of	Area	Swept	in	3	days	
751 (1 0.0259) 0.86    	
 
Therefore, the lower bound of the probability of sweeping an EAB deployed for a 




(2) Coordinated constellation (China’s Best Case - Upper Bound). It was 
mentioned that a satellite will require a minimum sweep width of 722.81nmi (~1430km) 
to be able to scan the entire earth. Hence, with a sweep width of 37km, if China is able to 
coordinate their constellation in such a way that each satellite covers a unique portion of 
the 722.81nmi wide area, they will be able to sweep the entire area almost twice. 
PሺSweeping	an	EAB	in	a	3	day	periodሻ	ൌ	Proportion	of	Area	Swept	in	3	days	
75 0.0259 1.94   		
Therefore, the upper bound of the probability of sweeping an EAB deployed for a 
3 day period is 1.00. 
In summary, the analysis shows that the EAB has a very high risk of being swept. 
However, it should be noted that the probability of sweeping over the EAB does not 
necessarily guarantee detection. Since in practice, there are imperfect sensors. 
3. Simulation Model Formulation
A simulation model was developed with the objective of assessing the probability 
of being located when the following factors were varied: 
A.  Duration of stay at a specific location. 
B. China’s continual increase of spy satellites in operation 
C. China’s continual improvement in sensor capabilities to improve the 
sweep  width of satellites 
D.  Using “false” EABs as decoys 
a. Entities
This model consists of three entities: the area of conflict, the satellites, and the 
EABs. The characteristics of each entity shall be discussed in the following sections.  
(1) Entity: Area of Conflict (AOC). In the context of this study, the AOC is 
defined as any land area around the South China Sea where an EAB could be positioned. 
In this model, the AOC is divided into 356 by 333 grids, where each grid has an area of 
7.4km by 7.4km. 
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(2) Entity: EABs. Each EAB can be randomly positioned into each of these 
grids divided in the AOC. A number of 20 EABs is assumed for each simulation unless 
stated otherwise. 
(3) Entity: Satellites. This model assumes that China has a total of 25 spy 
satellites capable of producing imagery that aids in locating an EAB. And as mentioned 
earlier this model assumes that all China’s satellites have a sweep width of 37km. 
 Azimuth of Satellite Path
The azimuth of the satellite path is deduced from the movement of a Chinese 
satellite across the AOC. The azimuth is calculated via the use of samples of the 
satellite’s coordinates. It is approximated to be 12.48o, 167.52o, 192.48o or 347.52o (0o 
towards true north in the clockwise direction) depending on its AOC entry position. In 
this model, the collection of satellite paths is limited to an azimuth of 77.52o or 192.48o. 
As the area which is swept by a path with 167.52o and 192.48o is similar to the areas with 
347.52o and 12.48o, that limitation simplifies the model. And due to the pre-defined size 
of each grid (7.4km by 7.4km) in the model’s AOC, the azimuth is further adjusted to 
168.7o and 191.3o to simplify the process of determining the grids that the satellite will 
sweep. See Figure 43 and Figure 44 for the azimuth of satellite path.  
 Number of Passes across AOC
As mentioned earlier, each satellite is assumed to have three passes of the AOC 
per day. 
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Figure 43.  Azimuth of satellite path (map and Directions of Arrows are not drawn to scale).
In summary, the following characteristics of China’s spy satellites are assumed 
for all simulations unless stated otherwise: 
 Sweep width: 37km
 Probability of sweeping AOC in each revolution: Sweep width divided by
722.81nmi (~1430km).
 Number of revolutions of each satellite per day: 14
 Number of passes per region per satellite per day: 3
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b. Simulation Implementation 
The Monte Carlo simulation was developed using a statistical computing tool, R 
(R Core Team 2013). Each run randomly replicates the deployment of the EABs and 
movement of the satellites. Each run is designed to model three days’ worth of EAB 
deployment. 
(1) Deployment of EAB. The deployment of the EABs is first conducted by 
generating random values to assume the grid location of the EABs in the AOC.  
(2) Movement of Satellite. For the three passes assumed for each satellite, a 
grid position was generated as the AOC entry position of the satellite. The path of the 
satellite was then formed based on the AOC entry position, the azimuth of the path, and 
the satellite’s sweep width. Any EABs that falls within the path was considered swept. 
 
Figure 44.  Illustration of a satellite path with Azimuth of 78.7o. 
 95
4. Simulation Results
This section discusses the results of the four analyses that were conducted using 
the simulation model. 
a. Analysis A: Various Duration of Stay at a Specific Location
This simulation aimed to analyze the effect of an extended stay of an EAB at a 
specific location. As such, the duration of stay was varied between one and six days. 
Figure 45.  Effect of extended EAB stay in a location on probability of being swept, i.e., 
observed 
The effect of the increase in the duration of stay at each EAB is shown in the 
Figure 45. It can be clearly seen that the longer the duration of the stay, the higher the 
probability of being located. A huge jump (~25%) in the probability is observed when an 
EAB extends its stay from day 1 to day 2. Hence, the result of this analysis highlights the 
importance of reducing the duration of stay. If the deployment is extended for a long 
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period, it will be necessary to employ deceptive operations such as “decoy EABs” and 
level of activity fluctuations at each EAB. 
b. Analysis B: China’s Continual Increase of Spy Satellites in Operation 
This simulation aimed to analyze what affect the threat of China’s continual 
increase of satellites has on the deployment of EABs. As such, the number of satellites 
was varied between 10 to 24 satellites.  
 
Figure 46.  Effect of China’s continual increase of spy satellites in operation. 
The effect of the increase in the number of satellite sensors is shown in Figure 46.  
In the context of improving the probability of identifying EABs, it can be seen that the 
return on investment of putting more satellites into space is significant. A heavy 
investment of a two-fold increase in numbers results in a significant increase of 10% for 
the probability of sweeping an EAB. Hence, if China is able to achieve their strategic 
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goal of having 50 satellites in space (Pangburn 2014) the EABs run a higher risk of being 
identified. 
c. Analysis C: China’s Continual Improvement in Sensor Capabilities to
Improve the Sweep Width of Satellites
This simulation aimed to analyze the effect of China’s continual improvement in 
their satellite’s sensor capabilities on the deployment of EABs. As such, the magnitude of 
the satellite’s sweep width is varied between 7.4km to 74km. 
Figure 47.  Effect of China’s continual improvement in satellite sensor capabilities. 
The effect of the increase in the capability of satellite sensors is shown in Figure 
47. As the sweep width of the satellite becomes higher, it corresponds to a higher
probability of locating an EAB. From the plot, a sweep width of 30km corresponds to a 
probability of 80%. Depending on sensor technology advancements, if China is able to 
produce a satellite which has a sweep width of 50km capable of producing 3m by 3m 
pixel imagery, they will be able to identify an EAB within three days.  
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As this study assumes that China’s satellites have a sweep width of 37km, it may 
contrast with their actual capability. Hence, it may be necessary to perform a study to 
evaluate the actual capability of their satellite sensors. 
d. Analysis D: Using “false” EABs as Decoys 
This simulation aimed to analyze the effects of using “False EABs” as decoys. 
The ratio of “False EABs” is varied in the simulation from 0.0 to 0.6 of the total number 
of EABs in operation.  
 
Figure 48.  Effects of using “False EABs” as decoys 
The effect of using “False EABs” as decoys is shown in Figure 48.  From the plot, 
it can be deduced that for each 10% increase in the proportion of “False” to “True” 
EABs, it reduces the chances of locating a “True EAB” by 10%. 
The results highlight the importance of introducing “False EABs” as decoys as it 
can significantly reduce the probability of a “True EAB” being swept. In addition, the 
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identification of a “False EAB” may also lead to time-consuming efforts by China to 
further confirm the EAB’s existence, or further, a wasted salvo against a non-existent 
EAB. 
5. Conclusion
This study does raise some concerns with regards to the susceptibility of EABs. 
Based on the analysis, the EABs could be located by China’s current strength of satellites 
within a few days. And, their continual investment of putting up more satellites into space 
would further improve the surveillance of the conflict area. However, the study did show 
that the use of decoy operations could reduce the probability of an operational EAB being 
located. Hence, strategies such as decoy operations, camouflaging methods, and 
fluctuating levels of activities should be further evaluated for feasibility to enhance the 
concept of EAB deployment. 
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VIII. DAW SOLUTION PART 2: THE SEA SCOUT CONCEPT
A. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Sea Scout chapter outlines the analytic process that started with a Naval Air 
Warfare Center concept known as Sea Vex and resulted in the SEA 20B re-design and 
renaming of that concept. After the SE process determined the high level functions and 
requirements for providing naval air capability in an advanced A2AD environment, the 
team determined that it was necessary to reengineer the Sea Vex design to better fit into 
the architecture of the overall naval air force structure. The goal of the redesign was to 
maintain the advantages of the original design while addressing its challenges in a 
manner that would allow for an IOC around the 2025–2030 timeframe. 
Sea Scout is a system designed to meet the requirement of distributing airborne 
ISR, Land Strike and Surface Strike capabilities throughout the Fleet. It comprises two 
main elements – a small UAS courier ship and embarked airborne platforms – that offer 
these three primary warfighting capabilities. 
The UAS courier vessel, also known as CVE, is about 1/3rd the size of CVN and 
requires only 16% of the CVN/CVW crew to man, has a speed of up to 50 knots, and is 
coupled with point defense capabilities and soft kill measures (Levine et al. 2013). 
Sea Scout provides ISR capability, in the proposed construction, via an airborne 
asset such as the A160 Hummingbird, a rotary wing autonomous UAS. Among the full 
spectrum of ISR missions, use of the Hummingbird also provides the fleet with surface 
early warning and over-the-horizon targeting capabilities that enable extended range anti-
ship cruise missiles and land attack missiles to reach their full capability in dynamic 
targeting scenarios. Its capability is far superior to any platform of its type and weight 
class boasting a 222 knots maximum speed, 2,500+ nm range, 20+ hour endurance, 2,500 
lbs. payload capacity and full complement of integrated sensors. 
Strike capability is designed into Sea Scout with the utilization of current and 
emerging state of the art cruise missile technology via the Tactical Tomahawk Land 
Attack Missile (TLAM) and the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). These 
platforms are integrated into the system by the use of 14 Mk 57 next generation Vertical 
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Launch Systems. With the Mk 57, Sea Scout brings a tailored mixture of up to 56 strike 
missiles to the fight. 
Whether attached to a SAG or CSG, Sea Scout delivers critical distributed 
capabilities wherever and whenever the fleet needs them the most. 
B. CONCEPT BACKGROUND (SEA VEX) 
At a very early point in the project timeline a solution alternative known as Sea 
Vex was presented to the team for further analysis by the Naval Air Warfare Center as a 
viable way of projecting and distributing naval air power across the fleet. Sea Vex is a 
system-of-systems concept comprising two types of platforms, the first being a small 
escort-sized UAS carrier (CVE-X or CVE) and a compliment system of various UAS 
platforms that would launch and recover from the CVE. The UASs carried onboard 
would be capable of executing a variety of missions currently accomplished by today’s 
manned CVW assets representing distributed air wing capabilities. The primary goals of 
the concept are to reduce the acquisition and operating costs associated with current naval 
air systems, reduce the risks of operating in an A2AD environment, and maintain most or 
all of the CVW’s current mission capabilities. 
The 2013 Fall Quarter Total Ship’s Systems Engineering (TSSE) class at the 
Naval Postgraduate School designed a specific platform for the CVE which will be 
referenced from here forward in regard to the ship design (Levine et al. 2013). Compared 
to a CVN, a CVE is a much smaller and has a less ambiguous visual signature and radar 
cross section. The TSSE design requirements state that the vessel will be 320 feet long 
and 90 feet wide, about one-third the size of a CVN (Levine et al. 2013). Also, it will 
displace ~4000 tons compared to today’s Nimitz class CVN which displaces ~100,000 
tons (Levine et al. 2013). 
The CVE is also designed to be faster than today’s CVN. With its catamaran style 
hull, the TSSE report predicts that it could reach speeds as fast as 50 knots, compared to 
the CVN’s published 30+ knots (U.S. Navy 2014) (Levine et al. 2013). Given both the 
CVE’s small size and speed, when combined with the appropriate sensors and 
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countermeasures, the risk of being targeted by A2AD threats such as ASBMs and 
submarines could be greatly reduced. 
Figure 49.  CVE launching embarked UAS assets (from Levine et al. 2013). 
The CVE platform design is also significantly cheaper than the traditional 
CVN/CVW to build and man. From the TSSE analysis, it was estimated that the cost of 
the CVE, including its air component, would be about $710M (FY14), which would be 
about 1/8th the cost of a Nimitz Class CVN without its air wing (Levine et al. 2013). The 
design calls for a crew complement of 40 personnel with an additional 60 members to 
manage the UAS systems (Levine et al. 2013). For the acquisition cost of a single CVN, 
eight CVEs could be purchased with a total manning requirement of 800 personnel versus 
the 5000+ personnel required to man the current CVW/CVN system. That is about 16% 
of today’s CVN/CVW manning. This reduced manning coupled with the smaller size and 
increased agility of the vessel could significantly reduce risk in regard to the loss of 
human life and assets in the A2AD environment. 
In regard to the Sea Vex concept’s unmanned air wing, the concept calls for the 
use of small scale UASs to represent capabilities currently filled by manned platforms 
within the traditional CVW. These UAS platforms would be modified BQM target drones 
that would be configured to perform a wide range of naval air missions while launching 
 104
and recovering from the CVE platform. See Table 6. The baseline vision includes the 
following missions (Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Dvision 2013): 
 Fleet Scout/Reconnaissance 
 Electronic Support Measures 
 Electronic Warfare 
 Decoy 
 Precision Strike 
 Communications/Network Relay 
 Fleet Air Defense 
 Fleet Training 
 
Use of these small and inexpensive BQM air vehicles could potentially provide an 
economic means of distributing naval air capability across a Surface Action Group or 
Carrier Strike Group in the absence of or in concert with traditional CVW assets. 
 
Table 6.  BQM platforms considered for Sea Vex (from Levine et al. 2013). 
The Sea Vex concept provides advantages beyond just size, cost and speed. 
Another important advantage to Sea Vex is the idea of distributing naval air capabilities. 
Multiple CVE platforms dispersed throughout the maritime environment would provide 
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the fleet with access to air power over a much wider swath of the battle space by 
attaching air capability directly to Surface Action Groups, Surface Flotillas, Amphibious 
Ready Groups, Marine Expeditionary Units and even Carrier Strike Groups. By 
accomplishing this, naval assets would no longer be constrained to staying within range 
of the CVW when air capability is required to complete the mission. With a dedicated 
CVE platform assigned to the group, air capability is always on station wherever and 
whenever it is needed. Distribution also adds to tactical flexibility as the number of CVE 
platforms could be tailored to the situation by adding or subtracting vessels from a group 
to adjust for combat capacity.  
As a direct result of the distributed capabilities of the Sea Vex concept, another 
important advantage that it brings to the table is the physical dispersion of assets across 
the battle space. As mentioned in the problem statement discussion, the present method 
of placing an entire CVW on a single CVN is problematic as it allows for a single-point-
failure in regard to the naval air wing. However, naval air capabilities brought to the fight 
by a squadron of CVE platforms dispersed across the fleet would be significantly more 
difficult to for the enemy to detect, identify, target and neutralize. 
C. SEA VEX CHALLENGES 
While there are certainly many advantages that the Sea Vex concept brings to the 
solution space, the team also noted several challenges that needed to be considered. 
Sea Vex calls for large levels of autonomy in both ship and UAS operations; 
however, heavy reliance on autonomy in system design also poses significant risk. This is 
because effective autonomous technology in regard to both shipboard and UAS 
operations is still a long way from being perfected. For example, during the autonomy 
discussion several team members cited the case of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), which 
is heavily debated and studied throughout NPS. The ship was required to operate with a 
crew of 40 sailors by relying on a significant amount of autonomy designed into the 
system to meet this manning requirement. Today, shortcomings in autonomous 
technology have resulted in additional manning requirements requirement (Fellman 
2012).  
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 For example, the original 40 crew concept of LCS left significant operational 
gaps (Fellman 2012). Considering the lessons of LCS, the team consensus was that 
reliance on heavy automation should not be a major design consideration unless that 
technology has been developed and demonstrated in the operational environment (TRL 7 
or higher). 
The team also considered the present maturity level of UAS platforms as a total 
system in regard to the wide spectrum of naval air mission sets, and it was determined 
that overall UAS technology is fairly immature in this respect. A general observation, 
given an unclassified survey of current UASs in the U.S. military performed by the team, 
highlighted that today’s operational UASs do not represent a very significant amount of 
capacity and capability when compared to manned assets. Other than ISR and small 
volume Strike and Decoy capabilities, the survey could not find reference to UASs that 
successfully provide a significant capacity of other critical capabilities to include 
Offensive and Defensive Counter Air, Airborne Electronic Warfare, Airborne Anti-
Submarine Warfare, Anti-Mine Warfare, Airborne Early-Warning, or myriads of other 
capabilities currently covered by manned assets. Also, the ISR and Strike UAS platforms 
that are operational today have not been proven in a non-permissive environment where 
survivability is a key attribute. 
Given the relative immaturity of UAS technology and the short time in which the 
system needs to be operational (2025–2035 time frame), the team concluded that the 
initial installment of the Sea Vex concept would be very limited in the capacity and 
capability it could provide to the fleet. 
While the reduced size and tonnage of the CVE design is advantageous in regard 
to cost, speed, and probability of being targeted, the associated space-limitations present 
significant challenges to the amount of air capability that can be carried onboard the 
CVE. Its small dimensions restrict both the size and number of aircraft that can be stored 
and operated on a single vessel. This restriction is significant because, it was noted during 
the UAS survey, that greater capability and capacity generally requires larger sized air 






Length Range Endurance Payload 
Capabilities 
STRIKE AIR ISR 
RQ‐2A Pioneer 
(IHS Jane's 2010) 17’ 1” (5.2 m) 13’ 1” (4.00 m) 100 nm 5 hrs.  none  X 
MQ‐8A/B Fire Scout 




35’ (10.67 m) 41’ 8” (12.7 m) 324 nm 14 hrs.  700 lbs.  X  X 
BQM‐74E (NAVAIR 2005) 5’ 9” (1.76 m) 12’ 11” (3.94 m) 350 nm 1 hrs.  80 lbs. 
BQM‐177 
(Levine et al. 2013) 7’ (2.13m) 17’ (5.18m) 500 nm 1.9 hrs.  200 lbs. 
Scan Eagle 
(IHS Jane's 2014) 10’ 2” (3.11 m) 5’ 7” (1.71m) 62 nm  24 hrs.  none  X 




12.9’ (3.93m) 23’ (7.01m) 350  1.9 hrs.  90 lbs. 
MQ‐9 Reaper 
(IHS Jane's 2013)  65’ 7” (20 m)  36’ 1” (11 m)  4,600 nm 32 hrs.  3,000 lbs.  X  X 
MQ‐1 Predator 
(US Air Force 2014)  48’ 8” (14.8 m)  27’ (8.22 m)  675 nm 24 hrs.  1,000 lbs.  X  X 
X‐47B UCAS‐D 
(IHS Jane's 2014)  62’ (19 m)  38’ (12 m)  2,100 nm NA  4,500 lbs.  X  X 
RQ‐170 Sentinel 
(IHS Jane's 2014)  66’ (20 m)  14’ 9” (4.50 m) NA  NA  NA  X 
RQ‐4 Triton Global Hawk 
(IHS Jane's 2014)  130.9’ (39.8 m)  47.6’ (14.5 m)  8,700 nm 28 hrs.  3,000 lbs.  X  X 
Table 7.  Selected survey conducted of current UAS platforms employed by the U.S. 
military. 
Consider a comparison of the BQM-177A to the MQ-9 Reaper. The BQM-177A 
has a length of 17ft and a wingspan of 7ft which allows the baseline CVE to easily 
accommodate up to 60–70 platforms (Levine et al. 2013). The BQM-177A has a range of 
500nm, endurance of 1.25hrs and an external payload capacity of 200lbs (Levine et al. 
2013). The MQ-9 Reaper, on the other hand, has a significantly increased capability with 
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a range of 4,600nm, endurance of 32hrs, and an external payload capacity of 3,000lbs 
(IHS Jane's 2013). However, the MQ-9’s size is also significantly larger with a length of 
over 36ft and wingspan of over 65ft (IHS Jane's 2013). Only one asset could fit across the 
90ft width of the CVE flight-deck and it would only take six to fill up its 230ft x 90ft 
storage deck (Levine et al. 2013). 
 
Another challenge to the Sea Vex concept is the reliance on wireless networks for 
UAS control. These networks are susceptible to electronic warfare such as jamming, 
spoofing, and hacking. A recent example of a state-of-the-art UAS system being captured 
by non-friendly state actors was when the RQ-170 drone was taken down while flying 
over Iran on 04 December 2011. It is speculated that Iranian agents were able to conduct 
an “electronic ambush” to jam the communications and GPS of the drone (Owano 2011). 
Wireless communications and navigation are susceptible to external forces and would 
require redundant communications and navigation systems to reduce the risk of external 
tampering. 
Finally, the team determined that the reliance on waterborne-recovery of 
unmanned air vehicles, as part of the CVE CONOP set forth by the TSSE team, could 
present significant issues in a high-paced operational environment. A thorough analysis 
was conducted on this method as outlined below. 
D. WATERBORNE-RECOVERY ANALYSIS OF BQM-TYPE UAVS 
The CVE vessel is designed to launch UASs from four catapults on the front end 
of the vessel (Levine et al. 2013). Once the UAV mission is complete, the UAVs are 
designed to return to the ship conducting a water-landing in the vicinity of the ship. A 
helicopter or smaller surface vessel then recovers the UAV from the water and delivers it 
back to the CVE (Levine et al. 2013). Using waterborne recovery methods as a normal 
means to recover unmanned airborne assets is time consuming and could force the CVE 
to linger in a hostile threat environment. To explore waterborne recovery further, the 
team created a Monte Carlo simulation model. 
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a. Approach
A scenario was modeled in which multiple UASs return to the CVE after a 
mission and land in the water at a recovery point near the ship for retrieval. Each UAS 
landing event was treated as a random event, independent of any other factors in 
conjunction with the model. The team assumed a Circular Error Probability (CEP) and 
applied it in the random calculations of each UAS landing. CEP represents a radius from 
a target point where exactly half of the landings fall inside and half fall outside. The team 
used the simulated landing dispersal to determine how much area that the CVE would 
need to search in order to ensure the retrieval of 100% of the UASs dispersed around a 
landing point. Given the size of the search projected by the model, an estimate of the time 
it takes for the CVE to conduct a search and recovery of all the UASs was generated. 
b. Assumptions
BQM-type airframes typically recover via flying to a recovery point, either over 
land or water, and employ a parachute for the final descent to land. A former BQM 
operator stated that the recovery could be done consistently within the first 1500 feet of a 
runway or about 0.25nm on an average day, about 0.125nm in terms of CEP. Given the 
parachute descent method, this accuracy varies based primarily on the wind speeds 
(Subject Matter Expert 2014). 
In estimating the CEP for BQM recovery, the team considered the 0.25nm landing 
threshold and included plausible sources of dispersion that might affect the CEP given an 
operational maritime environment. First, it was assumed that GPS would not be reliable 
in the vicinity of the CVE vessel due to GPS denial tactics within an A2AD environment 
which would result in increased landing dispersion. It was also assumed that recovery 
would not be immediate and that the BQMs would spend a significant amount of time 
subject to environmental conditions such as wind and sea currents. From these 
environmental and operational assumptions, the team assumed doubling the CEP of 
0.125nm to 0.25nm was reasonable. 
For search and recovery, it was assumed that while the CVE travels along the 
search pattern path it will be able to see and recover BQMs within 0.25nm on either side 
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via a smaller surface vessel. It was also assumed that on average the recovery of a single 
vehicle would take about 30 minutes, although it has been reported that recovery time is 
highly variable and may take as few as 15 minutes or as long as 1.5 hours (Subject Matter 
Expert 2014). And finally, the time of this evolution includes launching the smaller 
recovery vessel, connecting to, towing and hauling the UAS back aboard the CVE vessel.  
c. Model
A bivariate normal distribution was used to model 1,000 UAS landing events to 
determine the furthest probable extent of the area that a CVE would need to search during 
recovery operations. This then determined the size of the search area and subsequent 
travel distance that the CVE had to travel during search and recovery operations. The 
simulation results indicated that the search would need to be conducted in a 1.5nm x 
1.5nm box, and that the CVE would have to travel a total distance of 7.5nm in order to 
search the entire area as seen in Figure 50. 
Figure 50.  Simulation results for 1,000 landing events with a 0.25 nm CEP. 
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With the size of the search area determined, the recovery calculation was done 
assuming two different search speeds, five knots and 10 knots. The teamed looked at the 
recovery times required to gather three, four, and six UASs. These sets of UASs were 
multiplied by the estimated recovery time of 30 minutes for each UAS; and then the 
product of this (time to pick up all the UASs) was then added to the time for the CVE to 
travel the total search track which was 1.5hrs. 
The results of the calculations from the 0.25nm CEP model are 
summarized below in Table 8.  
# of Assets 
3 4 6 
Average recovery time 
(hrs) for each asset 
Speed 
(kts) 
5 3hrs 3.5hrs 4.5hrs 0.85 
10 2.25hrs 2.75hrs 3.75hrs 0.67 
Table 8.  0.25nm CEP recovery times for all UAS assets. 
d. Implications
The results of the model imply that there is a significant amount of time that 
needs to be devoted to the recovery of UASs given waterborne-recovery methods. 
Recognizing that this does not include the time required for turnaround maintenance 
including maintenance inspections, saltwater rinsing, refueling, and reloading the UAS 
for another mission, these additional evolutions would easily add at least another 0.75 to 
one hour to the overall turnaround time of a vehicle. 
Considering the results, the team has concluded that recovering aircraft via a 
waterborne recovery CONOP is not feasible in a high-tempo operational environment. 
Operating in this manner would prohibit the CVE from conducting efficient cyclic 
operations thus reducing critical sortie generation capability. It would also require the 
platform to remain in a small search area at very slow speeds for extended amounts of 
time during combat operations which is tactically infeasible. Therefore, it was concluded 
that use of the BQMs should be limited to single-use/one-way missions only. 
 112
E. SEA SCOUT DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
Considering all of the advantages and disadvantages, the team’s initial assessment 
was that the Sea Vex, as a high level concept, was a plausible alternative to consider 
going forward with. The concept could provide a cheaper more survivable naval air force 
structure that would lead to greater operational flexibility. However, key challenges 
needed to be addressed in the high level design of the system. Going forward with Sea 
Vex, the team focused its efforts on developing a design that would try to address the 
concept challenges while maintaining all of its advantages. 
In order to stay on timeline and meet an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 
the 2025–2035 timeframe, the team developed the following design strategy. 
 Develop the concept within an evolutionary acquisition strategy. This
allows for priority capabilities to make it to the fleet in a timely manner by
focusing on proven technology first and developing follow-on
technologies in future increments.
 Concentrate efforts on developing a limited amount of naval air capability
in the first increment rather than spreading resources thin to capture the
capability of an entire CVW in the first iteration.
 Utilize to the maximum extent possible COTS/MOTS technology. This
will help save in R&D expenses by leveraging current technologies that
have been vetted through operational use as well as lower schedule risk by
utilizing known and proven technologies.
 Design the UAS systems to do one or two missions exceptionally well
versus designing a multi-role platform that marginally performs across
several mission areas.
Considering the design strategy outlined above and keeping in line with the 
missions outlined in the project scoping statement, the team considered the development 
of four separate UAS mission sets: Surface Strike, Land Strike, Decoys and ISR. These 
mission sets allowed for the leverage of COTS/MOTS vehicles and high technology 
maturity level UAS technologies. Also, Strike and ISR relevance falls in line with the 
recommendations from the Air-Sea Battle report which highlights the importance of 
developing a robust ISR and Strike capability in order to deter aggressive acts from an 
enemy state (Tol et al. 2010). The team excluded the OCA and DCA mission sets from 
UAS design consideration for the Sea Vex concept due to the low maturity level of these 
 113
types of platforms, lack of current COTS/MOTS systems, and the large airframes likely 
required to provide effective capability. 
The overall goal of this Sea Scout concept design, which is what it will be called 
from here on out, was to quickly field the initial capabilities, and deliver the additional 
capabilities in increments as UAS technology rapidly matures. 
1. Scoping Considerations
Given the broad scope of alternatives considered in developing the Distributed 
Air Wing solution, it was necessary to determine to what depth the team could design and 
analyze the Sea Scout concept. The Sea Scout scoping kept in line with the study plus the 
following additional items that are delineated below. 
a. CVE and UAS Platform Design Scope
In regard to the CVE platform, the design presented by the TSSE class project 
was utilized. Therefore, most aspects of the CVE design were considered out of scope. 
Certain aspects of the CVE design were brought into scope in cases where 
reconfiguration was deemed necessary to improve UAS air wing operations from the 
vessel. In this regard, slight modifications are recommended for the CVE design in 
relation to launch and recovery operations as well as deck space and storage space 
considerations. Otherwise, the overall size and general design of the hull and 
superstructure were not changed. 
For UAS platforms, the study considered all avenues of the systems’ design and 
functions to be in scope including UAS platform design, UAS mission CONOPS, as well 
as the design and CONOPS of the CVE launch and recovery apparatus. 
b. UAS Mission Design Scope
The team initially considered every mission in the baseline Sea Vex concept 
mission-list as well as several missions outside of the list; however, given the desire to 
develop a concept that could be employed within years and not decades, it was 
determined that minimizing and prioritizing the capability of the first increment was 
prudent. As previously mentioned, the team concluded that making the UAS mission 
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design scope too broad would immediately place the potential acquisition program at 
high risk by spreading already sparse funding and resources over several complex 
technologies, therefore placing cost, schedule, and performance goals at risk. 
F. SEA SCOUT ISR MISSION 
In considering UAS capabilities and mission sets to employ from the Sea Scout 
concept, the ISR mission is at the forefront of possible alternatives because the mission 
provides military value on several levels. First, there is a vast amount of prior research 
and development already done that can be leveraged in the refinement of UAS 
technology. Therefore, the ability to use these commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
technologies and systems can drastically reduce the total acquisition cost of ISR mission-
centric vehicles acquired by the naval services. 
Second, ISR capability is extremely valuable and necessary to the fleet across all 
levels of warfare. On the strategic level, the UAS can be leveraged to provide persistent 
presence in a nonthreatening non-lethal manner. On both the strategic and operational 
level, ISR capability provides commanders with crucial information in regard to enemy 
movement and operations throughout the battle space. In an operational context 
specifically, the mobility of the UAS is especially valuable with the collection of 
information in a time-sensitive dynamic environment. Considering the tactical level, ISR 
configured UAS platforms can additionally provide for over-the-horizon (OTH) target 
detection, identification, and weapons grade positioning to cue OTH weapons systems. 
Focusing further on the tactical level, the utilization of the ISR UAS as an early-
warning and OTH targeting platform is of specific interest to the Navy in a war-at-sea 
context as it can provide surface-to-surface offensive and defensive functions. That said, 
the ISR mission presents a significant demand to the CVE magazine of assets in that, 
while operating in a combat environment, a constant and persistent presence is required 
along the threat sector to ensure target detection, identification and cueing. ISR assets 
used in this manner would have to remain airborne around the clock in order to ensure 
that the threat sector is covered. 
 115
Given that CVE has a finite amount of space with an initial concept threshold of 
about 60 BQM-74E Chukar-sized air vehicles, the primary purpose of the below analysis 
is to identify the number of ISR platforms required aboard the CVE to accomplish the 
OTH detection/targeting mission. The secondary purpose is to determine threshold values 
for the UAS technical parameters of speed, range, and endurance. Having an 
understanding of how much space is left after housing ISR platforms allows functional 
design teams to understand the capacity left for other UAS capabilities, and 
understanding the speed, range and endurance requirements will help understand the 
types of UAS platforms that can be considered for employment from CVE. 
A third purpose of this analysis is to gain insights that help shape Sea Scout 
requirements and concept of operation (CONOP) within the context of not only UAS ISR 
platforms, but also Sea Scout as a system-of-systems. 
1. Scenario
The exploration of Sea Scout ISR-capable UASs was done through a vignette 
within the U.S. and China Spratly Islands conflict scenario. The scenario involves a war-
at-sea between the United States where U.S. forces are tasked with denying Chinese 
military vessels access to the Spratly Islands. 
A single Sea Scout unit is attached to a Surface Action Group (SAG) to provide 
early-warning and surface-to-surface target identification and missile cueing. The SAG 
consists of four Aegis missile destroyers located about 130nm due West of Puerto 
Princessa, Palawan. The U.S. and PRC are engaged in full conflict and the rules of 
engagement allow for engagement of any vessel with a positive hostile identification. 
Given the abundance of merchant traffic in the area, positive hostile identification is met 
when the class and precise position of a vessel can be identified and correlated through a 
combination of any of the following sensors; optical, electro-optical, radar or forward 
looking infrared. The U.S. SAG has been ordered to maintain control of its present water 
space and engage any enemy contact that comes within range from its position off the 
shore of Palawan.  
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Intelligence has received indications that a PRC SAG containing an undisclosed 
number and type of vessels is steaming from a threat bearing of 360 degrees true. Based 
on further intelligence estimates and the time since last known position, the Composite 
Warfare Commander has defined a threat sector that covers a 90 degree arc from 315 
degrees true, clockwise to 045 degrees true. 
2. Concept of Operations 
When considering ASCM employment from a surface vessel, the lack of an 
organic means to positively identify and provide over-the-horizon cueing is currently a 
gap that can potentially be filled by utilization of ISR-configured UASs.  
The general concept of operations involves sending UAS vehicles equipped with 
sensors down range at a far enough distance to detect and identify enemy surface 
combatants prior to these combatants reaching their maximum weapons release range (a 
key assumption is that Blue forces have an anti-surface missile with maximum effective 
range greater than the adversary). Given a detection and positive identification, the UAS 
would then send precise targeting coordinates through a data link back to a missile launch 
platform. After the missile is launched, the UAS would continue to provide midcourse 
updates until the target is detected by the missile’s seeker head. 
The concept UAS is designed for the single purpose of detecting, identifying and 
relaying targeting information. It does not provide a means for weapons carry and 
delivery. Once deployed, the UAS is not utilized for secondary ISR missions, but 
maintains its primary mission function until recovered. It requires at least three UAS 
platforms to cover a search sector: one UAS on station performing the search, one UAS 
en route to relieve the current searcher and one UAS in a maintenance turnaround state 
onboard CVE. This assumes that the recovery and turnaround maintenance cycle can be 
done efficiently enough to allow the first UAS to relieve the third and thus continue the 
cycle indefinitely. 
After being launched from the CVE platform, the UAS intercepts a maximum 
range flight profile. This profile begins with a maximum performance climb to cruising 
altitude. Once at cruise altitude, the throttle is set to achieve maximum range airspeed. 
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Next, the UAS performs fuel conserving minimum throttle descent to its search altitude 
between 8000ft AGL and 100ft AGL (depending on weather). 
At the search distance, the UAS turns to place itself on a path perpendicular to the 
outbound path and conducts a back and forth barrier search at max endurance air speed. 
During the barrier search, a cookie-cutter shaped detection threshold is applied to 
the radar sensor. If a new contact pierces the cookie-cutter circle by virtue of its path or 
the UAS’s path, the UAS veers from its course and flies to within identification range of 
its optical sensors. Visual identification information is acquired and transmitted back to 
the UAS controller who identifies the vessel and declares it as friendly, hostile or 
unknown.  
The sensors onboard consist of airborne sea search radar for detection and a 
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) targeting sensor capable of both visible and infrared 
sensing for target identification. Again, target identification is done through human-in-
the-loop visual identification, but could be done by autonomous platform recognition 
through an onboard threat library in future systems. 
With a hostile declaration, the coordinates are made available through a data link 
to the fire control computer onboard the missile platform and provides initial coordinates 
for a firing solution. After the missile is launched, it receives updates from the UAS via 
data link until the missile seeker-head detects and correlates the target. 
Figure 51.   Visual depiction of ISR CONOP. 
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3. Analysis of BQM-74E Chukar III in the ISR CONOP 
The baseline Sea Vex concept is designed around the utilization of the BQM-74E 
Chukar III as the primary UAS payload. Therefore, initial assessment was done to 
determine the feasibility of using the Chukar III for the Sea Scout ISR mission. The main 
assumption in using the Chukar III is that its 80lbs payload capability is utilized to 
support the array of ISR sensors (NAVAIR, PMA 208: Aerial Target and Decoy 
Systems). 
A flight profile was calculated with data and methods from the BQM-74E 
NATOPS flight manual. The flight profile consisted of a maximum performance climb to 
20,000ft MSL, level flight at max range cruise speed, followed by a descent to 4,000ft 
AGL for ISR operations. At the completion of ISR operations, the flight profile was 
repeated from climb to descent for recovery. It was calculated that the Chukar can drive 
out to a range of 100nm and remain on station long enough to do no more than three 
20nm legs before having to recover (which equates to roughly 15 minutes time on 
station) (NAVAIR 2005). 
This short range and time on-station makes the Chukar III infeasible for the 
mission on two accounts. First, assuming a 20min outbound flight, a 15min on-station 
time, a 20min return flight and a very optimistic 60min turnaround time, it would take 
seven additional vehicles launched at 15 minute intervals to continuously cover one 30nm 
search sector (20nm legs and a 10nm sensor reach with overlap). For a 90 degree threat 
sector with a 100nm radius, a total of five search sectors would be needed for a total of 
40 air vehicles. Now, consider that the Chukar III utilizes a waterborne recovery method 
which is fairly time consuming. When recovery operations begin, five Chukars will need 
to be recovered from the water and returned to the CVE platform for turnaround 
maintenance every 15 minutes. 
Second, the maximum radius of 100nm is insufficient considering threats that 
currently exist. For instance, take into account the SS-N-27B SIZZLER, a Russian 
surface-to-surface missile widely proliferated and utilized by potential threat nations. 
With the SIZZLER’s published maximum range of 300km (~160nm) and conventional 
Blue force defensive doctrine of targeting launcher platforms well outside of the threat’s 
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maximum range, a search radius of at least 180nm to 200nm is required (IHS Jane's 
2012). 
Taking into account the above analysis, the study did not specifically model the 
BQM-74E for the Sea Scout ISR mission and proceeded forward by modeling notional 
platforms to explore speed, range, endurance, search patterns and what effects these 
parameters had on probability of detection. 
4. MANA Discrete Event Simulation of the ISR CONOP
The modeling tool Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) was utilized to 
explore probability of detection of UAS platforms conducting a barrier search in 
accordance with the above CONOP. MANA is a stochastic, discrete event simulation, 
agent-based cellular automata model with a wide range of functions that allows the very 
specific modeling of individual agent behavior. It was designed to be applied to a wide 
range of military applications and allows for the modeling of individual agent and squad 
behavior, weapons configurations, sensor configurations and situational awareness 
communications (McIntosh et al. 2007). 
While the potential for MANA to intricately model behaviors is fairly broad, there 
were four different modeling attributes that made the program desirable for analyzing this 
particular ISR barrier search CONOP.  
First, MANA provides the capability to model several different entities that can 
operate both individually and in squads. This allowed for the creation of the various types 
of vessels needed for the scenario which includes enemy and allied surface combatants, 
neutral shipping surface vessels and UAS searcher vehicles. 
Another important attribute is the ability to model sensors. MANA specifically 
allows for both detection and identification ranges which enables the modeling of both 
UAS sensors required in the barrier search CONOP; surface search radars (detect) and 
optical sensors (identify). 
The third important attribute is the ability to model communication links where 
entities can provide situational awareness to other entities. This feature allowed for the 
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over-the-horizon targeting aspect of the CONOP to be modeled with the UAS platforms 
transmitting situational awareness data back to the shooter platform. 
Finally, MANA is capable of modeling weapons which is critical in combat 
models. Specifically, the probability of hit (Phit) can be modeled to include a decreased 
probability of hit with increased range. 
 
Figure 52.  MANA screen shot depicting barrier search model. 
a. MANA UAS ISR Searcher Mission: Modeling Specifics 
The MANA model within this study was built to focus on and explore the search 
and identification aspect of the ISR barrier search UAS CONOP and does not incorporate 
cueing to a missile shooter (this facet of the CONOP will be explored in future versions 
of the model). The aim of the ISR barrier search model is to identify the best combination 
of UAS numbers, barrier search leg lengths, and search speeds to serve as a basis for 
requirements’ thresholds. The later model will build upon the ISR model and add the 
surface shooter element with weapons exchanges between the two surface forces. 
The MANA search and identification model utilizes four separate entities. The 
first type of entity, are the UAS searcher entities that are distributed along a range arc 
within a 90 degree threat sector. The barrier search path is essentially a chord drawn 
between two points on the arc, and its length is determined by dividing the arc equally 
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among the number of searchers. The searcher flies back and forth between two waypoints 
that intersect the arc. Search endpoints are spaced 10nm between UAS searcher search 
paths to allow for overlap of UAS sensor identification range to ensure no gaps between 
searchers. While conducting its search, if a UAS detects a contact, it can veer up to ~5nm 
off of course to attempt identification. When a contact is made, the entity slows to half of 
its search speed to account for maneuvering and orbiting that would be required to 
visually identify a target in a real world mission. Once an entity is identified or the target 
moves out of contact range, the searcher returns to its normal search speed and continues 
on a straight path towards its waypoint until it comes into contact with another unknown 
contact. 
Figure 53.  Depiction of six searcher path configuration. 
The second entity is a single unit that marks the CVE position. The CVE unit is 
merely a place-marker to give a visual reference as to where the UAS searchers would 
originate from as well as the threat sector origin. 
The third entity in the search and identification model is a single Red unit. On 
each run, the Red unit starts randomly between the end points of the 90 degree arc just 
outside of the search range. From its starting position, it makes a pure pursuit course 
towards the CVE platform. In other words, the red unit does not attempt a flanking 
maneuver to bypass the barrier search. 
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The fourth and final entity type, are the merchant shipping vessels which appear 
and maneuver randomly at a density of ten vessels per 100nm x 100nm section of water 
space. These entities represent “white shipping” that can be identified optically at 
detection range as a warship-sized contact. There are no entities that represent small 
skiffs or fishing vessels. The assumption here is that, at radar contact range, optical 
resolution is good enough to distinguish between a small fishing vessel and a warship-
sized vessel. However, a closer approach is needed to tell for certain whether a 
warship-sized vessel is actually a warship. Figure 54 depicts the search and 
identification model entities and their basic layout. 
Figure 54.  Depiction of basic MANA model layout (three searcher configuration without 
traffic). 
b. MANA Modeling Assumptions
Below is a summary of the assumptions of the barrier search model:  
 A single UAS model entity represents the multiple platforms required to
continuously support a search sector.
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 The model does not explicitly model the launch and recovery of multiple
UAS vehicles.
 Sensors have a detection range of 15nm and an identification range of
7nm.
 Entities will veer off of course up to ~5nm to prosecute a contact. If
veering off course does not bring the contact into identification range, the
entity will continue on to its waypoint. This was necessary in MANA to
keep a searcher entity from veering excessively off course when randomly
placed vessels were spaced close together.
 Line-of-sight communications between searcher and shooter platforms are
maintained throughout the search.
 Detection is 100% accurate.
 Identification is 100% accurate.
 An actual enemy SAG would have several ships; however, a single enemy
vessel was used in the model for the purpose of easily quantifying and
comparing the MANA model data to the analytic barrier search model.
 Enemy combatants travel at 20kts to remain inconspicuous in their
approach.
 Searcher platforms reduce speed to 50% of their search speed when in
contact with a surface contact until it is identified.
 The threat sector search radius is 200nm in order to give a 40nm buffer
zone prior to the SIZZLER’s 160nm maximum launch range.
c. Design of Experiment
In barrier search theory, barrier lengths and the speeds of both the searcher and 
targets are independent variables. Therefore, the design of experiment varies the number 
of UASs, which determines the barrier lengths and the searcher speeds. The searcher 
speeds ranged from 300kts, representative of jet-powered UASs, to 50kts which 
represents speeds of smaller scale propeller-driven vehicles. Target speed was fixed at 
20kts in accordance with the assumption above. A third aspect of the design compared 
searches with traffic and without traffic to determine if there would be a significant 
difference in detection when the searcher is interrupted along its search path while 
identifying the merchant vessels. The specific parameters used in the design of 









Table 9.  Design of Experiment summary. 
The model was replicated 100 times for each case. As suspected, higher search 
speeds and shorter search legs resulted in practically assured detection. Across all 
“Number-of-Searcher categories,” a speed of 150kts and above resulted in a Pd of .99 or 
better. In the six and four searcher categories, speeds as low as 100kts attained a Pd of .98 
or better. 
Shipping traffic did not greatly affect Pd given short search legs and speeds above 
100kts as seen in the case of six-searcher and four-searcher models.  
In the six-searcher model, where Pd falls off from 1.0, there is only a .03 
difference in Pd between the Traffic and No Traffic cases. Given a 95% confidence 
interval of .81 – .94 for No Traffic; and .77 – .91 with Traffic, there is no significant 
difference in regard to the six-searcher model. 
 
Figure 55.  Six-searcher traffic/no traffic comparison. 
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In the four-searcher model, there is a .04 difference between the Traffic and No 
Traffic cases. With 95% confidence intervals of .64 – .81 for the No Traffic case; and 
.60 – .78 for the Traffic case, there is no significant difference. For these calculations, the 
Agresti-Coull score confidence interval method for Binomial Confidence intervals was 
utilized for all CIs (Agresti and Coull 1998). 
Figure 56.  Four-searcher traffic/no traffic comparison. 
In the three-searcher model, only the 50kt searcher speed case shows a significant 
difference between No Traffic and Traffic cases; with a No Traffic 95% confidence 
interval of .52 - .70 and a Traffic confidence interval of .30 - .49. 
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Figure 57.  Three-searcher traffic/no traffic comparison. 
Given the above comparisons, it can be concluded that, within the constraints of 
this model, shipping traffic only makes a significant difference when search speed is slow 
(below 100kts) and search legs are long (over 70nm).  
Since having three searchers is the most advantageous in regard to space and 
resources aboard the CVE platform, confidence intervals were used to compare search 
speed results of the three-searcher model to determine a design threshold for 
speed. Figure 58 depicts this comparison. 
Figure 58.  Three-searcher case comparison of Pd. 
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With the desire to have assured detection, an acceptable threshold for the searcher 
UAS in regard to speed would be the slowest search speed that assures detection. 
Allowing the slowest search speeds to be considered gives a wider range of solution 
alternatives by including the possibility of using both jet and propeller air vehicles. This 
threshold essentially marks the no-lower-than point where speed can be traded for range 
and endurance in the use of propulsion methods other than jet engines. 
From Figure 58. it can be seen that 135kts is where assured detection begins to 
drop off, although with overlapping confidence intervals to either side. Moving further to 
the left, 125kts and 100kts both have confidence intervals outside of the 150kts data 
point. Therefore, based on this model, the speed threshold should be set at the very 
minimum to 135kts. 
5. Search Theory Analytic Model
Probability of detection can be fairly easily calculated with an analytic barrier 
search model from search theory. The equation below was utilized to provide a back-of 
the-envelope calculation to compare with the stochastic MANA model. It does not 
account for the searcher veering off path or slowing its speed in order to identify a 
contact. 
Figure 59. and accompanying equations represent an approach to deriving the 
barrier search equation from a target stationary perspective as presented by Professor 
James Eagle of the Naval Postgraduate School which was adapted from A.R. 
Washburn, Search and Detection, 4th Ed., Institute of Operations Research and the 
Management Sciences, 2002, Section 1.3 (Eagle 2013). 
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Figure 59.  Barrier search geometry (from Eagle 2013). 
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Since the CONOP applies identical searches across a straight line in each sector 
and the entire arc is covered by the searchers, the probability of detection across a single 
search path is equal to the probability of detection across the entire arc. In this case, the 
numerator and denominator are both multiplied by the number of searchers. 
The above calculation was applied to each No Traffic test case. The sensor was 
given a radius of 10nm vice 15nm to account for the behavior in MANA that requires a 
target to have a closest point of approach of ~10nm from its search path before the 
searcher will veer away from its course and identify the target.  
Probability of detection calculation results are presented below with percent 
differences. The barrier search equation was entered as the accepted value for the 
calculation. A negative value signifies that the MANA result gives a lower value than the 
analytic equation. A positive value signifies that the MANA result gives a higher value. 
3 Searcher  300kts  200kts 150kts  135kts 125kts 100kts  50kts
MANA  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 0.98 0.86  0.61
Equation  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 0.93  0.49
% Dif.  0  0 0  0 ‐.02 ‐0.08  0.24
Table 10.  Pd % differences between three searcher models. 
4 Searcher  300kts 200kts 135kts  100kts 50kts 
MANA  1.00 1.00 1.00  0.99 0.73 
Equation  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 0.67 
% Dif.  0 0 0  ‐0.01 0.09 
Table 11.  Pd % differences between four searcher models. 
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6 Searcher  300kts 200kts  100kts 50kts 
MANA  1.00 1.00  1.00 0.87 
Equation  1.00 1.00  1.00 0.49 
% Dif.  0 0  0 0.77 
 
Table 12.  Pd % differences between six searcher models. 
The analytic search theory calculation proved to be slightly more optimistic than 
the MANA values in the 100kts to 135kts range. Perhaps one reason is the behavior 
exhibited in MANA where a searcher is pulled off of its path and slows to investigate the 
target, especially if the identification of the target in the MANA model requires the 
searcher to veer too far off course. Therefore, on rare occasion, there would be a drop of 
contact as the searcher continues along the waypoint. 
At the 50kts test point the opposite occurred. MANA presented more optimistic 
numbers, and in the case of the six-searcher model shows a 77% difference between the 
analytic and stochastic models. It was unclear why this result may have happened and 
will require further investigation. While there is disparity between the models at the 
slower search speeds, both models suggest that 135kts or better is a safe lower bound for 
assured detection. 
6. Implications from Both Models 
Based on both previous analysis models, the BQM-74E is not a viable alternative 
for use as an ISR UAS platform in the Sea Scout concept during the South China Sea 
Scenario. It has neither the range nor endurance to effectively search at a range that 
would allow for the targeting of a surface-to-surface threat prior to reaching its maximum 
range of employment. Even if its range were significantly extended, the waterborne 
recovery aspect of the vehicle prevents it from being viable for cyclic operations. 
A three-searcher CONOP is the most desirable as it eases support requirements 
and allows a larger number of vehicles in the CVE magazine to be utilized in missions 
other than ISR. Using this CONOP also allows for a speed design threshold as low as  
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135 kts, which opens up the use of other-than-jet options such as tilt-rotor, rotary-wing, 
and propeller-driven air vehicles.  
In the case of rotary-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft, these platforms were thoroughly 
examined to explore the benefits of their capability to launch and recover without the use 
of catapults, arresting gear and waterborne methods. It was determined that utilization of 
these types of vehicles negate the costly requirement of installing catapults on a CVE and 
save the time, money and manpower required in the waterborne recovery method of the 
baseline concept. By eliminating catapults from the ship design the overall acquisition 
cost would be decreased by $318M (FY14) (Levine et al. 2013). 
Considering the results of this study, the following recommendations are 
submitted for consideration in the requirements for the Sea Scout ISR platform. 
 Utilize a search speed threshold (i.e., minimum) of 135kts
 Utilize a search CONOP of three sectors covering 90 degrees, with a
radius of 200nm, and 90nm perpendicular legs.
Based on this CONOP, the threshold for range and endurance should allow for a 
launch, recovery and turnaround cycle utilizing no more than three vehicles per search 
sector, i.e., one vehicle on-station, one airborne to relieve and one undergoing turnaround 
maintenance. Assuming recovery and turnaround takes no longer than 1.5 hours, a relief 
would be launched every 2.25 hour, take 1.5 hours to transit outbound, remain on station 
for 2.25 hours, and take another 1.5 hours to return to base. This equates to a range 
threshold of 710nm and an endurance threshold of 5.25 hours. The time schedule in Table 
13 outlines this concept in detail for three air vehicles over one cycle. 
 132
Schedule (Hrs.) 
   AC1  AC2  AC3 
Launch  0 2.25 4.50
Arrive Cap  1.50 3.75 6.00
Leave Cap  3.75 6.00 8.25
Land  5.25 7.50 9.75







Table 13.  Summary of cyclic time schedule. 
 
7. ISR UAS Platform Selection 
Given the above analysis, the team focused UAS design efforts on exploring 
various Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) capable options that might fit the ISR 
searcher threshold values. The current inventory of U.S. operational VTOL UAS 
platforms is quite small compared to fixed winged vehicles, so the scope was expanded to 
include designs outside of the United States inventory. The VTOL UAS market survey is 
summarized below in Table 14. and represents the most capable systems found during the 
























Model  NRUAV  Skeldar V‐200  ATRO-X Eagle Eye  Fire Scout (MQ‐8B)  Hummingbird 




rotary diameter  6.20m (20 ft.)  9.6 ft. (2.9 m)  27.50 ft. (8.4 m)  6 ft. 
Height  2.97 m  4.3 ft. (1.3 m)  2.1 m (6.8 ft.)  ~ 5.8 ft. (1.74 m)  9.71 ft. (2.9 m)  9.71 ft. 
Max. Takeoff 








Weight  220 kg  88 lbs. (40 kg)  120 kg (264 lbs.)  200 lbs. (90 kg)  600 lbs.  2,500 lbs. 





Endurance  6 hrs.  6 hrs.  > 2.5+ hrs.  ~ 4 hrs.  8+ hrs.  20+ hrs. (@15,000 ft.) 
Max. Speed  100 kts  140 km/h/75 kts  200 km/h (124 mph)  210 kts  135+ kts  222 kts 































Table 14.  VTOL market survey summary. 
In the survey, the Boeing A160 Hummingbird was the only alternative that met 
every threshold value determined by the ISR CONOP analysis in terms of range, speed 
and endurance. Not only did it meet thresholds; it greatly exceeded them. That said, there 
are risks associated with the design, as the platform is technically still a developmental 
system. Also, it should be acknowledged that the technology has had its challenges, 
which have been exacerbated by cuts in the U.S. defense budget as outlined in the 
platform summary below. However, considering its capability potential, the significant 
amount of development invested to date, and the timeline in which the system has to 
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come online, the team concluded that it was the most plausible airframe to utilize for the 
Sea Scout system’s fielding timeframe goal of 2025–2035. 
a. A160 Hummingbird 
The A160 Hummingbird began development in 1998 by the Frontier Aircraft 
Company, and became a Boeing project after the company was purchased in May 2004 
(Golightly 2004). The design was based on DARPA requirements for a low observability, 
rotary-winged surveillance UAV, with flight endurance up to 48 hours (IHS Jane's 2013). 
The aircraft underwent several years of technological development and flight testing with 
significant achievements in capability to include an 18 hour, 41 minute and 28 second 
continuous flight in May 2008, which at that time was deemed a world record for an 
autonomously controlled vehicle in its size-class (IHS Jane's 2013). By 2009 the platform 
had achieved significant enough capability to gain the interest of U.S. Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM). IHS Jane’s sources report that SOCOM began the process to 
acquire 10 airframes in October 2009, and a year later Boeing funded the production of 
21 A160 airframes (IHS Jane's 2013). 
Between 2010 and 2012 the platform underwent substantial developmental and 
operational testing with SOCOM and the U.S. Army (IHS Jane's 2013). The Marine 
Corps also considered the platform in its Cargo Unmanned Aerial System program where 
the platform successfully autonomously delivered two sling loads of 1,250lbs in two 
150nm round trips, meeting all program thresholds (McHale 2010). The Marine Corps 
passed on the Hummingbird likely in favor of the competing system Lockheed Martin’s 
K-Max, which has a 3.5ton single payload capacity (Roach 2011). (Note: The K-Max 
was not considered for Sea Vex due to its large size.) 
Significant development of the platform continued within the U.S. military until 
April of 2012 when a single platform crashed while undergoing a flight test in 
Victorville, California. It was the third crash over the two-year time frame. Two months 
later, the U.S. Army issued a “stop work” notice (IHS Jane's 2013), and in December of 
2012 the program was discontinued when budget constraints forced the U.S. Army to 
abandon the pursuit of a rotary-winged UAV (Magnuson 2012). 
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As of February 2013, IHS Jane’s reports that Boeing continues to promote the 
Hummingbird (IHS Jane's 2013), and it is still marketed on the official Boeing website at 
the time of this report (Boeing 2014). It is unclear whether or not SOCOM still utilizes 
the platform. 
In spite of the program’s recent hiatus, the platform has developed a significant 
amount of mission capability to include ISR, Direct Attack, Communications Relay and 
Precision Resupply applications. A summary of key operational attributes are 
summarized below (IHS Jane's 2013): 
 Autonomous operation.
 Various EO/IR Sensor integration schemes
 Foliage penetrating Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Tracking and
Engagement Radar integration (FORESTER)
 Vehicle Dismount and Exploitation Radar (VADER)




 Up to eight x Hellfire-type air-to-surface missiles
Figure 60.  A160 Hummingbird (from Boeing n.d.). 
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8. ISR UAS Platform Integrations with CVE
A spatial analysis was conducted in regard to the feasibility of embarking the 
A160 Hummingbird aboard the TSSE CVE ship design. It was determined that 
accommodating the UAS platform within the vessel only required slight modification 
to the original design as seen in Figure 61 and described further below. 
Figure 61.  TSSE CVE deck layout (from Levine et al. 2013). 
To accommodate the Hummingbird’s dimensions, elevators would need to be 
enlarged on Level One, Main Deck, and First Deck. A dimension of 40 ft. x 40 ft. would 
allow for either two vehicles with rotors folded, or one vehicle with rotors configured for 
flight to fit on each elevator.  
Level One would need to be reconfigured as an open bay design similar to the 
hangar deck of an aircraft carrier. It was determined that this deck could easily hold 15 
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vehicles with the rotors folded and still have plenty of space for maintenance and 
movement. 
Figure 62.  Old vs. New Hangar Deck configuration (from Levine et al. 2013). 
The Main Deck or Forward Flight Deck would also require some minor 
modifications. In the original design, the area immediately underneath the super structure 
is cluttered with several refueling stations and racks to accommodate BQMs. To 
accommodate Hummingbirds, the space would again need to be opened up in the same 
manner as the hangar deck by removing the racks and placing refueling points against the 
port and starboard bulkheads. This reconfiguration would allow for two landing spots in 




Figure 63.  Old vs. New Main Deck configuration (from Levine et al. 2013). 
Extending elevators up to the First Deck would allow UAS launch and recovery 
to be conducted from the helicopter deck as well allowing up to three Hummingbirds to 
launch and/or recover simultaneously. 
The team assessed that this reconfiguration allows for enough space to embark at 
least 21 Hummingbirds aboard CVE and still have enough room to conduct maintenance 
operations and allow for system growth. Considering the ISR CONOP, this amount of 
aircraft would provide 180 degrees of coverage out to 200+ nm. 
G. SEA SCOUT STRIKE AND DECOY MISSIONS 
Traditional CVW assets bring a tremendous amount of Strike capability into the 
Commander’s battle plan due to their significant payloads and ability to generate a high 
volume of sorties. Therefore, if a CVW is denied access into a theater, a substantial 
amount of the Combatant Commander’s strike power is cut off. The Sea Vex concept 
presents an opportunity to ensure that a significant amount of strike capability can 
operate under the A2AD umbrella and service these targets when traditional assets are 
denied the ability. 
The idea of developing a UAS for use as a decoy was considered in tandem with 
the strike mission because their use is envisioned as a way to increase the effectiveness of 
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the Strike platforms. There are two manners in which this effect might be accomplished. 
First, the decoys could serve in a military deception tactic. An example of using them in 
this manner would be to feint an attack from single or multiple directions in order to 
disguise the actual direction of the incoming strike package. The other way that decoys 
could be used is to employ them in concert with Strike assets in a way that saturates 
enemy defenses and increases the likelihood that the Strike assets will reach their 
intended targets unscathed. In this study, the latter was explored with quantitative 
analysis. 
1. Strike and Decoy Platform Consideration
In regard to the type of Strike platform to utilize onboard the CVE, the team 
considered two CONOPS. The first CONOP involved the utilization of a reusable 
platform that could launch from the CVE, carry a payload of ordnance, acquire the target, 
deliver its ordnance, and recover back aboard the CVE. The other concept that was 
considered involved utilizing a single-use disposable platform where the air vehicle 
would launch from CVE on a one-way mission. 
In exploring the reusable-vehicle CONOP, the team first considered BQM 
platforms, but immediately discarded them as a viable option for the same reasons they 
were discarded from the ISR mission. Their range, endurance, limited payload capability, 
and waterborne-recovery constraint made their use infeasible. However, BQM platforms 
were kept in consideration to be utilized as one-way Strike platforms. 
Next, COTS/MOTS systems were considered. Several fixed-wing vehicles 
showed promise in terms of capability. However, significant Strike capability was by and 
large attributed to large airframe designs, which is not conducive to the limited space 
onboard a CVE. Also, their utilization would require major redesign of the CVE to 
accommodate recovery operations. In addition to taking up precious space onboard the 
CVE, fixed-wing vehicles would also require adding some type of arresting system 
resulting in the need to expand the length of the ship. The team surmised that if the CVE 
design was increased in size to accommodate these larger fixed-wing platforms, it would 
quickly grow to the size of a CVL and fail to preserve the advantages of cost and overall 
size. 
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The team again turned to the VTOL designs to capitalize on their small launch 
and recovery footprint. In this class of vehicles, the MQ-8 Fire Scout and 





















Table 15.  Capability Comparison of COTS VTOL UAS platforms. 
While VTOL aircraft can fit the ISR mission very readily, their use as a Strike 
asset appeared to be limited. Fire Scout did show promise as a plausible candidate given 
its proven capability in the maritime operational environment; however, its payload 
capacity is fairly low at 600 lbs. Also, the Fire Scout has a very limited combat radius of 
110nm. This short range would require the CVE to drive well into the weapons ranges of 
both surface and land targets which is tactically infeasible. 
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In regard to the A160 Hummingbird platform, the team determined that it had a 
significant enough range, endurance, and payload capability to be considered for the 
Strike mission. However, in comparison to jet and rocket powered alternatives, its 
maximum speed of 225 knots sacrifices valuable transit time along with the ability to 
quickly put ordnance on time-sensitive targets. Their consideration for the Strike mission 
was tabled as the team moved on to explore one-way Strike vehicle CONOPS and 
platforms. 
As mentioned earlier, BQM-type air vehicles were considered as plausible options 
for use as Strike platforms in a one-way mission CONOP. However, the team determined 
that a considerable amount of reengineering would be needed to apply kinetic capability 
to the platform. At a minimum, it would need to be fitted with a warhead and fusing 
system. The BQM platform could use its current GPS navigation system for terminal 
guidance; however, if the platform were to be utilized against mobile targets such as 
naval vessels or land vehicles, it would also require developing some type of seeker-head. 
Considering the current unit cost of BQM platforms, which is between $340K and $890K 
(Levine et al. 2013), the cost of modifying them to deliver kinetics would likely push the 
unit cost into the price range of sea-launched missile systems that already exist such as 
the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) which costs between $751K (FY14) and 
$1.54M (FY14) depending on the variant (U.S. Navy 2014) (National Priorities Project 
2013). At this point, it was determined that modification of the BQM into a Strike 
platform was not a viable option. However, the team noted that the BQM design is very 
well suited for the decoy mission and decided to utilize the platform if decoys proved 
useful in the analysis. 
Attention was next directed to sea-launched attack missiles to explore the 
feasibility of their use to fill the Strike role in the Sea Scout concept. The team 
immediately considered two missile systems; the TLAM and the Long Range Anti-ship 
Missile (LRASM).  
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Figure 64.  Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (from Raytheon 2014). 
TLAM is a well-developed Strike missile system that has been used in the Navy 
onboard naval surface vessels and submarines for decades. There are several variants in 
existence today that are able to employ a1000lbs High Explosive or Combined Effects 
warhead against targets up to 1,500nm away (U.S. Navy 2014). The latest generation 
TLAM has a significant amount of UAS-type network capabilities that allow the missile 
to communicate with and use targeting data from other platforms (Naval Air Systems 
Command 2014). Additional capabilities include in flight re-targeting, ability to loiter for 
emerging targets, and onboard cameras that can provide battle damage assessments 
(Naval Air Systems Command 2014). While current versions do not have a moving target 
capability, improvements are currently being developed to allow for land and sea moving 
targets (Raytheon 2014). Advanced Anti-Radiation capability is also being considered for 
future blocks (U.S. Navy 2012). Overall, the team assessed that TLAM, due to its 
significant capabilities, small size, and operational maturity, would make an exceptional 
Strike platform to integrate into the Sea Scout concept. 
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Figure 65.  Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (from Defense Industry Daily 2014). 
LRASM is a missile system that is currently being developed by DARPA for the 
U.S. Navy as a stop-gap measure to replace the insufficiently ranged Harpoon missile 
(Majumdar 2014). It leverages the design of the currently operational Joint Air-to-Surface 
Standoff Missile (JASSM) employed by U.S. fighter aircraft since 2009 (Mabbett 2013). 
LRASM will build on JASSM’s 230+nm range and low observability by adding 
capabilities specifically tailored to the Surface Strike mission. These capabilities include 
data-link updates, a sea skimming terminal profile, and the ability to autonomously 
acquire and identify moving surface targets through onboard target recognition 
algorithms (Mabbett 2013). The system is designed to be compatible with the Mk-41 
Vertical Launching System (VLS) and successfully demonstrated the ability to launch 
from a VLS in January 2014 (Lockheed Martin 2014). To date, the system has 
demonstrated that it can successfully detect, engage and hit a moving surface target 
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 2013). LRASM is transitioning from 
concept demonstration to the developmental phase in FY14 and aims to be operational by 
2018 (Osborn 2014). This timeline allows sufficient time for LRASM to be successfully 
integrated into the initial installment of the Sea Scout system. 
All things considered, the team concluded that the implementation of both 
missiles, LRASM for Surface Strike, and TLAM for Land Strike, presented the most 
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logical options to provide a capable, cost-effective and expedient airborne Strike 
capability to the Sea Scout system. The VLS proved to be the integrating factor that 
allows for both platforms to easily fold into the Sea Scout concept. 
A spatial analysis was again conducted on the CVE layout to determine where 
VLS systems could be placed, how many would fit, and whether the reconfiguration 
could be done without affecting Hummingbird operations. 
Due to the catamaran hull utilized in the CVE design, it was determined that VLS 
systems would have to be positioned towards the outboard of the vessel to accommodate 
their height of 26 feet. Since fuel cells are located in the aft catamarans, the only location 
they could fit would be in the forward catamarans. In regard to vertical placement, the top 
of the VLS would lie flush with the Main Deck with the remainder of the structure 
extending below through the Hangar Deck and into the Second Deck. Due to the 
overhanging superstructure, the VLS canisters would only be able to run forward to aft 
for a length of ~100 feet. This would limit the amount of VLSs onboard the CVE to 
seven; four cell canisters on each side for a total missile capacity of 56 missiles. While 
the addition of VLS canisters would take up some additional space, the team assessed 
that they would not significantly affect the embarkation or operations of the A130 
Hummingbird platform onboard the CVE. Figure 66. depicts the redesigned layout of the 
CVE Main Deck and Hangar Deck. 
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Figure 66.  CVE deck layout with VLS canisters. 
2. Surface Strike and Decoy Analysis 
With the selection of the LRASM as the Surface Strike platform for the system, 
an analysis was conducted to determine what effect the additional assets would have in a 
surface exchange when employed within a Surface Action Group or Flotilla concept. The 
analysis also explored the use of mixing BQM decoys into the salvo to determine if their 
employment was a viable low-cost way to saturate enemy defensive systems and increase 
the expected number of mission-kills. 
a. Model Scenario Vignette 
The model was constructed within the context of the South China Sea scenario. 
The vignette begins when a Hummingbird detects, identifies, and relays that it has 
discovered a group of Red enemy surface combatants approaching the Blue SAG from a 
bearing of 030 degrees at 194nm. Among the information sent is also the number and 
classes of warships identified, area images, and coordinates for the current center-point of 
the formation as well as its last speed and heading. The Tactical Action Officer (TAO) 
utilizes the imagery to confirm the hostile assessment of the system’s onboard target 
identification algorithms. The targets are then correlated and declared hostile via the 
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Aegis fire control system and the Hummingbird is directed to establish an orbit 50nm 
South-southwest of the enemy group. 
Next, targeting information is uploaded into LRASMs aboard the various vessels 
within the SAG including the Sea Scout CVE. A coordinated salvo of missiles and 
decoys is volleyed toward the enemy combatants to achieve a precise time on top. 
The enemy detects the inbound salvo and applies both area and point defense 
systems to the incoming bogeys. Unable to sort actual missiles from decoys, the area 
defense systems attempt to target as many inbounds as possible. While some of the 
bogeys are successfully targeted, the sheer number is beyond the capacity of the system 
and several make it through. 
The LRASMs that get through the area defense open their seekers and begin to 
identify and lock onto targets. BQMs that survive continue on. Without precise final 
guidance measures, they do not get close enough to the combatants to be engaged by 
point defense systems. 
The enemy’s Close in Weapons Systems (CIWSs) attempt to engage the inbound 
LRASMs, but they are overwhelmed by the numbers that have gotten through. At the 
designated time on top, the LRASMs’ high explosive warheads wreak havoc on the 
enemy SAG. 
After the predicted time of impact, the Hummingbird asset is directed to 
investigate and provide a battle damage assessment. The UAS moves to the target area 
and relays the information back to the TAO, who confers with the Commander on the 
next move. 
b. Modeling Method 
SIMIO was utilized to model the weapons exchange scenario outlined above. The 
SIMIO program is a discrete event simulation tool that allows modeling of stochastic 
networks, where agents move along arcs and “queue-up” for service at nodes. Transit 
times and service times can be drawn from specified probability distributions. 
The model consists of four basic elements; entities, sources, servers and sinks. 
The entities (anti-ship missiles and decoys in this case) are created by the sources. The 
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servers (enemy surface-to-air missiles and CIWS in this case) process the entities; and the 
sinks destroy them. Probabilistic paths and nodes link all of the basic elements together 
and direct the flow of entities through the model. 
Explanation for how the model works is to best conveyed via the flow of the 
entities through the model as depicted in Figure 67. Starting from the left and working 
right, ships firing anti-surface missiles and decoys are represented by a source. When the 
modeling run begins, the source generates entities, which represent a single anti-ship 
missile or decoy. Missiles are fired according to an exponential distribution with a mean 
of 7 seconds until the designated number of missiles and decoys for the salvo has been 
released. Once released, the missiles and decoys travel to the first node where they are 
essentially shuffled like a deck of cards. 
 
Figure 67.  SIMIO model example. 
Next, the missiles flow to the area defense server which represents the defending 
SAG’s surface-to-air missile targeting capacity. The server becomes full when the 
number of missiles that has entered equals the defending SAG’s assumed maximum 
targeting capacity as shown in Table 16. At this point, missiles that have not entered the 
server bypass and move on to the point defense section of the model. Those entities that 
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have entered the area defense server are sorted probabilistically based on the surface-to-
air missile probability of kill. Surviving anti-ship missiles and decoys are sent to the point 
defense section while destroyed entities are discarded. 
Once making it successfully past the area defense server, decoys are removed 
from the model (since it is assumed that they will not get close enough to the point 
defense systems to be engaged). Surviving anti-ship missiles are evenly distributed 
among the defending SAG’s vessels where they are processed by the point defense 
servers. 
Point defense servers work in the same manner as the area defense server and are 
bypassed when the assumed capacity has been reached, see Table 16. Anti-ship missiles 
that either bypass or survive the point defense server go on to a hit/miss node where they 
are probabilistically sorted into the hit or miss sink based on probability of kill. Enemy 
casualties that reduce defensive capabilities are accounted for through programming logic 
that removes a ship’s defense measures when it is destroyed. 
The program tallies the number of hits on defending ships by counting the number 
of anti-ship missiles that enter the sinks. The single-hit mission-kill criterion is then 
applied resulting in the number of kills the anti-ship missile salvo achieved. This process 
is then simulated multiple times to tabulate the mean value of ships destroyed given a 
SAG configuration. 
c. Model Assumptions 
The table below lists the ship classes and their assumed capability parameters 
utilized within the SIMIO model. The number and types of missiles that a certain class 
could hold was based on open source information. In cases where a ship’s mixture of 
missiles could vary given VLS launcher capability, plausible load-outs were assumed. 
Also, the individual Probability of Kill (Pk) of missiles, CIWS systems, and system 















64 x SM-2 
-Pk: .90 
-Target Capacity: 
12 per salvo 
16 x LRASM 
-Pk: .90 
-Fired per Salvo: 8 




CVE None 56 x LRASM 
Pk: .90 
Fired per Salvo: 20 
2 x CIWS 
Pk: .30 
42 x RAM 
Pk: .96 
(Levine et al. 
2013) 
Red Forces 
Type 52D DDG 64 x HHQ-9B 
-Pk: .70 
-Target Capacity: 
16 per salvo 
16 x C-805 
Pk: .90 
-Fired per Salvo: 8 
2 x Type 730 CIWS 
Pk: .30 
- Ammo Capacity: 
2 x 4 sec. burst each 
(IHS Jane's 
2014) 
Type 52C DDG 64 x HHQ-9B 
-Pk: .70 
-Target Capacity: 
16 per salvo 
16 x C-805 
Pk: .90 
-Fired per Salvo: 8 
2 x Type 730 CIWS 
Pk: .30 
- Ammo Capacity: 





44 x SA-N-7 
-Pk: .70 
-Target Capacity: 
12 per salvo 
8 x SS-N-22 
Pk: .90 
-Fired per salvo: 8 
4 x AK630 CIWS 
Pk: .30 
-Ammo Capacity: 
2 x 4 sec. burst each 
(IHS Jane's 
2013) 
Type 22 Missile 
Boat 
None 8 x C-802 
Pk: .90 
-Fired per salvo: 4 
1 x AK630 
Pk: .30 
-Ammo Capacity: 




Table 16.  Blue and Red force modeling parameters. 
Additional assumptions: 
 Red forces were alert and able to provide 100% of their defense 
capabilities against the entire inbound salvo until destroyed 
 Red targeting capacity was not randomized 
 Red forces were targeted outside of their anti-ship missile range. They did 
not fire any anti-ship missile salvos in return 
 Red shoots only one surface-to-air missile per targeted LRASM. 
 Soft-kill missile defenses such as chaff were not modeled 
 BQM target-drones were applied to area defenses only, and were not 
targeted by point defenses 
 CVE could fire a maximum of 20 missiles at a rate of two missiles every 
seven seconds 
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d. Modeling Cases 
Given the different enemy SAG compositions plausible within the scenario, 
several cases were utilized to explore the offensive surface missile and decoy 
combination’s potential in various Red vs. Blue exchanges. The goal of the different Red 
force structures was to provide a wide range of defensive capability to determine what 
cases, if any, might benefit from the use of decoys. Table 17. lists the Blue force vs. Red 




Case Red Force 
Composition 
3 x DDG 
1 x Sea Scout 
1 1 x Sovremenny 
2 x Type 52D 
2 x Type 52C 
2 15 x Type 22 
3 15 x Type 22 
2 x Type 52 C 
 
Table 17.  Cases modeled. 
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e. Results and Analysis
Figure 68.  SIMIO Figure Legend. 
Figure 69.  Case 1, LRASM vs Decoy results. 
Figure 69 shows the results from the Case 1 which pits three DDGs and a single 
Sea Scout CVE against five robust Chinese DDGs. In the “No Sea Scout” run, 24 
LRASM from the three DDGs resulted in a mean number of casualties of about three. 
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With the additional 20 LRASM provided by the Sea Scout CVE in the next run, the mean 
number of enemy casualties increased from three to four. The additional LRASMs also 
had the effect of ensuring that the enemy SAG experienced at least two casualties in a 
single salvo. 
The employment of decoys had no effect on the mean number of casualties, but 
they did increase the minimum number of casualties observed from zero to one. There is 
likely no significant decoy effect due to the fact that the area defense has enough capacity 
(the DDGs can target up to 72 inbound missiles in this case) to target all inbound missiles 
and decoys with surface-to-air missiles. 
 
Figure 70.  Case 2, LRASM only results. 
In Case 2, which pits the Blue SAG against 15 Type 22 missile boats, the addition 
of the Sea Scout CVE significantly affects the range of enemy casualties by increasing 
the minimum from six (in the No Sea Scout run) to 11 when a maximum salvo of 20 
LRASM are fired by the Sea Scout CVE in the next run. The mean number of Red Type 
22 missile boat casualties also increases from 10.41 to 13.62. 
There were no decoy effects in Case 2 because the Type 22 missile boats do not 
have an area defense capability. 
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Figure 71.  Case 3 LRASM vs Decoy results. 
Case 3 adds two Type 52C DDGs to the enemy SAG which provides an area 
defense capability to target up to 28 missiles. In the “No Sea Scout” run, this resulted in 
an appreciable decrease in the mean number of Red Type 22 missile boat casualties, 
down from 10.41 in Case 2 to 3.91. However, the additional 20 LRASM delivered by the 
Sea Scout CVE in the next run resulted in a mean of 11.89 Type 22 missile boat 
casualties. 
In this case, there was also a significant effect in the 20 Decoy run. The addition 
of decoys provided by the Sea Scout CVE to the DDG salvo resulted in a mean of 8.43 
enemy kills compared to the “No Sea Scout” run mean of 3.91 kills. 
The effect of using decoys in Case 3 was explored further by doing a cost 
comparison of the dollar value to obtain a kill with various numbers of LRASM and 
BQM decoy assets. The Sea Scout CVE salvos were tested incrementally with up to 40 
additional missiles or decoys added to the DDGs’ salvo (an additional Sea Scout CVE 
platform was assumed into the SAG for a total of two).  
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Figure 72.  Incremental effects of adding LRASM to the Sea Scout CVE salvo with up to two 
Sea Scout CVE platforms. 
 
Figure 73.  Incremental effects of adding BQM decoys to the Sea Scout CVE salvo with up to 
two Sea Scout CVE platforms. 
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Figure 74.  LRASM vs. Decoy Effectiveness. 
As indicated by Figure 74. the effectiveness of providing extra LRASMs to the 
salvo is significantly higher than adding decoys. In this case, LRASM is clearly the better 
choice. However, the cost of achieving this effectiveness tells a different story. 
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Figure 75.  LRASM vs. BQM-74E Cost to achieve Type 22 missile boat kills. 
The graph in Figure 75 shows the relationship between total salvo cost and mean 
number of Type 22 missile boat kills achieved. In regard to the BQM-74E decoy, its cost 
is low enough compared to LRASM to provide increased savings over LRASM up to 
about eight kills. After eight kills the savings area decreases. The BQM-74E decoy is the 
better cost option up to about 10 kills; however, in order to achieve this effectiveness, 40 
BQM decoys would need to be launched in a salvo. By interpolation, the maximum 
savings of $35M-$37M around the eight-kill point is achieved when a salvo of 20 BQM 
decoy drones are launched from the Sea Scout CVE. 
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Figure 76.  LRASM vs. BQM-177A Cost to achieve Type 22 missile boat kills. 
In regard to the cost of BQM-177A, there is still a savings. In this case, the cost 
effectiveness is negated at around eight kills where LRASM’s effectiveness becomes the 
more cost-effective option. 
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Figure 77.  LRASM vs. BQM-34S Cost to achieve Type 22 missile boat kills. 
In Figure 77 the cost curve of the BQM-34S aligns with LRASM up until about 
eight kills, and then departs significantly in favor of LRASM showing no potential 
savings. 
f. Implications
The analysis shows that the additional fire power added when Sea Scout employs 
LRASM has significant effects in regard to the attrition of enemy forces in all cases. 
Therefore, the addition of LRASM into the magazine of Sea Scout is recommended, 
especially when surface engagements are likely. 
In regard to the use of decoys to overwhelm area defenses, it was found that this 
tactic was only effective when area defensive capacities could be overrun, allowing assets 
to go through untargeted. In cases where area defenses had the capacity to target all 
inbound assets, decoy use had little to no effect. 
On the matter of cost effectiveness, when decoys combined with anti-ship 
missiles could over capacitate area defenses, the cost difference between the Strike asset 
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and the decoy asset determines whether decoys are worth employing. In the case of the 
BQM-74E, its unit cost was low enough to achieve substantial savings given a desired 
effect. 
Considering the case-dependent effectiveness of BQM employment as a decoy 
within a strike salvo, the team decided that mixed LRASM/BQM decoy salvos were not 
especially advantageous over the use of LRASM-only salvos. Therefore, the overall 
design of Sea Scout should not be prioritized to the use of BQMs. Considering this 
finding, the team recommends that the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System 
(EMALS) catapults be removed from the CVE design and VLS canisters be installed 
instead. If utilization of BQMs is required or desired in the future for other possible Sea 
Scout missions, removal of the catapult will not preclude their use, as Jet-Assisted Take-
Off (JATO) methods will allow their employment from the CVE flight deck. 
3. Sea Scout Concept Conclusion
The Sea Scout concept capitalizes on all of the advantages that the baseline Sea 
Vex concept sought to enable, and utilizes a cheaper smaller vessel to distribute airborne 
capability throughout the fleet at a superior value. While the capabilities designed into 
Sea Scout are not as broad as those imagined in Sea Vex, the focused design of three 
critical capabilities allows for the system to provide a decisive amount of ISR, Surface 
Strike, and Land Strike capability in the absence of manned CVW assets.  
a. Sea Scout Final System Design Concept
The Sea Scout system comprises three major warfighting systems; a small fast 
CVE ship, 21 A160 Hummingbird UASs, and a configurable mixture of 56 VLS 
launched TLAM or LRASM missiles. 
The A160 Hummingbird is an autonomous VTOL UAS that provides the eyes and 
ears for the fleet. It’s far reaching range, tremendous endurance and sophisticated sensors 
enable the platform to serve as a fleet scout that can detect the enemy well before they get 
close enough to pose a threat. The Hummingbird’s sensors and data-links enable TLAM 
and LRASM to achieve their full potential against dynamic land and surface targets. Over 
land or over sea, the system can be utilized to collect the full spectrum of information 
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across a vast range of ISR mission sets. With its 2,500lbs payload capacity and 
integration of the Hellfire air-to-surface strike missiles, it has capacity for growth and 
taking on additional mission sets in future increments. 
The combination of LRASM and TLAM enable Sea Scout to provide critical 
Strike capabilities on both land and water from ranges that far exceed today’s strike 
fighter aircraft at significantly lower risk. Both platforms are network-ready and have the 
ability to integrate with manned and unmanned fleet assets as wells as provide flexible 
targeting options to the Commander. 
A squadron of Sea Scout CVEs dispersed throughout the fleet would provide 
distributed Strike and ISR capabilities to areas that pose too high of a risk for the 
CVN/CVW system. Combined with CVW assets, the Sea Scout system would allow 
manned and unmanned platforms from the carrier to shed much of the ISR and Strike 
responsibilities in order to focus on other critical mission areas such as DCA and OCA. 
Alternatively, in situations that require excessive capability, the Sea Scout system-of-
systems would become a force multiplier coordinating with manned platforms to deliver 
devastating fire-power. Whether aggregated in a SAG or CSG, Sea Scout brings 
distributed capability to the fight.  
It is important to note that Sea Scout is not a lone wolf platform. While the CVE 
does have point defense systems onboard, its lack of dedicated air defense capability 
requires it to be protected under the umbrella of air defense systems such as Aegis or 
manned and unmanned fighter aircraft. Although, when small scale autonomous airborne 
UAS swarm technologies mature, a future increment of the Sea Scout systems could step 
into the air-to-air arena. 
The Sea Scout system-of-systems has capacity for growth. The CVE itself has the 
space for more platforms, and the Hummingbird has room to integrate more sensors and 
weapons as well. As UAS technologies improve, more critical capabilities such as 
Electronic Warfare, Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Warfare could be added in later 
increments. While the first increment of Sea Scout may not be able to completely 
replicate CVW capabilities, with potential for growth and the rapid advancement of UAS 
technology, it is plausible the later third or fourth increment will fit the bill. 
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IX. DAW SOLUTION PART 3: THE MTX CONCEPT
A. CLOSING THE CAPABILITY GAP 
The concept of the unmanned “missile-truck” (MTX) was developed by the team 
to address the possible need for increased Offensive Counter-Air (OCA), Defensive 
Counter-Air (DCA), and  Early Warning capability that may arise when the manned 
assets on the CVN (or EABs) are limited by range and threatened within the A2AD 
environment. 
Closing this capability gap reduces risk to human life while increasing range, 
payload, and deception which are imperative to increase the probability to overcome the 
A2AD threats and win a conflict in the South China Sea. 
B. MTX CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
The Missile-Truck Concept (MTX) leverages unmanned technology in order to 
gain a decisive advantage in the battle for air superiority outside of traditional carrier air 
wing range. The key to the MTX concept rests with two key sub-concepts. First is the 
ability to slave an unmanned air vehicle (“missile-truck” UAV) to a manned fighter 
platform  (F/A-18 Hornet, F-16 Falcon, etc.) while conducting OCA missions. Second is 
the ability to control a separate type of “missile-truck” UAV from a land- or sea-based 
static control station to conduct DCA missions.  
For OCA missions, the firepower available to the manned aircraft would be 
significantly increased with the addition of a slaved missile-truck. The Weapons System 
Officer (WSO) would have control over a higher payload with an extended flight profile 
range, reducing risk by conducting the tactical mission with an unmanned system from an 
extended distance. 
For DCA operations, the ability to deploy missile-truck UAVs controlled from 
land- or sea-based control stations, provides the U.S. forces with the defense capabilities 
and air superiority it currently owns when using a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) (Goure 
2011) without putting the high value unit at risk. Maintaining the capability to conduct 
DCA is imperative to protect the nation’s air bases, sea bases, surface action groups, and 
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Carrier Strike Group. Providing a dedicated Early Warning missile-truck UAV with 
increased endurance and payload capability, would increase the ability to disrupt or deter 
adversary air strikes before they pose a threat while simultaneously providing the 
capability to defend U.S. forces long enough to launch manned aircraft to engage 
incoming threats. 
 
C. MTX HIGH-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
The following high-level requirements would allow the achievement of the 
envisaged capability of the Missile-Truck Concept. 
(1) Unmanned Control. The missile-truck UAV should have the ability to be 
slaved to and remotely controlled by a Weapon Systems Officer onboard a manned air 
asset. It should also have the ability to be controlled from designated land- or sea-based 
control station. If technology and budget allow, it would be desirable for the Missile-
truck UAV to be capable of autonomous operation.  
(2) Missile Payload. The missile-truck UAV shall have the ability to carry a 
mix of eight-to-ten Advanced Medium-Range Air to Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and Air to 
Ground Missiles (AGM) such as the AGM-65 Maverick to perform its mission. The 
quantity listed is based on the maximum payload of the legacy F/A-18s (Raytheon 2014). 
Having this requirement would increase the air-to-air firepower of the air asset that the 
missile-truck UAV is being slaved to. 
(3) Endurance.   The missile-truck UAV shall have the ability to operate 
longer than the air asset that it is slaved to as to enable it to be projected deeper into 
adversaries’ territory to conduct OCA missions and be able to sustain flight back to base. 
At the moment, the master platform has yet to be designated; however, when reference to 
F/A-18 as the master platform, the missile-truck UAV should minimally endure 
approximately 1.5 times longer than the F/A-18. This is to be accomplished through 
modifications made to the aircraft by removing the modules used by the pilot that are no 




(4) Stealth.  It is desirable for a future missile-truck UAV variant to have a 
reasonable amount of stealth capability to improve its survivability and chances of 
mission success. The reduced Radar Cross Section of the missile-truck UAV variant 
lowers the possibility of being detected by adversaries’ radars. However, the level of 
stealth would have to be balanced against cost. Later in the report a platform 
recommendation for a stealthier UAV variant (other than the QF-18) is discussed. 
(5) Air Refuel Capable. The missile-truck should be air refuel capable. This 
capability allows the Missile-truck UAV to remain airborne for extend periods of time, 
which would provide the U.S. Navy with a persistent DCA capability. The ability to 
refuel an unmanned aircraft while in flight is a capability that requires further research 
and development; however, the capability for midair air refueling should exist until 
technology catches up MTX CONOPS 
(6) Offensive Counter-Air Mission. OCA seeks to suppress and disrupt the 
enemy’s military air power by destroying its air assets (i.e., aircraft and missiles) and 
their supporting infrastructures before and after launch, as close to the source as possible. 
The MTX concept can be integrated into the Distributed Air Wing (DAW) concept or the 
traditional CSG concept to provide the increase in strike power required in an A2AD 
environment, with a lower cost while reducing the risk to personnel and military assets 
(Defense Systems Staff 2013). 
b. Platform for OCA role: Modified F/A-18 hornet (QF-18)
Utilizing the legacy Hornet design has significant inherent benefits. It is a proven 
airframe with radar and weapon systems already integrated. It can carry up to 10 AIM-
120 AMRAAM missiles when utilizing both under-wing and fuselage pylons (Jenkins 
2000). Furthermore, it is effectively a sunk cost; the systems have already been bought 
and paid for, and will eventually be phased out and replaced by either Super Hornets or 
F-35C Joint Strike Fighters over the next few decades (Gertler 2009). 
Utilization of an unmanned asset in the OCA role would require significant 
modification, but would yield additional benefit. While installation of the required data 
link capability and flight control systems would likely be both complex and expensive, it 
is unlikely this equipment would weigh more than the now-extraneous equipment that 
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could be removed. Items such as the M61 cannon, ejection seat, cockpit displays and 
other avionics, as well as all life-support equipment could be removed, yielding weight 
savings and increasing performance or payload.  
In the OCA role, each QF-18 will be fully loaded with ten AIM-120 Advanced 
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), slaved to a master manned dual-cockpit 
F/A-18F (or F-35C when available). The master aircraft will be armed with four 
AMRAAM and two GBU-31 precision guided bombs. Four pair of F/A-18F + QF-18, a 
total of four manned and four unmanned aircraft will form a “UAS-enhanced Self Escort 
Strike” with a total weapons payload of 56 AIM-120 and eight GBU-31s.It should be 
noted that this is a typical configuration of a strike package for OCA role and can be 
varied depending on mission needs and threat complexity. 
c. Control Concepts and Operation 
When activated for OCA missions, the strike package of eight aircraft will be 
launched from the designated Hub/TSB/CVN. The four manned F/A-18F will take off 
ahead of the four unmanned QF-18 upon activation and fly to the rendezvous waypoint. 
Subsequently, the four QF-18s will be launched from the Hub/TSB/CVN, with the 
launching conducted by controllers located on the Dispersed Bases or CVN. After take-
off, the QF-18 will fly to the rendezvous waypoint where the control of the aircraft will 
be handed over to the Weapons System Officer (WSO) in the back cockpit of the F/A-
18F. Thereafter the QF-18 will be controlled by WSOs via line-of-sight communication 
onboard the aircraft. Once all four QF-18 are paired up with their master aircraft, the 
strike package will carry out the various UAS enhanced Self Escort Strike missions such 
as air-to-air, air-to-ground, fighter sweeps, or escort assignments.  
The WSOs will have the capability of directing the paired QF-18s and also have 
full access to its fire control system. When the strike package formation is within the 
radar targeting range, the WSO will appropriately target the QF-18s into hostile enemy 
aircraft factor groups. If the strike package manages to destroy all enemy aircraft in the 
engagement and penetrate deep into enemy territory through in-flight refueling, the BRU-
31 on the F/A-18F will be used to destroy key infrastructures, crippling and preventing 
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the enemy from further response. Even if the QF-18s expend all their weapons, they 
could potentially stay in theater to act as targeting decoys to further confuse the enemy.  
Upon completion of its mission, the strike package will return to home base with 
the F/A-18F passing control of its assigned QF-18 to the ground controllers or AWACS 
before landing. 
In an A2AD environment, conducting Early Warning missions entails a broad 
spectrum of mission sets that are critical to ensure the success of DCA and OCA 
missions. Air platforms chosen to perform Early Warning missions must have range and 
endurance to penetrate deep into the region of conflict. DCA missions attempt to secure 
an area where friendly forces can operate effectively by denying the enemy the freedom 
to carry out offensive air operations. Effective execution of DCA requires early warning 
of enemy air attack from Early Warning so that early engagement and defense in depth 
are achieved. Incorporating MTX with DAW or traditional CVN concepts will enhance 
mission effectiveness with a reduced risk to personnel in an A2AD environment.  
d. Platform for DCA / Early Warning role: MQF-X
One proposed system (hereafter referred to as the MQF-X) would be capable of 
fully autonomous operation either from an aircraft carrier or from forward dispersed 
airfields. It would carry eight to twelve AIM-120C/D AMRAAM missiles, for a total 
combat payload of approximately 2,760 to 4,140lbs. This payload is comparable to the 
General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper combat drone, which has an approximate payload 
capacity of 3,750lbs (U.S. Air Force 2010). The weapons could either be carried 
externally, or alternatively, in an internal bay to reduce radar cross section as well as 
aerodynamic drag.  
The airframe could incorporate some aspects of stealth technology to 
minimize the radar cross section, balanced against cost. Extensive use of composite 
materiel would reduce both weight and RCS. Thrust and power would be provided by 
one or two highly efficient turbofan or turboprop engines. With no aircrew, weight is 
greatly reduced as there is no requirement for life support, avionics, or survivability 
measures. To take full advantage of this mass reduction, the data-link equipment, 
 166
including transceivers and processors, should be designed to incorporate weight-saving 
features. As it would be entirely dependent on cueing from external platforms, there 
would be no requirement for onboard sensors, further reducing weight and power 
requirements. With no emitters, the signature of the platform is reduced further, allowing 
it to operate undetected at standoff ranges. Inclusion of certain types of sensors could be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the inclusion of long-range electro-
optical or infrared sensors could be considered to allow the platform the capability to 
assist in the detection and identification of potential threats. A passive electronic warfare 
capability could also be considered.  
e. Control Concepts and Operation
The MQF-X can be controlled from a ground station, an AEGIS ship or an 
airborne platform such as the E-2D Hawkeye or the E-3 Sentry (Navy Recognition 2012). 
For missions requiring deep penetration, it is even conceivable that a radio buoy, 
deployed by a submarine, could link the unmanned aircraft via satellite data link to a 
remote ground control station. For the DCA/ Early Warning mission, a total of three 
MQF-X assets will constitute a DCA/ Early Warning package as shown in Figure 78. 
Each Hub/TSB/CVN will have at least two DCA/ Early Warning packages to ensure 24-
hour coverage.  
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Figure 78.  DCA/ Early Warning package comprising three MQF-X for 24 hours 
coverage.  
During DCA/ Early Warning missions, when enemy aircraft is detected, the DCA 
package will intercept the incoming threat before more fighters are scrambled from the 
Hub/TSB/CVN for reinforcement. 
D. MTX CONCEPT ADVANTAGES 
With the implementation of the MTX concept, the U.S. Navy will be better 
equipped to engage adversaries in a more efficient and cost-effective manner. As a force 
multiplier, the MTX concept leverages technology to provide more firepower capability 
with minimal increase in manpower.  
Manpower management is a critical issue within the U.S. Navy and is not 
expected to go away anytime soon. Finding ways to reduce manpower while also 
reducing risk will always be beneficial regardless of the country’s fiscal situation. With 
the MTX concept, this can be addressed, as it allows for two airborne assets in the sky to 
conduct air-to-air missions while essentially halving the required number of trained pilots 
to do so. Providing twice the amount of firepower, added range, and reducing risk 
translates to cost savings in today’s budget-conscious environment. The foundation 
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technology that is required for the MTX is available, and when compared to the creation 
of an entirely new aircraft, the proposed alternative is cost effective. However, the 
existing technology for autonomous flight, slaved control, and engagement will need to 
be refined for the MTX concept to become a reality. 
The MTX concept would be most effective if integrated into the Dispersed Air 
Wing solution than simply the traditional CSG force structure for the reasons outlined in 
the following sections. 
1. Manpower and Logistics 
If the MTX were to be integrated into the Dispersed Air Wing Operations concept 
solution, then instead of sending two CVWs for a campaign, only one CVW would be 
required. This is due to the force structure composition. Instead of having two manned 
aircraft, one manned aircraft would be launched along with an unmanned, both of which 
can launch from a Hub or Tactical Strategic Base. The firepower and operating assets 
brought about by one CVW can potentially be doubled. The logistic trail required to 
support a potential Dispersed Air Wing Hub or TSB would already be established and 
would not be as complex and expensive as maintaining and sustaining a Carrier-based air 
wing. The substantial daily operating costs necessary to operate a CVN at sea also make 
the Dispersed Air Wing solution is a more fiscally responsible alternative. By adopting 
the MTX concept and employing it in conjunction with a DAW, the potential cost-saving 
and risk reducing effect will have a multiplier effect. 
2. Increased Reach in the A2AD Environment 
With the MTX concept, the drone that is slaved to the manned aircraft can be 
placed in front of the later to provide a longer range of operation. This will augment the 
already closer reach of the Hubs and TSBs that would exist, especially in a situation 
where the CSG may need to be stationed outside the A2AD threat umbrella. 
E. MTX CONCEPT CHALLENGES 
There are some aspects in regards to the development of the missile-truck concept 
that present an immediate challenge if it is to be pursued as a force structure addition. 
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Below is a list of obstacles the team determined when comparing the modified F/A-18, 
modified MQ-9, and the future autonomous unmanned platform the X-47B (which will 
be discussed below) as baseline aircraft that could be converted into missile-truck UAVs. 
1. Current Platform Limitations
The platform for which the MTX capability is assigned will be a major factor in 
determining its exact range capabilities and Early Warning capabilities. If the current 
F/A-18 is used as the base structure of the OCA-mission missile-truck UAV (QF-18) it 
will be limited if launched from outside of the DF-21 range due to its 1,089 nautical mile 
range (U.S. Navy 2009). The same range limitation applies to the DCA-mission missile-
truck UAV (MQ-X). The current MQ-9 Reaper has approximately the same range as the 
Hornet with a distance of 1,000 nautical miles (U.S. Air Force 2010). This range 
limitation is offset by its 14 hour loiter capability, making it more suited for a strictly 
DCA role. (U.S. Air Force 2010)  If an F/A-18 or the MQ-9 frame is used, the asset will 
either need to “lily-pad” from multiple dispersed air bases, conduct aerial refueling, or be 
optimally stationed throughout the region. This limitation turned the team’s attention to 
the need for a future missile-truck platform, such as the X-47B.   
The X-47B is an unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) that was designed to 
conduct operations from an aircraft carrier. Designed for semi-autonomous operation, as 
of this report the X-47B is still in its test phase. The subsonic aircraft has already 
conducted launches, touch-an-go landings, and recoveries onboard the USS George H.W. 
Bush. Compared to the F/A-18 and the MQ-9, the X-47B could be an ideal candidate to 
be operated within the MTX concept due to its autonomous design and much longer 
range of almost 2,100 nautical miles (Kazianas 2013). If the X-47B could be developed 
to increase its payload, maintain its range, and operate under similar control schemes, 
using it as the MTX frame would eliminate the need to use intermediate land bases to 
reach the frontlines. 
2. UCLASS Program Development Costs
The cost for further development in safely operating and controlling unmanned 
aerial vehicles with new airframes and systems from a CVN is another challenge to the 
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MTX concept. The X-47B is a viable option for the MTX concept; however, it is still in 
the early stages of test and evaluation. In addition, integrating the desired control 
schemes as well as the ability to conduct OCA missions may not be feasible in terms of 
finding an immediate low-cost solution for the MTX concept. The Unmanned Carrier-
Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program started with a project 
budget of $2.3B FY11 (LaGrone 2013) which was eventually scaled down for cost 
purposes. Some of the requirements set for the Unmanned Combat Aerial System 
(UCAS), first envisioned with an emphasis on strike missions, were that its unit 
acquisition cost would not be greater than $150M, it would be able to strike from a range 
of at least 2,000 nautical miles, and it would be able to maintain a consistent orbit of 600 
nautical miles (LaGrone 2013). Already three years into its testing phase, the UCLASS 
program is scheduled to award a contract for its development in 2015 (Naval Air Systems 
Command 2014). Although the initial stages of the development of the X-47B show 
promise, due to the early stage of the technology involved and the risk of cost overruns if 
the project is accelerated, the modified UCLASS would best be approached as a follow 
on program. By utilizing the converted QF-18 platforms, valuable lessons learned can be 
gathered regarding control schemes and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), 
which can then be leveraged to improve the X-47 program. 
3. Control Scheme Development 
The ability to operate within the A2AD environment requires the development of 
multiple control schemes to allow the MTX to be both safe and effective. The U.S. Navy 
already utilizes several robust data links that could be incorporated for use. LINK 16, 
CEC, and the new NIFC-CA are all options for integration. The potential for jamming 
and other forms of exploitation require that some form of autonomy be programmed in to 
allow, at a minimum, the aircraft to safely return to base in the event of a loss of 
communications or navigation. Control schemes to be investigate include dedicated 
fighter-to-fighter data-link, as described in Section D.1.b. Further options include 
satellite-to-ground station data-links, control by E-2D Hawkeye or similar AWACS 
aircraft, or control by Air Intercept Controller watch-standers onboard AEGIS ships. One 
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key consideration for remote control is latency. Effort should be expended to ensure that 
latency is minimized to maximize the offensive capability of the MTX. 
4. EMCON Status Limitations
A common concern when operating any unmanned aircraft with U.S. military 
forces is the ability to operate them at any Emission Control (EMCON) status. If UAVs 
are to be used consistently from HVUs, such as an aircraft carrier, the need for them to be 
able to land autonomously when EMCON conditions precluding flight control are set is 
crucial. Without this capability, there is a possibility of losing airborne UAVs when the 
ship of origin is required to secure its emissions. Command and control redundancies 
should be designed into all ship-based UAV platforms including the MTX concept 
platforms. Alternatively, unmanned aircraft could be diverted to nearby land bases, if 
available, in the event that EMCON must be set while they are airborne. 
F. QUANTIFYING PERFORMANCE: HUGHES SALVO EQUATIONS 
In order to measure the added benefits that the MTX would bring to the fight the 
Hughes Salvo Equation (Hughes 1995) was modified in order to use it in an air-to-air 
scenario.  
The primary variables used in the Hughes Salvo Equations are defined as: 
A/B = # of Aircraft in battle 
a1/b1 = # of missiles fired by each aircraft 
(a1 would originate from Aircraft A;  b1 would originate from Aircraft B) 
a2/b2 = each individual missile’s PK 
a3/b3 = Evasion Effectiveness 
a4/b4 = Countermeasure Effectiveness 
The Hughes Salvo Equation used for the purpose of this analysis solves for the 
number of losses incurred by force A (represented by ΔA) and is arranged in the 
following manner:  
߂ܣ ൌ ሺܤ ∗ ܾ1 ∗ ܾ2ሻ–	൫ሺܣ ∗ ܽ3ሻ ൅ ሺܣ ∗ ܽ4ሻ൯ 
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This equation, and its tactical ramifications, will be explored in depth in the 
scenario below. 
Notes and assumptions on the scenario: 
 The U.S. AMRAAM is given a slightly higher PK of 0.85, while the PRC
PL-12s are assigned a PK of 0.65.
 Each J-10 has one chance to conduct an evasion with a probability of
success of 0.2, while each QF-18 has a slightly higher chance at 0.25 as
they are diving away. The F-35C has an evasion chance of 0.5, given its
higher stealth.
 All countermeasures are assumed to be 10% effective.
1. DCA Scenario Vignette
The scenario takes place in the South China Sea. The PRC is attempting to force a 
United States Surface Action Group (SAG) away from the Spratly Islands. The Chinese 
forces, using H-6 bombers capable of multiple ASCM launches, leave Hainan Island and 
are being escorted by 30 J-10 fighters. Each J-10 is loaded out with six PL-12 BVR air-
to-air missiles. Four F-35Cs, carrying six AIM-120s (AMRAAM) each were operating 
over Palawan originating from a CVN conducting operations in the Sulu Sea. They detect 
the incoming strike. All airborne fighters are directed to engage the H-6s and J-10s when 
in sight. Two QF-18s make up the U.S. SAG’s DCA stations and there are currently two 
sets of them employed. Each QF-18 is carrying 10 AIM-120 (AMRAAM) Air-to-Air 
missiles.  
The first aircraft to arrive are the QF-18s. They are being controlled by a DDG in 
close proximity and quickly launch all of their missiles. Once the PRC fighters realize 
they are under fire, they immediately launch in retaliation. Each aircraft decides to launch 
only half of their missiles (three each) while they search for the source of the threat. This 
scenario is illustrated in Figure 79.  
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Figure 79.  Two DCA stations protecting SAG in South China Sea of two unmanned QF-18s 
each and F-35s conducting operations over Palawan.     
2. Air-to-Air Battle Outcome Based on Hughes Salvo Results
A total of 34 AMRAAM missiles (of the 40 fired) from the four QF-18s find their 
PRC targets and home in. Each J-10 attempts one evasion while deploying 
countermeasures, but a total of 26 AMRAAM missiles still destroy their targets, leaving 
only four J-10s, each with only half of their missiles remaining, to escort the H-6 bomber 
force onward to weapons release range. All four of the QF-18s are destroyed in the 
exchange. 
Meanwhile, the four F-35Cs utilize their low RCS to close within firing range 
undetected. They each fire two missiles before evading, leaving the J-10s without targets 
to fire upon. All the J-10s are destroyed by this salvo, and the F-35Cs close in to finish 
off the bomber force. The full salvo calculations can be found in Table 18.  
In this scenario, a force of H-6 bombers escorted by over 30 PRC fighters was 
engaged and destroyed by only eight aircraft, of which only half were manned. While not 
a perfect analogue for an actual air-to-air battle, the modified Hughes Salvo Equations 
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provide a means to calculate rough approximations of the contributions of additional 
missiles to an air-to-air battle fought in missile salvos. 
 
 
Table 18.  Results from the Hughes Salvo Equations for the air-to-air scenario. 
3. Air-to-Air Battle Monte Carlo Analysis 
Expanding on the DCA vignette, a Monte Carlo simulation was conducted to 
evaluate the effectiveness of a single DCA station comprised of two MTX platforms, 
each armed with 10 AMRAAM missiles. These were confronted by 10 attacking fighter 
aircraft. The simulation assumes that each MTX is capable of firing all 10 of its missiles, 
each targeting a single attacking fighter. Each missile was given a 65% probability of kill, 
which encompasses all missile functions, from rocket motor burn to warhead 
effectiveness. The adversary aircraft next deploy countermeasures with a 10% chance of 
successfully distracting a missile, followed by an evasion attempt at 20% effectiveness. 
Evasion effectiveness is in this case a combination of maneuver, radar cross section, and 
passive countermeasures. Each event was assigned a binary result, and aircraft survival 
was determined by simply summing the effective missiles and then subtracting instances 
of successful countermeasure employment or evasion. 
The Monte Carlo was run through 5,500 repetitions. Each missile, evasion 
attempt, and countermeasure seduction attempt utilized independent randomly generated 
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numbers. The number of surviving aircraft was tallied following each run, generating the 
histogram in Figure 80. 
Figure 80.  Result of 5,500 runs of MTX Monte Carlo Simulation showing number of 
survivors 
The results show that with the assumptions made, just two MTX platforms, 
outfitted with 10 AMRAAM missiles, have a 99.9% chance of destroying three aircraft, 
or approximately one-third, of an incoming raid of 10 aircraft. There is an approximately 
97% chance that more than 5 aircraft would be destroyed, and an approximately 75% 
chance that fully two-thirds of the incoming aircraft would be destroyed. Depending on 
the adversary’s doctrine, destruction of one-third to one-half of an incoming raid would 
likely cause the surviving aircraft to turn back. Even if it did not, however, there is a 
strong likelihood that the surviving aircraft would be degraded in their ability to respond 
to further attack by manned fighters or ground-based air defense systems.  
This simulation helps to demonstrate the potential contribution of the MTX to a 
defensive counter-air scenario. More detailed simulation, using classified figures for the 
effectiveness of missiles, countermeasures, and evasion would provide more fidelity and 
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could potentially change the results. Thus, additional modelling and simulation is 
recommended. 
G. MTX CONCEPT RECOMMENDATION 
It is recommended that the MTX concept be implemented in two phases. The first 
phase will be to convert existing manned platforms into unmanned drones. With the 
successful implementation of the QF-16 as a full scale aerial target, current F/A-18s 
should be converted into unmanned platforms to serve as Missile-Truck UAVs that help 
to perform the OCA mission.  
If it can keep its long range attributes, the MQ-9 Reaper should be modified to 
achieve a higher operational ceiling and slightly more weight carrying capacity to 
perform the DCA and Early Warning missions desired. (U.S. Air Force 2010). However, 
a more detailed cost analysis of the price to make these modifications could render the 
platform infeasible depending on the fiscal environment. 
To fully realize the utility of the MTX concept for OCA, DCA, and Early 
Warning missions combined, a flexible platform with a longer range of operation is 
required. Phase two of the MTX concept introduces a new platform that has a longer 
endurance and payload to replace the QF-18. The potential new platform for this versatile 
role should be the Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) X47-B. The new platform 
should be configured into an asset with better endurance, payload, and stealth to enhance 
the F/A-18s in theater. These design attributes will increase survivability and the 
probability of mission success. 
In addition, it is also recommended that the MTX drone not only be used as a 
slaved missile-truck for airborne fighters, but also have the capability to be configured to 
operate remotely from ground stations so that it can be incorporated into the dispersed air 
wing concept. This would aid in accomplishing the goal of keeping HVUs outside of the 
DF-21 range without sacrificing mission capabilities when operating within an A2AD 
environment. The MTX concept has the potential to close the capability gap while 
addressing the following MOEs of the solution: 
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Combat Attrition – minimize Blue force loss (See Quantitative Analysis 
in later section*) 
ISR Power – Early Warning; 24 hour “eyes in the sky”; custom sensor 
suite 
Strike Power – increased weapons payload; “UAS enhanced Self Escort 
Strike” augmented capability 
H. CONCLUSION 
The concept of the MTX adds three important elements that will aid in closing the 
capability gaps that are present when the CVN is distant from the fight. First, it reduces 
risk to personnel by replacing several manned aircraft required to perform the same 
mission. Second, it increases the payload available to manned fighters allowing the 
ability to engage more targets. Finally, MTX will provide an increase in combat range by 
eliminating weight and adding extra fuel tanks. 
An unmanned fighter jet (QF/A-18 or QF-16), an upgraded version of the MQ-9 
Reaper (MQF-X), and the X-47B UCAS were all investigated as candidates for being 
converted into a MTX Missile-Truck UAV. Each contender brings its own unique 
capabilities and characteristics that the team was able to dissect in order to make a 
recommendation for an appropriate option for future development. Taking into account 
the unit cost of each aircraft, the availability within the timeline of the scenario, and the 
capabilities of each platform, the following conclusions were made. A converted 
unmanned fighter would be the quickest and cheapest solution to fill the OCA capability 
gap if dispersed air bases are available and within range for landing. The MQF-X would 
likely require costly modifications, but would fill the dedicated DCA role in protecting 
high value assets afloat and ashore. And while the X-47B UCAS brings the greater range 
and endurance that is desirable within the A2AD environment it would come at greater 
price and longer lead-time for procurement due to the current TRL of the program. 
Therefore, a phased approach that leverages lessons learned from converted manned 
fighters first, then applies those lessons to follow-on unmanned aircraft makes sense both 
fiscally and technically. 
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X. FORCE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
USING INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
A. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The South China Sea Basing Optimization Model was developed to prescribe an 
optimal basing plan and force structure for the Navy by determining the quantity and 
locations of nuclear powered Aircraft Carriers (CVNs), Light Aircraft Carriers (CVLs), 
UAV Carriers (Sea Scouts) and Expeditionary Airbases (EABs) to cover specified 
mission sets in the South China Sea for minimal risk.  
Risk is defined to be the probability of mission-kill per day from all enemy 
weapon systems within reach of the platform or land base weighted by the number of 
personnel at risk. A mission-kill is defined as any damage suffered which causes flight 
operations to halt. If flight operations are halted, then the carrier or airfield is rendered 
ineffective and unable to contribute to the conflict. 
CVNs are the largest and most capable assets. They embark a Carrier Air Wing 
(CVW) consisting of 44 strike/fighter aircraft (Naval Aviation Enterprise 2012). CVLs 
are smaller, conventionally powered light aircraft carriers that embark up to 16 STOVL 
strike/fighter aircraft (Weisser and Coles-Cieply 2009). CVLs can perform all of the 
same missions as a CVN, although at a reduced capacity. Preliminary analysis showed 
that CVLs were not a component of the optimal force structures and were eliminated 
from the final recommendations. The reasons for this decision are described in detail in 
the following sections. The Sea Scout is classified as an escort carrier (CVE). 
Traditionally, CVEs accompany surface action groups or convoys to provide specific 
capabilities and defenses. In this case, Sea Scouts can provide ISR and strike capabilities 
but lack the counter-air capability of the other assets. Finally, EABs are land bases that 
can accommodate up to six STOVL strike/fighters and can be constructed on any suitable 
land in allied territory. 
The team derived a baseline mission set comprising the minimum capabilities 
necessary for U.S. forces to achieve victory in the Spratly Islands scenario described 
earlier in this paper. The optimal solutions for the baseline mission are depicted as the 
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yellow line in Figure 81. In addition to this baseline, several variations of requirements 
and capabilities were tested to ensure the stability of solutions. Several distinct force 
structures emerged as the most promising options. The most robust solutions are 
shown as the red X’s in Figure 81 and their geographic placements are shown in the 
following figures. Any value for risk less than 100% indicates a reduction in risk from 
the current force structure of CVNs only.  





























Figure 82.  Alternative 1, one CVN (cyan) with three Sea Scouts (magenta). 
Figure 83.  Alternative 2, ten EABs (green) with three Sea Scouts (magenta). 
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Figure 84.  Alternative 3, one CVN (cyan) with five EABs (green) and two Sea Scouts 
(magenta). 
These solutions all meet the minimum baseline requirements and reduce risk 
substantially from the baseline case of two CVNs operating alone. In addition, they all 
have sufficient excess capability to meet a doubling of ISR hours required on-station. Of 
the three solutions, Alternative 2 reduces risk the most, to 19% of the baseline risk. 
However, if in addition to a doubled ISR requirement, twice as much strike ordnance per 
day were required, then Alternative 1 could meet those requirements with higher risk 
level of 40% of baseline. Finally, if all requirements were doubled including twice as 
many counter-air hours on-station, then Alternative 3 is the best choice despite the higher 
cost and risk than Alternatives 1 and 2.   
From a strategic perspective, the specific quantity of platforms is not as important 
as the platform types utilized. All three force compositions include the Seas Scout 
platform and significantly reduce the risk incurred by the baseline force structure of two 
CVNs.  
The Team recommends in the near term that the U.S. Navy actively pursue an 
unmanned ISR platform to reduce the ISR burden on the current carrier air wing. 
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Acquiring the Sea Scout or a similar platform is one way to achieve this goal. However, 
any alternative that efficiently removes ISR requirements would help to reduce overall 
risk to the fleet.  
Additionally, the capability to build and utilize expeditionary air bases could 
further reduce the risk to the fleet. The Team recommends this as a long-term goal for the 
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. EABs provide a scalable alternative to project air power 
when a full carrier air wing or an additional carrier air wing is not required.  
Conventional nuclear powered aircraft carriers need not be eliminated from the 
force structure, but their massive strike and counter air capabilities should be augmented 
by additional ISR platforms, and when the entire might of a carrier air wing is overkill, a 
scalable alternative such as an EAB can bring the force necessary without exposing the 
fleet to unnecessary risk. 
Additional key insights, methods, and results from the optimization model are 
described in the following sections. 
B. INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMMING (ILP) MODEL: MINIMIZE COST  
In order to explore the South China Sea (SCS) scenario, the Team sought a way to 
compare different force structure alternatives within the context of the scenario. Although 
many aspects of the scenario are fluid and variable, the geography of the area will always 
remain constant. This inspired the group to create an Integer Linear Program (ILP) 
(Rardin 1998) where the geography of the area was translated into fixed nodes for input 
as a set-cover model. The Team started out with a basic model and continued to add 
complexity while gaining valuable insights throughout the entire process. Section B 
describes a basic model and insights gained, and Section C describes the full optimization 
problem to minimize risk to the force. 
For the basic model, the goal of the ILP is to minimize cost subject to a set cover 
mission constraint. This mission constraint requires that naval air assets cover the entire 
South China Sea. This requirement includes both time-critical strike missions and quick-
reaction counter-air missions to intercept PLA aircraft.   
The key insights from the basic analysis are as follows: 
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1. Key Insights 
 A minimum of four expeditionary airbases, three light aircraft carriers 
(CVLs), or two Ford class carriers (CVNs) optimally placed is required to 
provide air cover for the entire South China Sea. 
 The Philippines and Vietnam offer key basing locations on the east and 
west sides of the South China Sea. If either of the two countries is 
removed as a basing ally, the critical areas can no longer be covered with 
land bases alone. A sea-based carrier is required to fill the gaps. 
 Malaysia is the most beneficial basing partner in the southern part of the 
South China Sea. The two separate sections of the country offer strategic 
locations on both the east and west sides of the SCS. However, if Malaysia 
were not available as a basing ally, other countries such as Indonesia, 
Singapore, and Brunei can fill the void albeit with an increased number of 
EABs required. 
 If CVNs must be kept outside of DF-21D range from Hainan Island, at 
least two EABs are required to extend air power to the most northern parts 
of the South China Sea. 
2. ILP Formulation: Minimize Cost 
Indexed Sets and Subsets 
i , j hexagonal regions of South China Sea where j is an alias of i  
and i = {1, 2, …, 4266} 
k  platform type where k = {EAB, CVL, CVN} 
S  set of regions i containing water suitable for ships 
SA set of platform type k which is classified as a ship where SA = {CVL, CVN} 
L  set of regions i containing land suitable for basing an EAB 
Q  set of regions i which require naval air coverage 
Data [Units] 
Costk  fixed cost to acquire and place platform k [$ Billions] 
radk  the combat radius of an aircraft onboard platform k [nm] 
inrangeijk binary data set containing a 1 if the distance from the center of region i to  
  the center of region j is less than radk 
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Decision Variables 




min EAB i EAB k ik
i L i S k SA
Cost X Cost X
  
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   i S  (1) 
Constraint set (1) ensures no more than one ship is placed in each suitable sea region. 
, ,
,
1ij EAB i EAB ijk ik
i L i S k SA
inrange X inrange X
  
    j Q (2) 
Constraint set (2) ensures at least one base covers each region that requires coverage. 
ikX  Binary   ik          (3) 
Constraint set (3) declares variables as binary. 
3. Data Set Development
To implement the ILP, the South China Sea was first divided into hexagons, each 
30 nautical miles in height. This process created 54 rows and 79 columns for a total of 
4266 hexagons. The master map can be seen in Figure 85.  
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Figure 85.  Master map of South China Sea. 
Next the geographic region within each hex was classified as either sea or land 
and by the respective nationality. Finally, the distances from the center of each hex to the 
center of every other hex were calculated. 
Initially, three alternatives were explored for projecting naval air-power in the 
region: 
1. Ford Class Aircraft Carriers (CVNs) operating F-35Cs; 
2. Light Aircraft Carriers (CVLs) of about 30,000 tons operating F-35Bs; 
3. Expeditionary Airbases (EABs): austere, temporary refueling and arming 
points, designed for Short Takeoff, Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft 




Full-sized airfields, such as Clark Air Base in the Philippines, operating F-35A 
aircraft are not included in this model. Due to the size and static nature of these bases, 
they are ideal targets for conventional ballistic missiles. Therefore, to address the 
possibility that these bases might be put out of action for the critical first stages of a 
conflict, this model explores other options in the absence of such bases. 
Initially Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and the 
Philippines are all considered as possible basing allies in the region. Determining 
specifically which countries will grant expeditionary basing rights to the United States in 
the year 2025 is beyond the scope of this project. However, using sensitivity analysis to 
eliminate potential allies one at a time, the team discovered which countries are most 
vital as basing allies and thus where political efforts in the current timeframe could be 
reinforced. 
The regions of the South China Sea requiring immediate naval air coverage were 
determined. Those regions can be seen outlined in red in Figure 86. The initial critical 
region was made intentionally large and encompasses all of the contested regions of the 
South China Sea. It represents a scenario where the location of the next conflict is 
completely unknown, but naval forces must be ready to react anywhere. Future iterations 
will narrow the scope of the coverage to anticipated locations of conflict. 
Some assumptions were made in order to facilitate the analysis. These 
assumptions are: 
4. Assumptions
 This scenario takes place in the year 2025. The Navy and Marine Corp are
equipped with F-35 aircraft.
 Expeditionary airbases are assumed to be small temporary airstrips
capable of operating STOVL (F-35B) aircraft only.
 Each EAB has the same cost of construction regardless of region
placement.
 CVLs are light aircraft carriers of around 30,000 tons capable of carrying
up to 20 STOVL (F-35B) aircraft.
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 The coverage radius of a CVN is considered to be the unrefueled combat 
radius of the F-35C. This allows for quick reaction time without the 
logistics and delays associated with aerial refueling.  
 Full sized airfields, such as Clark Air Base in the Philippines, operating F-
35A are not available to provide the required coverage. 
 The combat radius of the F-35B is 450 nm. 
 The combat radius of the F-35C is 600 nm. 
5. Results 
Several different cases were designed to determine the minimum number of bases 
and their optimum placement to provide the required air coverage. The results can be 
seen in Table 19. 
 
Case # Description 
Solution 
EABs CVLs CVNs 
1 All allies allow EABs 4     
2 No allies allow EABs   3   
3 All allies except Malaysia allow EABs 5     
4 All allies except Vietnam allow EABs 3 1   
5 All allies except the Philippines allow EABs 3 1   
6 No allies allow EABs, No CVLs     2 
7 
CVNs must be kept outside of DF-21 range, 
No CVLs 2   2 
8 
All allies except Malaysia and Indonesia 
allow EABs 5     





Figure 86.  Case 1, all countries allow EAB access. 
Case 1 shows that four expeditionary airbases can cover the entire critical region. 
There are several different locations of bases that could satisfy these requirements, one of 
which is shown in Figure 86. It utilizes two bases in Malaysia and one base in Vietnam 
and the Philippines. 
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Figure 87.  Case 2, no countries allow EAB access. 
Case 2 shows that if no countries in the region allowed EAB basing, the region 
could be covered by three light aircraft carriers, albeit at a higher cost.  
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Figure 88.  Case 3, all countries except Malaysia allow EAB access. 
Case 3 explores the scenario in which Malaysia revokes EAB access. It shows 
that the region could be covered by five EABs, an increase of one from the original case. 
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Figure 89.  Case 4, all countries except Vietnam allow EAB access. 
Case 4 explores the scenario in which Vietnam revokes EAB access. It shows that 
the region can no longer be covered by EABs only. It requires at least one sea-based 
platform to meet the requirements. In this case, three EABs and one CVL are the optimal 
solution. 
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Figure 90.  Case 5, all countries except Philippines allow EAB access. 
Case 5 explores the scenario in which the Philippines revoke EAB access. Similar 
to Vietnam, it shows that the critical region can no longer be covered by EABs only. It 
requires at least one sea-based platform to meet the requirements. In this case, three 
EABs and one CVL are the optimal solution. 
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Figure 91.  Case 6, no EABs and no CVLs. 
Case 6 shows that using only traditional carrier strike groups consisting of CVNs, 
the critical region could be covered by two aircraft carriers. 
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Figure 92.  Case 7, no CVLs, and CVNs must remain outside of DF-21 range. 
Case 7 explores the case where CVNs are required to operate outside of DF-21 
range due to strategic directives. This case requires two EABs in addition to two CVNs to 
cover the entire region. 
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Figure 93.  Case 8, all countries except Malaysia and Indonesia allow EABs 
Case 8 explores the case where both Malaysia and Indonesia do not allow EAB 
access. The solution shows that this loss does not have significant adverse effects. The 
continued access allowed by more traditional U.S. allies such as Singapore and Brunei 










C. INTEGER LINEAR PROGRAMING (ILP) MODEL: MINIMIZE RISK 
After analyzing the basic set-cover model, the Team sought to gain more insight 
by adding realism and complexity. The goal of this enhanced ILP is to minimize the risk 
to friendly forces subject to satisfying three types of mission requirements. The three 
mission types for this model are strike, counter-air, and ISR. For this scenario, specific 
mission requirements are assigned to each region on the map. It is assumed that if these 
mission requirements can be met by the force structure, then the operational commander 
has all the tools necessary to enable victory.  
One important distinction should be made here. This is not intended to be a 
scheduling problem. This means the model does not specify exactly when or where each 
capability will be used, but it provides the commander with an overall quantity of each 
capability to distribute as he/she sees fit. For example, one requirement calls for 
500,000lbs of strike ordnance to be available in the region of the Spratly Islands each 
day. This does not specify locations and types of targets, but enables the commander to 
distribute the strikes as the circumstances require. 
To implement this model, four different data sets were created for each 
alternative. These four data sets are risk, strike effectiveness, counter-air effectiveness, 
and ISR effectiveness. 
Risk is defined to be the probability of mission-kill per day from all enemy 
weapon systems within reach of the platform or land base weighted by the number of 
personnel at risk. A mission-kill is defined as any damage suffered which causes flight 
operations to halt. If flight operations are halted, then the carrier or airfield is rendered 
ineffective and unable to contribute to the conflict. 
Each mission set is quantified by a specific measure of effectiveness. These 
MOEs are described fully in Chapter VI Section B and shown below. 
Strike Power  Assets Payload  Mission Success Rate SGR  
Counter Air Power  Assets RCP On Station Time Mission Success Rate SGR
ISR Power  AssetsOn Station Time Mission Success Rate SGR  
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Both Sortie Generation Rate (SGR) and on-station vary as a function of range and 
decrease the farther away from the conflict one operates. Therefore, the ILP can optimize 
the range and quantities of the various force structure alternatives to determine the 
optimal number and location of assets.  
1. Key Insights 
Several key insights were learned from this model. 
 Risk to the Fleet can be significantly reduced by fulfilling the mission ISR 
requirements with Sea Scout or another similar ISR platform 
 EABs offer a scalable alternative to a full carrier air wing 
 A combination of CVNs, EABs, and Sea Scouts provide a robust solution 
that can handle a doubling of any or all mission requirements 
 Sea Scouts are still a viable alternative even without Hummingbird UAVs 
 To utilize EABs effectively, it is necessary to strengthen relationships with 
Vietnam and the Philippines to ensure basing access for future conflicts 
2. ILP Formulation: Minimize Risk 
Indexed Sets and Subsets 
i , j hexagonal regions of South China Sea where j is an alias of i  
and i = {1, 2, …, 4266} 
k  platform type where k = {EAB, CVL, CVN, CVEX} 
S  set of regions i containing water suitable for ships 
SA set of platform type k which is classified as a ship  
where SA = {CVL, CVN, CVEX} 
L  set of regions i containing land suitable for basing an EAB 
Data [Units] 
ISRreqi ISR coverage required in region i [hrs/day] 
STRIKEreqi strike capability required in region i [lbs/day]  
DCAreqi counter air coverage required in region i [hrs/day] 
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RISKik risk incurred by platform k in region i  
[probability of mission kill/day] 
isrijk ISR coverage provided by platform k from region i to region j 
[hrs/day] 
strikeijk  strike capability provided by platform k from region i to region j 
[lbs/day] 
dcaijk counter-air coverage provided by platform k  
from region i to region j [hrs/day] 
Costk fixed cost to acquire and place platform k [$ Billions] 
Crewk personnel required to operate platform k [# of personnel] 
TotalCost total budget allowed [$ Billions] 
Decision Variables 




min i EAB EAB i EAB ik k ik
i L i S k SA
risk Crew X risk Crew X
  
 
There is one objective, to minimize the risk to the force structure. The risk is the 
probability of mission kill of each platform weighted by the number of personnel 






   i S  (1) 
Constraint set (1) ensures no more than one ship is placed in each suitable sea 
region. 




  TotalCost (2) 
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Constraint set (2) restricts total cost of all the platforms to less than the total 
budget. 




  ISRreq j   j    (3) 
Constraint set (3) ensures that the ISR requirement is met in each region. 




  STRIKEreqj j    (4) 
Constraint set (4) ensures that the strike requirement is met in each region. 




  DCAreqj  j    (5) 
Constraint set (5) ensures that the counter-air requirement is met in each region. 
ikX  Binary   ik          (6) 
Constraint set (6) declares variables as binary. 
3. Risk Data Set Development 
To quantify risk, a measure of effectiveness was created called “Scaled Risk.” 
Scaled risk incorporates two separate and distinct types of risk that combine for an 
overall measure of risk. The first type of risk is operational risk. This is quantified by the 
probability of an asset suffering a mission-kill. For these purposes, a mission-kill is 
defined as any damage suffered which causes flight operations to halt. If flight operations 
are halted, then the carrier or airfield is rendered ineffective. The methods used to 
determine the probability of mission-kill, denoted Pmk, for each option will be discussed 
in the following sections. The plot of the probability of mission-kill vs. range for each 
option can be seen in Figure 94.  
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Figure 94.  Probability of mission-kill vs. range. 
The second type of risk is strategic risk. This type of risk quantifies the emotional, 
psychological, and political importance of the asset. It’s clear that the loss of aircraft 
carrier would be much worse than the loss of an EAB. Therefore, the operational risk 
must be scaled by a factor to weight the asset’s importance. There is no standard way to 
measure the importance of an asset. Therefore, for this analysis the team decided to use 
“number of personnel at risk” as a scaling factor. This includes all crew onboard the ships 
and any personnel physically located at an EAB. This does not include support personnel 
physically located away from the conflict such as depot level maintenance or off-site 
UAV operators. The personnel at risk for each asset can be seen in Table 20. Scaling risk 
by the amount of personnel at risk does not imply that a mission-kill will cause the 





































Table 20.  Personnel at risk 
The resulting scaled risk vs. range plots for each option can be seen below in 
Figure 95. It can be seen that a CVN has a much higher scaled risk than all of the other 
platforms. This is due to the large size of the crew onboard the CVN and thus the high 
importance of the asset. However, along with the higher risk a CVN projects a much 
larger force into the region. A balance must be reached between the risk incurred and the 
power projected. 
 



























a. CVN/CVL Probability of Mission-Kill
A2AD threats to an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea include submarines, sea 
mines, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), 
which can be launched from shore or carried by bombers. It is assumed for this analysis 
that CVLs will encounter the same threats at the same rates as CVNs. The higher 
difficulty of targeting and hitting a smaller target with ballistic missiles is offset by the 
reduced BMD defensive ability of the CVL. Therefore, the CVL risk profile is identical 
to the CVN risk profile. 
The differing ranges and effectiveness of each of the A2AD threats led to the 
creation of a layered model with each threat composing a separate layer of risk. Each 
threat is assumed to be independent of the others. These threats to a CVN can be seen in 
Figure 96.  
Figure 96.  A2AD layered threats. 
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Due to the nature of the scenario and the desire of both sides to control the 
contested region and its resources, it is assumed that neither side will employ mine 
warfare in the area of interest. This does not exclude mine warfare for the entire conflict, 
but only in the contested waters that will be used by USN ships. 
This section describes the risk to a CVN or CVL in the A2AD environment. The 
risk to a Sea Scout is similar with the exception that it is too small to be targeted by 
ballistic missiles. Sea Scout risk will be discussed in the next section.  
In order to quantify the risk to a CVN, it was assumed that one hit by a ballistic 
missile, a cruise missile, or a torpedo would likely cause the aircraft carrier to halt flight 
operations, thus resulting in a mission-kill. This does not imply that one hit is enough to 
sink a carrier, only to render it ineffective.  
Next, each layer of risk is quantified and their effects compiled. 
 Bombers 
China’s bomber fleet consists of H-6 bombers capable of aerial refueling that 
have an effective range of 1800 km (IHS Jane's 2014). Each of bombers can carry four 
ASCMs that can be air launched at maritime targets (IHS Jane's 2014). The probability of 
hit (Phit) of an ASCM is assumed to be a constant value of 0.4. This takes into account 
both active and passive countermeasures used by the defending ships. Using a binomial 
distribution, if a bomber launches all four ASCMs the probability of one or more hits is 
0.87. However, the likelihood of a bomber successfully reaching its launch point is 
assumed to decrease linearly with range from a maximum achievable value of 0.1. The 
low value given here is attributed to the defenseless nature of bombers against air-to-air 
fighters and surface-to-air missiles on unescorted missions. The longer the time a bomber 
spends in the air, the greater the chance that it will be shot down. A graphical depiction of 
the individual threat profiles can be seen in Figure 97.  
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Figure 97.  A2AD layered threat profiles. 
 Submarines 
Submarines are the next threat encountered by a CVN. China possesses two 
general types of submarines: diesel powered submarines (SSKs) and nuclear powered 
submarines (SSNs). SSKs are assumed to patrol out to 1000km. SSNs are assumed to 
patrol between 1000 km and 2000 km. China is estimated to possess 30 SSKs and 10 
SSNs for this conflict. 
The submarine threats were modeled using random search theory. Each 
submarine was given an equal portion of the operating area to search for 24 hours. When 
the carrier is detected, the submarine will engage with torpedoes if it can get close 
enough (this is assumed to occur 30% of the time), otherwise it will engage with ASCMs 
from a longer distance (this occurs the remaining 70% of the time). Torpedoes have a 
probability of hit of 0.8. The CVN’s risk from submarines also includes the time spent 





























Anti-ship ballistic missiles are the most uncertain of potential threats. China has 
developed the DF-21D medium-range ballistic missile. It has a range of 2000 km and a 
maneuverable re-entry warhead (IHS Jane's 2014). This allows it to target a moving ship 
such as a CVN. The probability of hit of the missile and tactics employed by the PLA are 
entirely unknown, but they have been assumed based on unclassified sources and 
analogous systems. It is assumed that the PLA will launch a salvo of 20 ASBMs each of 
which has a Phit of 0.5. Given a carrier with sufficient escorts to launch one SM-3 
midcourse interceptor (Phit 0.55) and two SM-T terminal interceptors (Phit 0.6), the 
overall probability of at least one DF-21 striking the carrier is approximately 0.5. This 
salvo Phit is assumed constant regardless of range. However, in order to launch a salvo, 
accurate targeting information must be provided. 
Targeting for ASBM attacks can be provided by satellites, UAVs, or maritime 
surveillance ships (“tattle-tale ships”) (Easton 2014) scattered throughout the region. 
Although China possesses extremely long-range over-the-horizon radar, it is assumed 
that this technology does not have the required resolution to provide accurate targeting 
for ballistic missiles.  
Satellites are the preferred method of targeting since they work equally well at 
any range. For the purpose of this analysis the probability of detection was assumed to be 
0.3. However, a full sensitivity analysis was performed on this parameter to identify its 
effects. This can be seen in Figure 100.  
The PLA is projected to have UAVs capable of accurate targeting by the year 
2025 (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2013). These UAVs are assumed to have a max 
range of 1000 nm and a max probability of detection (Pd) of 0.5 that decreases linearly to 
0 at maximum range. This decrease is due to a combination of fewer hours on station at 
longer ranges and counter UAV weapons such as SAMs and aircraft. 
Finally, maritime surveillance ships consist of both specially outfitted surveillance 
vessels as well as disguised fishing junks capable of passing along location data. It is 
assumed that this method has a maximum Pd of 0.05 within 500 nm of shore then 
decreases linearly to 0 at maximum range of 2000 nm.  
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Combining the Phit of a salvo of DF-21s with the probability of being accurately 
targeted by any method gives the overall probability of mission-kill for ASBMs. 
 Land-Based ASCM 
Finally, the last threat posed to a carrier is land-based ASCMs. They have a 
maximum range of 280 km (IHS Jane's 2014) and a max Phit of 0.4. It is assumed that 
the Phit decreases linearly to 0 at maximum range due to the counter detection and 
interception capability of the carrier strike group.  
 Risk Summary 
Each of the individual threat profiles can be seen in Figure 97. Each layer is then 
compiled to form an overall probability of mission-kill as a function of distance from 
Mainland China, which can be seen in Figure 98.  
Figure 98.  Risk vs. distance for a CVN operating area 
Risk significantly increases as the CVN operates closer to Mainland China. 
Several large increases occur when CVN enters DF-21 range and SSK range. Optimal 

































 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Since the exact probability of hit for a salvo of DF-21 missiles may vary from the 
original estimate of Probability of mission-kill (Pmk) 0.5, a full sensitivity analysis was 
performed on that parameter. Pmk was varied from 0.1 to 0.9 and the resultant risk 
profiles can be seen in Figure 99. The risk to a CVN varies considerably based on the 
effectiveness of ASBMs. 
 
Figure 99.  Effect of DF-21 salvo Pmk 
Similarly, the exact probability of detection from a PLA satellite may vary from 
the original estimate of 0.3, so a full sensitivity analysis was performed on that 
parameter. It was varied from 0.1 to 0.9 and the resultant risk profiles can be seen in 







































Satellite probability of detection has a very similar effect on risk as ASBM salvo 
Pmk. Therefore, degrading Chinese satellites could greatly enhance the survivability of a 
CVN for potentially a much lower cost than additional ballistic missile defense platforms, 
as seen in Figure 100.  
 










































Finally, if operating outside of DF-21 range is U.S. preferred tactic, then the most 
dangerous COA for China is to have SSNs patrol only outside of DF-21 range. At 1200 
nm, this increases the probability of mission-kill from 5% to 10%. This effect can be seen 
in Figure 101.  





























b. Sea Scout Probability of Mission Kill
The risks faced by a Sea Scout are identical to the risks faced by a CVN with one 
exception: they are unable to be targeted by ballistic missiles. This assumption was made 
because of the smaller size and maneuverability of the Sea Scout platform. Additionally, 
having a limited supply of DF-21 missiles, it is assumed that China would not attempt to 
use a significant number against a lower priority target such as the Sea Scout. The 
resulting risk plot for Sea Scout can be seen in Figure 102.  
Figure 102.  Risk vs. distance for Sea Scout operating area. 
c. EAB Probability of Mission Kill
Expeditionary air bases face fewer threats than sea-based platforms. The two main 
threats to EABs are short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and cruise missiles. China has 
a very large number of older, nearly obsolete SRBMs, such as the DF-4, that are very 
inaccurate. The CEP is estimated to be 1500m (IHS Jane's 2013). Although these missiles 
could be used effectively to disrupt operations at extremely large targets like fixed 
airbases where precision is not paramount, it is assumed that these older missiles would 
































21C missiles with a much more precise warhead. They have an effective range of 
2500km (IHS Jane's 2013). The targeting for SRBMs can come from satellites, UAVs, or 
HUMINT. It is assumed that satellites have a 0.5 probability of detection of EABs. UAVs 
have a Pd of 0.5 that decreases linearly out to its maximum range of 1000 km. Probability 
of detection by HUMINT sources is 0.05. 
Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) such as the C-602 have significantly 
longer ranges than anti-ship cruise missiles. The C-602 has a maximum range of 1800km 
(IHS Jane's 2014). It is assumed that the Phit of the C-602 is 0.6 and decreases linearly to 
0 at its maximum range. These LACMs can be launched from road mobile launchers 
mounted on trucks, or alternatively they can be air-launched from bombers. The H-6K 
can carry seven C-602s (IHS Jane's 2014) out to its maximum range of 1800km. Similar 
to the previous section it is assumed that the chance of bombers launching their missiles 
is 0.1 decreasing linearly to 0 at their maximum range. This decrease is due to longer 
time for detection and intercept by friendly forces. The resultant risk vs. range plot for 
EABs can be seen in Figure 103.  
 































4. Strike Data Set Development
The next step of this analysis was to model strike effectiveness as a function of 
range from the conflict. The measure of strike effectiveness is: 
Strike Power  Assets Payload  Mission Success Rate SGR  
Assets are the number of mission capable strike fighters available. Payload is the 
amount of ordnance, measured in pounds, available on each strike mission. Mission 
success rate is the probability of a strike mission accomplishing the mission without 
aborts for maintenance, weather, etc. SGR is sortie generation rate. It is a function of 
maintenance time (MT), flight time (FT), and turn-around-time (TAT) (Jewell 1998).  
SGR  24hrs
FT  MT TAT
Distance to the conflict directly affects SGR. A greater distance means longer 
flight time, longer maintenance time, and thus fewer sorties per day.  
A graph of each option’s strike power vs. distance can be seen in Figure 104. 
Each of the specific options will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
































a. CVN Strike Power 
Current budgets call for 44 strike/fighters in each carrier air wing including a 
combination of F/A-18s and F-35Cs (Naval Aviation Enterprise 2012). This total is 
reduced by the percentage of aircraft that are not mission-capable and require 
maintenance. Seventy-five percent of the aircraft are assumed to be mission-capable at 
any given time (Jewell 1998). Additionally, six F/A-18s must be equipped as organic 
tankers for launch and recovery operations. When equipped as tankers, these aircraft 
cannot perform strike missions or air-to-air combat. Finally, if no Air Force tankers are 
present, organic tankers are required to accompany strike aircraft on missions beyond the 
maximum unrefueled combat radius of 600nm for F-35C. Each tanker is assumed to 
extend the radius of two strike fighters by 200nm. However, if Air Force tankers are 
present the need for organic tanking is eliminated. For this scenario, it is assumed that no 
Air Force tankers will be available. A graphical depiction of SGR vs. range can be seen 
in Figure 105.  
 







































Table 21.  CVN strike parameters. 
b. CVL Strike Power
CVLs have a complement of 16 F-35Bs embarked (Weisser and Coles-Cieply 
2009) for strike missions. This number of assets is reduced by 25% for aircraft that are 
not mission-capable. CVLs have no organic refueling capability. The combat radius of 
the F-35B is 450 nm and the payload is 2000 lbs. Due to the space and personnel 
limitations of the CVL, it is assumed that the SGR onboard a CVL can never exceed 
four sorties per day. The resultant strike effectiveness of a CVL can be seen below. 

































Table 22.  CVL strike parameters. 
c. Sea Scout Strike Power
The upgraded Sea Scout possesses LRASM missiles for strike missions. They 
have a payload of 1,000lbs per missile and a maximum range of 230nm. At most, 56 
missiles can be carried in vertical launch tubes. These missiles are one-way threats 
therefore the associated SGR is 1.0. For more details on the Sea Scout strike capabilities, 
please see the Sea Scout section of the report. The resultant strike effectiveness of a Sea 
Scout can be seen below in Figure 107.  

































Table 23.  Sea Scout strike parameters 
d. EAB Strike Power
EABs have a complement of six F-35Bs for strike missions. This number of assets 
is reduced by 25% for aircraft that are not mission capable. EABs have no aerial refueling 
capability. The combat radius of the F-35B is 450nm and the payload is 2000lbs. Due to 
the personnel and maintenance limitations of the EAB, it is assumed that the SGR at an 
EAB can never exceed four sorties per day. The resultant strike effectiveness of an EAB 
can be seen below in Figure 108.  

































Table 24.  EAB strike parameters 
5. Counter-Air Data Set Development 
The next step of this analysis was to model counter-air effectiveness as a function 
of range from the conflict. The measure of counter-air effectiveness is: 
Counter Air Power  Assets RCP On Station Time Mission Success Rate SGR  
Assets are the number of mission-capable fighters available. RCP is relative 
combat power, which is a measure of the air-to-air ability of various aircraft types. For 
this analysis, RCP is base-lined to an F-18 aircraft, which is given an RCP value of 1.0. 
F-35 aircraft are estimated to be roughly twice as effective at air-to-air combat so they are 
assigned an RCP value of 2.0. On station time is the amount of effective counter-air time 
provided by each sortie. This time is limited by either fuel or by the number of air-to-air 
missiles carried. In a large scale air-to-air battle it is estimated that targets can be located 
and missiles fired at an average rate of 15 minutes per missile. Therefore, effective on-
station time is capped by the number of missiles carried multiplied by 15 minutes per 
missile. Mission success rate and SGR remain the same as the previous sections.  
A graph of each option’s counter-air power vs. distance can be seen in Figure 109. 
Each of the specific options will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
 219
Figure 109.  Strike power vs. distance for all options 
a. CVN Counter-Air Power
The CVN counter-air assets are the same set of 44 strike aircraft used in the strike 
mission. They are reduced by 25% for aircraft that are not mission-capable. The RCP of 
the F-35C is 2.0. Its mission success rate is 70%. SGR is calculated the same way as for 
strike missions and it decreases with range. On-station time is calculated by subtracting 
flight time from total endurance. The endurance of an F-35C is 2.5 hours. Each F-35C 
can carry four air-to-air missiles (IHS Jane's 2013) so total on-station time for counter-air 
missions can never exceed one hour per aircraft. The profile of CVN counter-air power 










































Table 25.  CVN counter air parameters 
b. CVL Counter-Air Power 
The CVL’s counter-air assets are 16 F-35Bs. They are reduced by 25% for aircraft 
that are not mission capable. The RCP of the F-35B is 2.0. Its mission success rate is 
70%. SGR is calculated as previously described and it decreases with range. On station 
time is calculated by subtracting flight time from total endurance. The endurance of an F-
35B is 2.0 hours. Each F-35B can carry 4 air-to-air missiles (IHS Jane's 2013) so total on 
station time for counter air missions can never exceed 1 hour per aircraft. The profile of 
CVL counter air power vs. range can be seen as the red line in Figure 109.  












Table 26.  CVL counter air parameters 
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c. Sea Scout Counter-Air Power
Sea Scout is not equipped with any assets capable of counter-air mission. It is 
limited to strike and ISR only.  
d. EAB Counter-Air Power
An EAB’s counter-air assets are six F-35Bs. They are reduced by 25% for aircraft 
that are not mission capable. The RCP of the F-35B is 2.0. Its mission success rate is 
70%. SGR is calculated as previously described and it decreases with range. On-station 
time is calculated by subtracting flight time from total endurance. The endurance of an F-
35B is 2.0 hours. Each F-35B can carry four air-to-air missiles (IHS Jane's 2013) so total 
on-station time for counter-air missions can never exceed one hour per aircraft. The 












Table 27.  EAB counter air parameters 
6. ISR Data Set Development
The next step of this analysis was to model ISR effectiveness as a function of 
range from the conflict. The measure of ISR effectiveness is: 
ISR Power  Assets On Station Time Mission Success Rate SGR  
Assets are the number of ISR capable aircraft. Mission success rate is the 
probability of an ISR mission being completed successfully. SGR is sortie generation 
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rate. It is a calculated as previously described. On-station time is calculated by 
subtracting the flight time from the total endurance. For several aircraft a maximum range 
is specified beyond which the aircraft cannot perform mission duties. The ISR range 
profiles for the four options can be seen in Figure 110. 
 
Figure 110.  ISR power vs. distance for all options. 
a. CVN ISR Power 
Fighter aircraft perform the CVN’s ISR mission. E-2D early warning aircraft 
provide communications and command and control for the fighters. The fighters can 
perform both ISR and strike missions simultaneously. Therefore, the assets available for 
ISR are 44 fighters reduced by 25% for aircraft that are not mission-capable. The mission 
success rate is 70%. SGR is calculated as previously described and it decreases with 
range. On-station time is calculated by subtracting flight time from total endurance. The 
endurance of an F-35C is 2.5 hours. The profile of CVN ISR power vs. range can be seen 







































Table 28.  CVN ISR parameters. 
b. CVL ISR Power
The CVL is equipped with both fighters and MQ-8 Fire Scout helicopters that can 
perform ISR missions. The total ISR provided is a combination of both of these assets. 
The fighter assets available are 16 F-35Bs reduced by 25% for aircraft that are not 
mission-capable. There are four MQ-8 Fire Scouts onboard a CVL (Weisser and Coles-
Cieply 2009). The mission success rate for both types is 70%. SGR is calculated as 
previously described and it decreases with range. On -station time is calculated by 
subtracting flight time from total endurance. The endurance of an F-35B is 2.0 hours and 
a MQ-8 is 10 hours. The profile of CVL ISR power vs. range can be seen as the red line 













Table 29.  CVL ISR parameters. 
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c. Sea Scout ISR Power 
The Sea Scout is equipped with 21 dedicated Boeing Hummingbird ISR UAV 
platforms. These UAVs are capable of flying for 20 hours at a speed of 165kts. They 
have a maximum range of 1125nm. For more specific details about the capabilities of Sea 
Scout UAVs please see the section discussing Sea Scout. The mission success rate is 
70%. SGR is calculated as previously described and it decreases with range. On-station 
time is calculated by subtracting flight time from total endurance. The profile of EAB 











Table 30.  Sea Scout ISR parameters. 
d. EAB ISR Power 
The EAB is equipped with both fighters and Fire Scout helicopters that can 
perform ISR missions. The total ISR provided is a combination of both of these assets. 
The fighter assets available are six F-35Bs reduced by 25% for aircraft that are not 
mission-capable. There are two MQ-8 Fire Scouts as well. The mission success rate for 
both types is 70%. SGR is calculated as previously described and it decreases with range. 
On-station time is calculated by subtracting flight time from total endurance. The 
endurance of an F-35B is 2.0 hours and a MQ-8 is 10 hours. The profile of EAB ISR 
















Table 31.  EAB ISR parameters. 
7. Scenario Requirements
Next the team developed the specific mission requirements for the scenario. The 
scenario envisions the Spratly Islands as the center of the conflict. U.S. forces are 
positioning to help allied nations defend their claims over the disputed regions. A PLA 
fleet is heading south from the coast of China to reinforce red troops on in the Spratly 
Islands and to attack any U.S. ships encountered. In order to achieve victory, the U.S. 
force structure must be able to wage a major strike campaign around the Spratly Islands. 
This campaign is estimated to require at least 200,000lbs. of ordnance per day in the 
Spratly trapezoid depicted in Figure 111. This region will also require 48hrs per day of 
ISR, which equates to two aircraft on-station at all times. Finally, a minimal amount of 
counter-air presence (8 hours on-station per day) will be required. 
In order to enable the strike campaign in the Spratly Islands, a barrier would be 
established between Vietnam and the Philippines to intercept any incoming bombers or 
fighter aircraft. This is where the major air battle is expected to take place. The barrier 
must be placed far enough away from the main fleet to allow interception of the hostile 
aircraft prior to launching anti-ship cruise missiles. This barrier can be seen in Figure 
111. It consists of an ISR requirement of 96 hours per day, a strike requirement of 
50,000lbs ordnance per day, and a counter-air requirement of 96 hours per day to fulfill 
four 24-hour combat air patrols.  
The area of the Paracel Islands also could hold a significant number of targets in 
this scenario. This area requires 12 hours of ISR, 50,000lbs of ordnance, and 48 hours of 
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counter-air missions per day. The Paracel Islands lie outside the barrier of air protection, 
therefore most strike missions will be accompanied by sufficient counter-air equipped 
aircraft. 
Finally, the Taiwan straits are a significant choke-point for surface vessels. 
Therefore, a persistent ISR capability accompanied by minor strike ability would be 
needed by U.S. forces.  
These mission requirements are depicted in Figure 111.  
 
Figure 111.  Baseline mission requirements. 
Due to the inherent unpredictability adversary technology, the team decided to 
test the robustness of the alternatives by subjecting them to more rigorous requirements 
in addition to the baseline requirements. If, for example, the PLA fighters developed were 
twice as effective as anticipated the counter-air requirements for U.S. forces could 
double. Similarly, if PLA military targets had advanced hardening capabilities, it may 
take roughly twice as many strike missions to neutralize the same number of targets. 
Therefore, the mission requirements described previously were doubled. These mission 
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sets were tested individually and together to determine their impact on results. The 
doubled requirements can be seen in Figure 112.  
Figure 112.  Doubled mission requirements. 
8. Results
The team sought to compare alternative force structures by limiting the types of 
platforms available in each optimization. The first case, and baseline for analysis, is a 
force structure composed of CVNs only. This equates to the current U.S. fleet where 
CVNs are the only current method of projecting naval air power. Next, CVNs are teamed 
with the Sea Scout to see how risk can be reduced by the addition of a dedicated UAV 
carrier. Then expeditionary air bases alone are used to meet the mission requirements. 
Next, EABs and Sea Scouts are paired together. Finally, CVNs, EABs, and Sea Scouts 
are all allowed into the solutions.  
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The results of these trials for the baseline set of mission requirements can be seen 











CVNs Only  2        21.9  3846  100% 
CVN + Sea 
Scouts  1     1  11.6  1480  38% 
EABs Only     22     31.0  1488  39% 
EABs + Sea 
Scouts     10  3  16.0  724  19% 
CVN + EAB + 
Sea Scouts  1  10  1  25.7  675  18% 
Table 32.  Optimal solutions for baseline mission requirements. 
Preliminary testing showed that CVLs were not efficient solutions for this model 
and were excluded from further analysis. This was mainly due to two assumptions made 
in the process. First, CVLs were assumed to suffer the same risks at the same rates as 
CVNs. Second, CVL cost estimation was performed using the America class LHA as the 
analogous platform. If dedicated CVLs could be built cheaper or if its size was small 
enough to eliminate the threat of ballistic missiles, then CVLs may become a viable 
alternative. The team highly recommends this topic as a candidate for future study.  
The results in Table 32. can also be plotted in a risk vs. cost graph. This shows 
that the solutions are stable over a wide range of costs. This can be seen in Figure 113. 
The red X’s show the acquisition costs and risk of the optimal force structures that 
compose the horizontal lines. 
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Figure 113.  Risk vs. cost for baseline mission requirements. 
This graph shows how the optimal solution changes with cost. The dashed blue 
line depicts the solutions when CVNs, EABs and Sea Scouts are all viable alternatives. 
The problem is infeasible when less than $12 billion is available. At $12 billion one CVN 
and one Sea Scout can meet the mission requirements. This incurs a risk of 38% of the 
baseline risk incurred by two CVNs operating alone. This is a significant drop in risk, 
which also comes with a much lower cost.  
Please note that the risk incurred is a function of asset placement as well as force 
structure. The optimal placement of two CVNs to meet the mission requirements can be 
seen in Figure 114. and the optimal placement of one CVN and one Sea Scout can be 








































Figure 114.  Optimal solution for CVNs only. 
 
Figure 115.  Optimal solution for CVNs and Sea Scouts. 
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The solution of one CVN and one Sea Scout remains the best solution for all costs 
less than $17 billion. At $17 billion a new optimal solution emerges consisting of ten 
EABs and three Sea Scouts. This incurs 19% of the risk of two CVNs. This provides an 
even lower risk in exchange for a larger price tag. The placement of assets in this solution 
can be seen in Figure 116.  
Figure 116.  Optimal solution for EABs and Sea Scouts. 
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This solution of ten EABs and three Sea Scouts dominates the alternative of 
EABs only. Using EABs alone requires 22 bases and suffers a risk of 39% of the baseline 
value. However, EABs alone still offer a risk reduction from the baseline case of two 
CVNs although at a higher cost. The optimal placement of EABs can be seen in Figure 
117. The optimal placement relies heavily on both Vietnam and the Philippines to reach 
both sides of the requirements barrier. 
 
Figure 117.  Optimal solution for EABs only 
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Finally, if $26 billion or greater is available for force structure acquisition, the 
optimal solution consists of one CVN, ten EABs, and one Sea Scout. This alternative has 
the lowest risk at 18% of the baseline. This optimal placement of this force structure can 
be seen in Figure 118.   
Figure 118.  Optimal solution for CVNs, EABs and Sea Scouts 
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The optimal solutions for the various combinations were plotted on a cost vs. risk 
chart to determine the efficient solutions. An efficient solution offers the most risk 
reduction for a given dollar amount. This plot can be seen in Figure 119. Increasing risk 
is down on the vertical axis and increasing cost is right on the horizontal axis. Therefore, 
the best force structures are those closest to the top left corner of the graph. 
 
Figure 119.  Cost vs. risk efficiency of alternatives 
There are three efficient solutions for examination. One CVN and one Sea Scout 
offer the least expensive alternative to achieve a significant reduction in risk. Then for 
approximately $5 billion more, ten EABs and three Sea Scouts offer an even greater 
reduction in risk. Finally, for an additional $10 billion only a minor further reduction in 
risk can be achieved. Therefore, the first two alternatives offer the greatest return on 
investment. The force structure with only CVNs and the force structure with only EABs 




























All of the efficient solutions contain Sea Scout in the force structure. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that Sea Scout would in fact help to achieve the goals of reducing risk 
and cost when operating in an A2AD environment. 
9. Sensitivity Analysis 
Next several different cases were examined to see how the solution changes when 
some of the key inputs are varied. First the team explored the possibility that it 
underestimated the scale of the mission requirements. For this case, each of the mission 
requirements was doubled and the optimization was performed on them individually and 
then all together. This protects against a situation in which PLA capabilities advance 
faster than anticipated and thus the U.S. commander in the conflict needs more capability. 
The first trial tested was one with doubled ISR requirements. This situation could 
arise if PLA counter detection capabilities advance more rapidly than anticipated. This 
could require twice as many aircraft on-station to find and identify targets of interest. The 












CVNs Only  3        32.9  5680  148% 
CVN + Sea 
Scouts 
1     1  11.6  2574  67% 
1     1  12.3  1495  39% 
EABs Only     48     67.7  3290  86% 
EABs + Sea 
Scouts     10  3  16.0  724  19% 
CVN + EAB 
+ Sea 
Scouts  1  10  1  25.7  687  18% 
Table 33.  Double ISR requirements, optimal solutions 
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Figure 120.  Double ISR requirements, cost vs. risk. 
This shows that ISR is extremely demanding in the absence of Sea Scout. When 
only CVNs are involved, three are required instead of the original two. When only EABs 
are used, 48 are required instead of the original 22. However, when Sea Scout is added to 
the force structure the solutions are generally unchanged. This shows that Sea Scout has 
additional excess ISR capability and is by far the best choice to meet the ISR 
requirements. 
The next case studied was doubled counter-air requirements. This case could arise 
if PLA aircraft are more effective or more numerous in 2025 than anticipated. This would 
result in twice as many air-to-air equipped U.S. fighter required to achieve victory. The 





































CVNs Only  2    21.9  4018  104% 
CVN + Sea 
Scouts  2 1  22.6  2909  76% 
EABs Only   23   32.4  1545  40% 
EABs + Sea 
Scouts   18  3  27.4  1298  34% 
CVN + EAB + 
Sea Scouts 
1  4  1  17.3  2629  68% 
1  5  1  18.7  1848  48% 
1  18  1  37.0  1263  33% 
Table 34.  Double counter air requirements, optimal solutions. 
Figure 121.  Double counter-air requirements, cost vs. risk. 
Doubled counter-air requirements prove to be one of the most stressful situations 
for the U.S. forces. One CVN cannot meet the requirements on its own and either EABs 






























situation because they are scalable and the number utilized can be expanded or reduced to 
meet the requirements. In contrast, if an entire additional CVN is brought into the conflict 
then the entire air wing is exposed to more risk. 
The next case studied was doubled strike requirements. This case could arise if 
PLA targets utilized hardened structures or counter-targeting abilities that made each 
strike less effective Twice the amount of ordnance would be needed to destroy the same 
number of targets. The results for doubled strike requirements can be seen in Table 35. 












CVNs Only  2        21.9  3846  100% 
CVN + Sea 
Scouts 
2     1  22.6  1480  38% 
1     3  12.9  1522  40% 
EABs Only     30     42.3  1545  40% 
EABs + Sea 
Scouts     10  13  27.4  1298  34% 
CVN + EAB + 
Sea Scouts 
3  10  1  47.6  682  18% 
2  10  3  38.0  721  19% 
1  10  7  29.7  782  20% 
Table 35.  Double strike requirements, optimal solutions. 
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Figure 122.  Double strike requirements, cost vs. risk. 
These solutions are similar to the baseline solutions, but they utilize additional 
Sea Scouts to make up for the strike shortfalls. The complement of 56 LRASM missiles 
makes the Sea Scout an effective strike platform as well as an effective ISR platform. 
CVNs are still the most cost efficient, long-range strike platforms and given unlimited 
funds three CVNs placed far away from the threats could still mount a formidable strike 
campaign. However, this requires Sea Scouts and EABs to relieve the ISR and counter-
air requirements deep within the A2AD threat environment. 
Finally, if all mission requirements are doubled at the same time, representing the 
most challenging of scenarios studied thus far, the results can be seen in Table 36. and 















































CVNs Only  3        32.9  5680  148% 
CVN + Sea 
Scouts 
2     2  23.2  2922  76% 
2     1  22.6  3893  101% 
EABs Only     51     71.9  3431  89% 
EABs + Sea 
Scouts     18  9  31.3  1401  36% 
CVN + EAB + 
Sea Scouts 
3  18  1  58.9  1270  33% 
2  18  3  49.3  1285  33% 
2  5  1  29.6  1858  48% 
1  5  2  19.3  1867  49% 
1  4  2  17.9  2654  69% 
Table 36.  Double all requirements, optimal solutions. 
 
Figure 123.  Double all requirements, cost vs. risk. 
When all requirements are doubled, the best solutions consist of all three force 




































one that has the most risk reduction for the best price is one CVN with five EABs and 
two Sea Scouts. This provides a robust solution that can handle a doubling of any of the 
original requirements for a cost of $19 billion. This force structure reduces the risk to 
49% of the baseline risk. 
Finally, for this analysis the Sea Scout was equipped with Hummingbird UAVs 
with excellent range and endurance specifications. However, if the U.S. Navy was unable 
to acquire UAVs with these specifications this could impact the effectiveness of the Sea 
Scout. Therefore, the group performed a sensitivity analysis to compare the optimal 
solutions for Sea Scout with both Hummingbird UAVs and less capable UAVs that meet 
the minimum required specifications described in the Sea Scout portion of the report. The 
comparison of capabilities can be seen in Table 37. and the results of this analysis can be 











Table 37.  Hummingbird UAV parameters vs. minimum requirements. 
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Figure 124.  Sensitivity analysis of Hummingbird UAVs. 
The results show that the optimal solutions are somewhat insensitive to the 
specific ISR capabilities of the Sea Scout UAVs. All of the solutions have similar force 
compositions with the exception that an additional three Sea Scouts are required to 
perform the duties of one original Sea Scout with Hummingbird UAVs. This shows that 
the team’s conclusion is still valid that the U.S. Navy should pursue an unmanned ISR 
platform to augment the current fleet capabilities. The ISR requirements can be reduced 
by a few extremely capably UAVs or with a larger number of moderately capable UAVs.  
10. Computation 
These formulations were solved using General Algebraic Modeling System 
(GAMS) software with CPLEX version 12.3.0.0. Typical runs utilize 16,316 constraints 
and 6,222 binary variables. Typical run time for the ILP to minimize cost is less than one 
minute on a Dell Precision T7500 computer with two Intel Xeon 3 GHz CPUs and 96 GB 



































Most trials were solved to 100% optimality. However, rare cases when total 
budget values were slightly less than the total cost for an optimal force structure resulted 
in extremely long run times with large gaps in optimality. For example, one trial for the 
doubled strike requirements with $37B in allowable budget was interrupted at 29% from 
optimality after 96 hours of run time. However, these rare instances do not adversely 
affect the conclusions drawn from this model. The force structures that compose the steps 
of the cost vs. risk function are stable over large ranges of cost and their compositions 
can be determined at other points on the curve. In the example described previously, the 
ILP solved quickly for a $36B and $38B budget. Therefore, it is not important what 
happens precisely at $37B, but rather the composition of the force structure to which it is 
transitioning. 
11. Conclusion 
All of the optimal solutions discussed above are compiled in Figure 125. The 
baseline mission solutions are depicted as the yellow line and the more stringent 
requirements are the other colors. 
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Figure 125.  Cost vs. risk for all optimal solutions. 
Three force structure alternatives are depicted in red that meet increasingly 
difficult requirements while at the same time reducing risk substantially from the baseline 
case of two CVNs operating alone. Of the three solutions shown, Alternative 2 reduces 
risk the most, to 19% of the baseline risk. It meets both the original requirement set and 
the doubled ISR requirement set. However, if the strike requirement was also doubled, 
then Alternative 1 provides the best value and reduces risk to 40% of baseline. Finally, if 
all requirements were doubled including counter-air, then Alternative 3 could still meet 
this challenge and reduce risk significantly while doing so. 
It can also be seen from the curves that a doubled counter-air requirement is the 
most difficult to satisfy. These optimal force structures require the largest budgets and 
reduce risk the least from the baseline case. Therefore, a system that can achieve a greater 
counter-air capability for less risk is a highly desirable asset. The MTX can fill this gap. 
When operated from CVNs or EABs the MTX can provide longer on-station time and 





























unable to test the impact of MTX in this analysis, it is likely that the increased counter-air 
capabilities can decrease the overall risk to the fleet even further.    
In order to compose any of these force structures, the Navy must commit to 
fielding an unmanned ISR platform to reduce the mission demands on a carrier. This ISR 
UAV embarked on a platform such as Sea Scout could significantly reduce the risk to the 
Fleet in an A2AD environment. Additionally, dispersed basing options such as EABs 
provide another way to reduce risk without the acquisition of new platforms. However, 
the Navy must invest in the training and personnel necessary so that they can build these 
bases quickly and efficiently when they are needed.   
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XI. COMBAT ATTRITION - MANA SIMULATION AND
LANCHESTER ANALYSIS 
A. SIMULATION SOFTWARE: MANA 
MANA, or Map Aware Non-uniform Automata, is an agent-based, time-stepped, 
stochastic, mission-level model. MANA was developed by the New Zealand Defense 
Technology Agency with the goal to create an abstraction of a scenario that captures the 
essence of the physical and behavioral aspects (SEED Center for Data Farming 2013).  
B. MODELING IN MANA 
MANA allows the scenario to be depicted through placement and representation 
of entity groups. An entity group or “squad” as it is known in MANA is a representation 
of real-world physical assets in simulation with some type of behavioral pattern. The 
control of the entity group is through parameters such as the personality of the entities 
within the group, its waypoints, sensor range, communication range, and probability of 
hit for its weapons. Personality of the entity groups are set by the influence of 
information that entities within the groups pick-up from their environment, such as the 
presence of different enemy entity types, presence of own-force entities, information 
about enemy and friendly forces obtained through information data exchange from other 
exchanges, and its own waypoints. The personality of weapons and sensor parameters 
may be set differently based on a set of built-in detection criteria. For example, when an 
enemy entity is detected, MANA will transition the entity to “Enemy Contact” state and 
the personality for that weapon/sensor entity is set to be biased towards targeting/tracking 
the enemy entity. 
C. MANA MODEL GOALS 
Specific scenarios of the Distributed Air Wing system-of-systems CONOP were 
modeled in MANA and compared to the traditional CVN CONOP to explore the different 
Force-Exchange Ratios that would result. This model specifically tested the defensive 
counter-air ability of the DAW to react against enemy aircraft attacks.  
 248
D. MODEL SETUP AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The experiment was divided into two scenarios to determine the effectiveness of 
each CONOP in terms of Force-Exchange Ratio. The model used the alternatives 
generated by the force structure optimization model as the baseline for the 
experimentation. 
E. ALTERNATIVES TO BE TESTED: 
The three alternatives generated were as followed: 
1. Alternative 1: Blue CVN Southeast of Palawan 
20 Blue fighter aircraft are carried by the Blue CVN operating southeast of the 
Palawan Island and are launched at 30 second intervals to counter the Red forces coming 
towards the Spratly Islands. 10 Blue fighter aircraft are patrolling in the region of the 
Spratly Islands as a first response to engage the adversaries. The Red CVN is in Macau. 
This can be seen in Figure 126.  
 
Figure 126.  Blue CVN southeast of Palawan, Red CVN in the Sea of Macau. 
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2. Alternative 2: Blue CVN is Operating Just North of the Spratly
Islands
The Blue CVN is operating just north of the Spratly Islands. 30 fighter aircraft are 
carried by the Blue CVN and are launched at 30 second intervals to counter the Red 
forces coming towards the Spratly Islands. 10 Blue fighter aircraft are patrolling in the 
region of Spratly Islands as a first response to engage the adversaries, as depicted in 
Figure 127.  
Figure 127.  Blue CVN north of Spratly Islands, Red CVN near Paracel Islands. 
3. Alternative 3: DAW Concept
The DAW concept of operations disperses the 30 Blue fighter aircraft across two 
locations. Eight of the 30 Blue fighter aircraft are dispersed across three locations in 
Vietnam. Another 12 of the 30 Blue fighter aircraft are dispersed across four locations in 
the Philippines. The last 10 of the 30 Blue fighter aircraft are patrolling in the region of 
the Spratly Islands as a first response to engage the adversaries. This can be seen in 
Figure 128.  
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Figure 128.  DAWO Concept. 
F. SIMULATED ENEMY SCENARIO 1 
The Red CVN is deployed near the Paracel Islands and also launches 20 aircraft at 
30 second intervals. They are assisted by 10 fighter sorties, also launched at 30 second 
intervals. The Red bombers follow behind the fighters and are launched after all fighter 
aircraft are launched. Their aims are to breakup or destroy the DDGs and Blue ships 
protecting the Spratly Islands to pave the way for their main forces to attack.  
G. SIMULATED ENEMY SCENARIO 2 
The Red CVN is now operating in the Sea of Macau. Here the Red forces have 
their DDGs patrol the Paracel islands instead of using the CVN for that purpose. The 
CVN launches 20 aircraft at 30 second intervals. They are assisted by 10 fighter sorties, 
also dispatched at 30 second intervals. The Red bombers follow behind the fighters and 
are launched after all fighter aircraft are launched. Their aims are to breakup or destroy 
the Blue DDGs and ships protecting Spratly Islands to pave the way for their main Red 
forces to attack. 
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H. SCENARIO PARAMETERS 







Average speed 300m/s 300m/s stationary
Maximum time 
to operate 
1 hour 1 hour unlimited 
Air to Air 
missiles 
4 0 0
Air to Surface 
Missiles 
0 4 0
Surface to Air 
Missiles 
0 0 4
Table 38.  MANA Scenario parameters. 
I. BEHAVIORS 
The behaviors of the fighter aircraft are as follows. The fighter aircraft will be 
launched at 30 second intervals and fall into the default state. In the default state, 
following the waypoints takes priority over other matters. This is used mainly for the Air 
Patrol aircraft.  
When the Blue aircraft detect any Red enemy in their radar, the default state will 
transit to the enemy contact state. In this state, the Blue aircraft engages enemies as their 
top priority and flies towards the enemy target to engage them. Each state takes place for 
a maximum of 40 minutes, which is the average time before fuel runs out. After the 
engagement or after 40 minutes, the aircraft move back to their bases for refueling or for 
repairs. In this maintenance state, the aircraft stay for a minimum of 20 minutes, to 



















Figure 129.  Behavior Flow Chart. 
J. RESULTS 
1. Scenario 1 
Each of the three Alternatives was then tested with 200 simulation runs in each of 













Average  27.6 27.6 28.3 
Std. Dev  3.2 3.2 2.7 
95% Conf. 
Interval  0.45 0.45 0.38 
Red 
Casualties 
Average  27.4 27.8 27.1 
Std. Dev  3.3 2.9 3.5 
95% Conf. 
Interval  0.47 0.40 0.49 

















Figure 130.  MANA Scenario 1 results. 
a. Insights 
The DAW spreads its assets to different locations instead of concentrating like the 
CVN. The experiments runs depicted the red aircraft concentrating their engagements on 
Vietnam before moving on to engage the Philippines troops. This is a risk that a 
distributed air wing will need to undertake for spreading their assets widely, into different 
locations. Hence, the locations nearer to the hostile country will need to be significantly 
higher. 
However, when comparing the results, it showed that the DAW results are not 
significantly worse off than the CVN alternatives. The number of casualties is about one 
more when a DAW is utilized. Because of the higher blue casualty rate, the number of 
red kills is less, though the difference is not statistically significant. Hence, these results 
showed that the performance of a DAW is comparable to the CVN.  
A long-range missile could incapacitate a CVN and could significantly reduce the 
CVN operating performance. The DAW, with its lesser risks and a comparable 
performance, is a better choice than the CVN alternatives. 
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2. Scenario 2 














Average  27.6 27.0 28.5 
Std. Dev  3.0 3.5 2.7 
95% Conf. 
Interval  0.43 0.48 0.38 
Red 
Casualties 
Average  27.7 27.9 26.1 
Std. Dev  3.2 3.0 3.7 
95% Conf. 
Interval  0.45 0.42 0.51 




Figure 131.  MANA Scenario 2 results 
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a. Insights
These results show a similar trend of performances. The DAW showed a slight 
drop in performance compared to the CVN. The difference in mean blue casualties 
between Alternative 1 and Alternative 3 is statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level (P value of 0.003). Similarly the difference in mean red casualties between 
Alternative 1 and Alternative 3 is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (P 
value of 0.000004). Although there is a measured drop in performance, the difference of 
approximately 1 additional blue aircraft may not be operationally significant. In this 
scenario, the reaction time for the Vietnam forces to sortie is less because of the close 
proximity to the Paracel Islands. Furthermore, the blue aircraft are sent on a first launch 
first engage methodology. This means they do not congregate before moving out to 
engage the red troops. Hence, the results show that sporadically sending troops to engage 
a large mass of forces will in fact cause greater losses. This means that despite a 
distributed concept, it is recommended that forces congregate at a rendezvous point to 
build up a larger force structure before moving out to engage the large troops.  
K. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The DAW did result in slightly worse performance than the more concentrated 
alternatives. However, the difference in casualties is not operationally significant. These 
results may be explained by the fact that the dispersion of the forces into two locations 
reduced the size of the effective force in each location.  
In the original case, the entire Red force takes on eight Blue in Vietnam then the 
remaining 23 Blue near the Philippines. 
When the CAP is moved to Vietnam, the effective force ratio is about two Red 
aircraft to one Blue aircraft. This allows 30 Red aircraft to combat 18 Blue in Vietnam 
then the remaining Red force takes on the last 12 Blue forces in Philippines.  
Generally concentrating forces is a better tactic than splitting them into smaller 
units as happens in this scenario with the DAW. However, when offensive strikes are 
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required Blue forces can still be concentrated from multiple bases to form a large strike 
package. Therefore, the slightly worse performance shown here only applies to the 
defensive counter-air scenarios. 
L. LANCHESTER EQUATION ANALYSIS: 
Another way to demonstrate the differences observed in this model is by using 
Lanchester equations. Using a two-staged Lanchester equation to model the engagement, 
the result can be seen that if the capabilities of the forces are equally matched (i.e., a = b), 
the outcome of the battle will be in Red’s favor using the square-law (i.e., aimed-fire.) 
and a draw if the battle is based on linear-law (i.e., area-fire). This is shown in the 
following equations. 
 
ݎ	 ൌ 	30	Red	aircraft, ܾ	 ൌ 	8	Blue	aircraft, ܽ	 ൌ 	ܾ	 ൌ 	1, 
݂݋ݎ	ݏݍݑܽݎ݁݀	݈ܽݓ	ሺܽ݅݉݁݀ െ ݂݅ݎ݁ሻ, ݎ	ݓ݅݊ݏ	ݏ݅݊ܿ݁	 ݎܾ ൐ ඨ
1
1 
	ݎ௖௔௣ ൌ 	ඨ30ଶ െ 11 ሺ8ଶሻ ൌ 28.9	ܽ݊݀	ݎ௙௜௡௔௟ ൌ 	ඨ28.9ଶ െ
1
1 ሺ22ଶሻ ൌ 18.74,	 
 
݂݋ݎ	݈݅݊݁ܽݎ	݈ܽݓ	ሺܽݎ݁ܽ െ ݂݅ݎ݁ሻ, ݐ݄݁	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁	ݓ݈݈݅	ܾ݁	ܽ	݀ݎܽݓ	 
ݏ݅݊ܿ݁	ݎ௖௔௣ ൌ 30 െ ଵଵ ሺ8ሻ ൌ 22, ݎ ൌ ܾ ൌ 22	݂݋ݎ	ݐ݄݁	݂݈݅݊ܽ	ܾܽݐݐ݈e 
M. IMPLICATIONS 
From the Lanchester equations, a risk pertinent to DAW is the thinning of forces 
as a result of dispersing the forces. However, the simulation of the scenario shows that 
both sides suffer almost equal number of casualties and that the battle somewhat follows 
linear-law. This would suggest that the one disadvantage of the DAW, which is that it 
lacks the numbers advantage of the CVN, is less crucial than expected. A possible 
explanation for this observation was that the aircraft has a high single-shot probability of 
kill; hence one aircraft from each side has equal probability of killing the other at the first 
shot. Despite the general adherence to Linear Law, it was still observed that there are 
slightly more Blue casualties than Red.  
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Another observation is that the bombing of the ships generally takes place after 
air-superiority is established. Therefore, the key objective of both CVN and DAW 
operations is to amass as many aircraft in the air to take out the incoming enemy aircraft. 
With red forces having perfect intelligence information on the location of the blue forces 
and without any change to the total number of aircraft or capabilities of the aircraft, 
dispersing the air-wing will not result in any improvement in aerial performance or force-
exchange ratio of the DAW. Hence at best, the DAW force structure has the same force-
exchange as CVN (assuming Linear Law), but may have degraded performance due to 
the lower airpower available at each dispersed airbase. 
Although this analysis suggests that the DAW Alternative has a worse force-
exchange ratio for defensive counter-air missions, this model omits the presence of 
several other threats including ballistic missiles and submarines that may potentially take 
out the entire CVN and lead to a catastrophic mission failure. Therefore, although the 
DAW Alternative goes against the principle of concentration of force, it may still have 
advantages over the CVN in reducing cost and risk. 
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XII. FORCE STRUCTURE COST ESTIMATION AND ANALYSIS
A. FORCE STRUCTURE COST 
This section outlines the cost estimation methods and research done in support of 
the analysis of alternatives. Cost was determined based on the most current data available 
through conventional DOD cost resources. In most cases, the use of current systems and 
technology allowed cost to be tabulated through simple research methods. In cases where 
future or undeveloped systems were utilized, cost estimations were made based on the 
information available as well as several cost estimating assumptions. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
 All costs are expressed in Fiscal Year 2014 dollars.
 When costs were converted to FY$14 dollars, the Joint Inflation Indices
provided by the Naval Center for Cost Analysis were used.
 Only Unit Costs were used to estimate each alternative force structure’s
costs and actual replacement costs were not.
 MILCON costs for EABs were given a baseline cost of $100M that only
includes construction of an operational airstrip in the most optimal
locations. Manpower, Defense Weapons, Additional Logistics, etc., are
not taken into account.
 The LRASM missile is given a baseline price of $1.3M FY$14 dollars
each (1.3 x the ~$1M production unit cost of the AGM-158A JASSM
missile) due to the infancy of the program and the lack of information on
the quantity that will be produced (DOD 2012). Lockheed has cited that it
can produce the missile for well under $2M dollars a unit. (Butler 2013)
C. COST OF CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE FOR SCS SCENARIO 
Table 41 shows a Unit Cost breakdown of this baseline configuration using the 
average cost of each platform to include a CVN (O'Rourke 2007), LCS (Freedom Class) 
(Ackerman 2013), LCS (Independence Class) (Ewing 2009), DDG (O'Rourke, Navy 
DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress 
2011), DDX, LHD/LHA (Military Today 2014), LPD (DON 2012), LSD (USN 2013), 
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SSN (O'Rourke 2014), SSGN (O'Rourke 2006) and JHSV (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 2013). 
QTY Platform Unit Cost Total Platform Cost  
CSG 
1 CVN $  10,111,602,868.94 $       10,111,602,868.94 
1 CAW $     5,091,020,242.40 $         5,091,020,242.40 
6 LCS $        724,346,987.15 $         4,346,081,922.90 
6 DDGs $     2,422,733,346.21 $       14,536,400,077.29 
2 DDX $     4,023,133,333.33 $         8,046,266,666.67 
ESG 
1 LHD/LHA $     2,504,337,087.19 $         2,504,337,087.19 
1 ACE $        382,193,552.10 $             382,193,552.10 
1 LPD $     1,600,000,000.00 $         1,600,000,000.00 
1 LSD $        425,901,574.42 $             425,901,574.42 
4 JHSV $        218,066,000.00 $             872,264,000.00 
3 SSN $     2,707,100,000.00 $         8,121,300,000.00 
1 SSGN $     5,913,210,305.48 $         5,913,210,305.48 
Total Force Cost $ 51,838,975,428.44 
Table 41.  Current Force Structure Costs (FY14$) for SCS Battle. 
Table 41. displays the fact that the main cost driver in the force structure is the 
CVN at approximately $10 billion while the SSGN and DDX contribute costs of $4 
billion and $5.9 billion respectively. 
Other than CVN costs, one other element in the CSG that contributed 
substantially to the total cost is the DDGs. The DDG unit cost of around US$2 billion is 
an average cost of 62 DDGs in the fleet. The latest DDG1000 that is being built costs 
twice as much at around US$4 billion. Up until now, only three have been budgeted for 
(O'Rourke 2011). If the DDG1000 proves to be a suitable replacement for all the DDGs 
in the fleet, the cost of replacement will be substantially higher. 
The CVN usually carries more than 75 aircraft while an LHA/LHD will carry 
approximately 20. The exact configuration can vary dependent on the mission the carrier 
is assigned.  
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Table 42 gives the unit costs of F/A-18E/F (DOD 2012), F/A-18C (N) (USN 
2009), E-2C (USN 2009), EA-6B (USN 2009), C-2 (USN 2013), MH-60R (DOD 2011), 
and MH-60S (DOD 2011). 
Carrier Air Wing 
QTY  Platform  Variants  Unit Cost FY$14 
15  F/A‐18F Super Hornets  F   $    69,602,693.10  
15  F/A‐18E Super Hornets  E   $    69,602,693.10  
15  F/A‐18C Hornet  C   $    59,302,743.00  
15  F/A‐18C(N) Hornet  C(N)   $    59,302,743.00  
4  E‐2C Hawkeye 2000 NP  C   $    87,116,094.00  
4  EA‐6B Prowler  B   $    54,100,748.00  
3  C‐2 Greyhound   $    42,425,537.80  
4  MH‐60F/MH‐60H Seahawk  MH‐60R   $    44,633,117.10  
Total    MH‐60S   $    29,235,211.90  
75    Total Cost   $     4,707,043,722.40  
Table 42.  Cost of a possible Carrier Air Wing Configuration 
Table 43 gives the Unit Cost of a possible ACE configuration by breaking down 
the costs of the CH-46 (MilitaryWikia 2014), UH-1 (Federation of American Scientists 
2014), AH-1 (MilitaryWikia 2014), CH-53 (Shelf3d.Com 2014), and the AV-8B (U.S. 
Military 2014). 
Air Combat Element (ACE) 
QTY  Platform  Variants  Unit Cost FY$14 
6  CH‐46 Sea Knights  $    10,688,765.00  
2  UH‐1 Iroquois    $    4,700,000.00  
3  AH‐1 Cobras   $    15,728,000.00  
3  CH‐53 Super Stallions    $    36,192,991.20  
4  AV‐8B Harriers  B   $    40,937,703.50  
Total    Total Cost   $    393,046,377.60  
18   
Table 43.  Cost of a common Air Combat Element. 
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D. EAB BASING COST ESTIMATION 
The first of three alternatives investigated was the Dispersed Air Wing - 
Expeditionary Air Base concept. A force structure composed of six F-35Bs, 2 MQ-8 Fire 
Scouts, and 2 AEW assets consisting of two variants of the MH-60 were estimated 
resulting in a cost of over $1 Billion. This cost is solely the unit or capital cost associated 
with each aircraft to be stationed at the EAB. Therefore, the number of EABs used will 
approximately cost over a billion dollars each. Due to the relatively high cost of the EAB 
force structure, it was assumed that the MILCON cost of the runway would be 
insignificant in comparison.  
Many variables come into play when assessing the construction cost of these 
EABs. For example, if an EAB was strategically chosen to be built within 100 miles of an 
already existing Air Force Base, such as Clark Air Base in the Philippines, and the sight 
was clear of any obstructions such as a thick forest or swampland; its cost would be low 
compared to a different site. A more expensive proposition would be one where there is 
not a base within close proximity. A large amount of forestation would need to be 
cleared, and if it were far inland without roads and supplies, the cost to construct and to 
maintain the base would be very expensive. Due to the large amount of variables that 
come in to play when figuring the MILCON cost, a set amount was set aside for this 
category. After considering factors such as each airstrip will be located in different 
geographical areas requiring different needs to clear space for construction and locations 
from ports and resources vastly differing, an arbitrary cost was used for the sake of 
consistency. It was assumed each base on average may cost approximately $100M to 
construct. This does not include defense capabilities such as SAM sites, Surface to Air 
artillery, etc. Nor does it include the cost of personnel to maintain the equipment and the 
base itself. This number represents what the team figured to be a reasonable cost to 
construct the airstrip. Even with a quadrupled EAB cost of $400M, the total cost of each 
EAB and the assets that would perform missions from it would still be under $2Billion 
for each base. 
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Table 44  shows the cost breakdown of the F-35B (DON 2013), MQ-8 Fire Scout 
(Oestergaard 2013), as well as the average cost of the MH-60R (DOD 2012) and MH- 
60S (DOD 2011).  
EAB (Expeditionary Airbase)   QTY  Unit Cost FY$14  Total Unit Cost FY$14 
F‐35B  6   $     200,243,519.00    $   1,201,461,114.00  
MQ‐8 Firescout  2   $       18,300,000.00    $        36,600,000.00  
AEW Assets (MH‐60S or R)  2   $       36,934,164.50    $        73,868,329.00  
EAB MILCON Cost ~ $100M   1   $     100,000,000.00    $      100,000,000.00  
Total Cost  $   1,238,061,114.00  
Table 44.  Single Expeditionary Air Base Cost Analysis 
The total cost of the assets needed and the estimated MILCON costs of an EAB 
were found to be just under $1.24 Billion each. That cost makes up a mere two percent of 
the total unit cost of the assets we are trying to replace. If the Dispersed Air Wing EAB 
concept alone could close the capability gap needed for the scenario then anything less 
than 50 bases would be a cost saving. That does not include the risk reduction of being 
destroyed compared to the 26 vessels in the current force structure being analyzed, and 
the savings of the loss of lives found when operating unmanned aircraft in battle. 
E. CVL COST ESTIMATION 
Although Light Aircraft Carriers (CVLs) were eliminated from the final force 
structures recommendations, they were considered as a possible alternative throughout 
the analysis process.   
Since the ship has only been researched (Weisser and Coles-Cieply, Operational 
Employment of a Light Aircraft Carrier 2009), and there are no plans to build it at this 
time, the cost estimation team used the latest big deck amphibious ship as an analogous 
platform for cost. The comparison resulted in a cost of over $3.6 Billion FY14 to use for 
the CVL Unit. Table 45. displays the costs of the CVL and its embarked assets. The 
assets analyzed to deploy with the CVL are the same ones that were analyzed on the EAB 
alternative. The only differences are the quantities assigned.  
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Table 45 breaks down the unit cost of the CVL and the assets it would need to 
conduct the missions needed based on the Team’s analysis by each asset including the 
Carrier (Weisser and Coles-Cieply, Operational Employment of a Light Aircraft Carrier 
2009), F-35B, MQ-8, MH-60R, and the MH-60S. 
Platform QTY Unit Cost Total Unit Cost 
CVL 1 $              3,601,029,018.80 $  3,601,029,018.80 
16 F-35B 16 $ 196,500,000.00 $  3,144,000,000.00 
4 MQ-8 4 $ 19,100,000.00 $        76,400,000.00 
3 MH-60R 3 $ 44,633,117.10 $     133,899,351.30 
2 MH-60S 2 $ 29,235,211.90 $        58,470,423.80 
3 AEW Helo 
(60R/S) 3 $ 36,934,164.50 $     110,802,493.50 
Total Cost $  7,267,091,507.56 
Table 45.  CVL and Assets Cost Estimation. 
As mentioned previously in the report, the CVL was only an alternative at the 
start of the Team’s analysis and did not “survive” as an alternative for further analysis 
based on risk factors attributed to its size and the cost.  
F. SEA SCOUT COST ESTIMATION 
The 2013 report “Next Generation Fleet Escort Carrier” by the NPS TSSE class 
outlined the design of a ship designated CVE that could carry UASs into battle (Levine et 
al. 2013). Though the TSSE design contained many characteristics that were beneficial to 
for bringing capabilities to the scenario, the overall design was changed to better match 
the needs determined by the study and therefore, adjustments to the overall cost were 
applied. 
To provide strike capability, the CVE was outfitted with a VLS system and an 
armament of 56 long range cruise missiles. Implementation of the VLS system resulted in 
an overall increase in cost to the TSSE design of about $167M FY14 (DOD 2013). 
However, the omission of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System from the 
ship’s design resulted in a reduction in cost of ~$320M FY14 (Levine et al. 2013). 
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In regard to long range cruise missiles, the cost of both Tactical Tomahawks and 
LRASMs were also added to the system (Analysis of the Fiscal Year 2012 Pentagon 
Spending Request 2013). The LRASM is currently in its early stages of development and 
will not be awarded for contract until 2018 (Osburn 2014). Since the cost of the LRASM 
is unknown at this time and the number to be procured is uncertain, a rough figure of 1.3 
times the ~$1Million cost of the JASSM missile, the design that LRASM is based on, 
was used to formulate a cost of $1.3Million each to produce the missile.  
Another important aspect to the Sea Scout concept is the use of the shelved U.S. 
Army Hummingbird platform to provide ISR. The cost for the UAV was cited as just 
under $4Million each (Wright 2010). Table 46 and Table 47 summarize the overall 
estimated cost of the Sea Scout system. 
Sea  Scout  Platform  
(TSSE Design w/Alterations)  Qty Unit Cost (FY$14)  Total Unit Cost (FY$14) 
UAV Carrier (TSSE Design)  1   $     389,811,658.00   $     389,811,658.00 
UAV Air Wing 
LRASM  56   $    1,300,000.00    $     72,800,000.00 
A160 Hummingbird  21   $    3,889,111.00    $     81,671,331.00 
VLS Cells  14   $       11,932,490.00    $     167,054,860.00 
Total Unit Cost   $    $711,337,849.00 
Table 46.  Cost using LRASM. 
Sea  Scout  Platform  
(TSSE Design w/Alterations)  Qty Unit Cost (FY$14)  Total Unit Cost (FY$14) 
UAV Carrier (TSSE Design)  1   $    389,811,658.00    $     389,811,658.00 
UAV Air Wing 
Tactical TLAMs  56   $    1,535,733.00    $     86,001,048.00 
A160 Hummingbird  21   $    3,889,111.00    $     81,671,331.00 
VLS Cells  14   $      11,935,490.00    $     167,096,860.00 
Total Unit Cost   $     724,580,897.00 
Table 47.  Cost Using TLAMs. 
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The Sea Scout cost tables show that using the LRASM vice the Tactical TLAM 
would add approximately $13.2Million in costs. If LRASM were to grow in costs to a 
high end estimate of $2Million per missile, a full load-out of LRASM would bring the 
total cost of the Sea Scout system to up to over ~$750Million.  
Compared to the TSSE design’s cost of $745Million, which includes a BQM air 
wing (Levine et al. 2013), the redesign of the Sea Vex concept would increase overall 





A. PROJECT CONCLUSIONS 
SEA-20B offers the U.S. Navy three alternatives that can be utilized to mitigate 
risks associated with operating in an advanced A2AD environment; the Dispersed Air 
Wing Operations (DAWO) concept, a seaborne unmanned aircraft courier system (Sea 
Scout), and a carrier/land based unmanned air-to-air fighting vehicle (MTX). Analysis 
has shown that a combination of these alternatives in varying degrees can deliver the 
fleet’s three most critical capabilities (ISR, Offensive/Defensive Counter Air, and 
Surface/Land Strike) at less risk than the current CVN/CVW force structure. 
DISPERSED AIR WING OPERATIONS 
DAWO involves dispersed basing capabilities that can be used to operate carrier 
aircraft from land bases to project Strike and Counter-Air capability within an A2AD 
environment. The use of dispersed basing complicates the enemy’s targeting and greatly 
amplifies the resources required for the enemy to put the entire air wing out of action. 
Operating the CVW in this way reduces risk and allows the full spectrum of Naval Air 
capabilities throughout the battle space. 
These basing options include small scale Expeditionary Airbases (EABs) for 
Marine Corps STOVL aviation combat elements, Tactical Strike Bases (TSBs) which use 
dual-purpose highways as runways for conventional-takeoff aircraft from the carrier air 
wing, and Dispersed Hubs consisting of civilian airfields with hardened and reinforced 
defenses. These basing options do not require the procurement of new hardware. They 
only require good relationships with the allied countries in the desired region and 
personnel with the expertise and the training required to construct such bases.   
The advantages and disadvantages of each basing concept were analyzed in detail 
by SEA-20B. Significant advantages of DAWO were determined to be reduced 
vulnerability, increased deterrence, and enhanced partnership opportunities with regional 
nations. Confounding factors are logistical and maintenance complexity and more 
difficult command and control requirements. 
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Simulations were conducted and analyzed examining the vulnerability and 
susceptibility of these bases to attack. Dispersed airbases were shown to be inherently 
less vulnerable than a CVN. They require significantly more ordnance to achieve 
neutralization. This is primarily a function of the dispersed parking. It was demonstrated 
that with a parked aircraft separation distance of 150m, 36 unitary or 28 submunition 
warheads are required to destroy one-third of an EAB’s aircraft with an 80% probability 
of success. This stands in stark contrast to the damage even a single warhead can cause to 
a CVW if it impacts a CVN flight deck. Although, not examined in detail, it was also 
postulated that camouflage and hardening are likely to provide additional vulnerability 
reduction by decreasing the probability of detection. 
SEA SCOUT 
Sea Scout is a system-of-systems designed to meet the requirement of distributing 
airborne ISR, Land Strike and Surface Strike capabilities throughout the fleet. It is 
comprised of two main elements, a small UAS courier ship and embarked airborne 
platforms that provide the three primary warfighting capabilities. Whether attached to a 
SAG or CSG, Sea Scout can deliver persistent distributed capabilities wherever and 
whenever the fleet needs them the most. 
The UAS courier vessel, also known as a CVE, is about 1/3rd the size of a CVN, 
1/8th the cost (including acquisition and operation support), and requires only 2% of the 
CVN/CVW crew. Its small size and speed of up to 50 knots, coupled with point defense 
capabilities and soft kill measures, make the vessel more difficult to target by A2AD 
threats and therefore make it more survivable than a CVN. 
Sea Scout provides full spectrum ISR capability via the A160 Hummingbird, a 
rotary wing autonomous UAS platform currently in development by Boeing. While ISR 
is the Hummingbird’s primary mission within the concept, developing capabilities also 
include small capacity Direct Attack, Communications Relay operations, and Precision 
Resupply applications. Among the full spectrum of ISR missions, use of the 
Hummingbird also provides the fleet with over-the-horizon detection and targeting 
capabilities that enable extended range anti-ship cruise missiles and land attack missiles 
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to reach their full capability in dynamic targeting scenarios. Its capability is far superior 
to any platform of its type and weight class boasting a 222 knot maximum speed, a 
2,500nm range, 20hr endurance, 2,500lb payload capacity and a full complement of 
integrated sensors. 
Strike capability is designed into Sea Scout with the utilization of current and 
emerging state-of-the-art cruise missile technology via the Tactical Tomahawk Land 
Attack Missile (TLAM) and the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). These 
platforms are integrated into the system by the use of 14 Mk 57 next generation Vertical 
Launch Systems. With the Mk 57, Sea Scout brings a tailored mixture of up to 56 strike 
missiles to the fight. 
Sea Scout was designed with the capacity for growth. The CVE itself has the 
space to integrate more platforms, and the Hummingbird has room to integrate increased 
sensor and weapon capabilities as well. Therefore, as UAS technologies improve, more 
critical capabilities such as Electronic Warfare, Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine 
Warfare could be added in later increments of the system. With potential for growth and 
the rapid advancement of UAS technology, initial Sea Scout capabilities can be upgraded 
often in future iterations. 
MTX MISSILE-TRUCK UAV 
MTX is a two-phase incremental system of unmanned aircraft capable of carrying 
air-to-air missiles to accompany manned aircraft on fighter missions and providing 
persistent on-station time for offensive and defensive counter-air missions. The MTX 
“Missile-Truck UAV” can be paired with a manned fighter for OCA or ISR missions or 
controlled by an operator from the ground for DCA missions. The concept of the MTX 
adds three important elements that will aid in closing the capability gaps that are present 
when the CVN is distant from the fight. First, it reduces risk to personnel by replacing 
several manned aircraft required to perform the same mission. Second, it increases the 
payload available to manned fighters allowing the ability to engage more targets. Finally, 
MTX will provide an increase in combat range by eliminating weight and adding extra 
fuel tanks. 
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Three options were considered for the MTX concept. First, an unmanned fighter 
(QF/A-18 or QF-16), is the quickest and cheapest solution. It can fill the OCA capability 
gap as long as dispersed air bases are available for deployment. Second, an upgraded 
version of the MQ-9 Reaper (MQF-X) could fill the dedicated DCA role in protecting 
high value assets, but it would need some costly modifications. Finally, the X-47B UCAS 
brings greater range and endurance that is highly desirable in the A2AD environment. 
However, it would come at a greater price and require a longer lead-time for 
procurement. Therefore, a phased-in approach based on technology readiness and 
operational necessity should be taken into account when acquiring these systems.   
FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIMIZATION 
The integer linear program developed to optimize the locations and quantities of 
the different force structure alternatives provides a high-level view of the problem. It 
shows how current carrier strike groups can be combined with Sea Scouts and dispersed 
bases to provide the optimal mix of capabilities for any future scenario. These optimal 
force structures can only be built if component platforms are in the Navy’s inventory. 
Therefore, it is critical to begin the process of acquiring an unmanned ISR system now so 
that they will be available for future conflicts. Similarly, the training and organization 
required to construct and utilize dispersed bases should begin now. 
The team concludes that nuclear powered aircraft carriers need not be eliminated 
from the U.S. Navy force structure. They provide unrivaled power projection capabilities. 
However, in order to ensure that their might can be brought to bear on future adversaries, 
the current force structure must be augmented by distributed capabilities that can mitigate 
risk inside of an A2AD environment. The analysis in this report shows how the 




B. Further Research Efforts 
While the team was able to explore and deliver a broad range of high level 
Distributed Air Wing concepts, the depth to which the options could be explored was 
limited due to the time available. There are several areas that must be explored in order to 
help determine the full potential and feasibility of each concept. 
The following items represent general overarching research that would benefit all 
of the concepts presented.  
1. Logistics
The function of providing logistics is an immensely important and intricate piece 
to conducting operations and must be explored in order to help determine the true cost 
and feasibility of each alternative. DAWO represents an especially challenging concept 
for logistics with logistical support requirements spread across an expansive area. 
2. Human Systems Integration
Very little consideration was given within this study to Human Systems 
Integration (HSI). However, HSI should be heavily integrated into the Systems 
Engineering process throughout the acquisition life-cycle in order to optimize the system 
outputs. Going forward, a significant effort should be placed across all HSI domains. 
Manpower 
The number of people needed to man a system is a tremendous driver to the 
overall system cost. Conducting frequent manning analysis early and often during the 
system development will help ensure two things. First, it will make certain that the 
number of people needed to man the system is accurate. Second, it will help provide 
feedback to the Human Factors Engineering design as the engineers strive to optimize the 
human/system interface. 
(1) Personnel. Choosing the right people with the right skill and experience to 
operate a system is another aspect that is very important. Bringing more UAS technology 
into the force structure requires a well thought out assessment of personnel selection. 
This is especially true as technology matures and UAS vehicles become more and more 
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autonomous. Presently, UASs in the Navy are controlled by aviators who require 
expensive training. However, as autonomy progresses and less unique skills and 
experience are needed to operate these systems, utilization of these highly trained and 
skilled individuals may not be necessary. The creation of a new officer designator or 
Navy Enlisted Classification may be prudent to free naval aviators up for flight duties and 
allow for UAS operators who require less stringent training requirements. 
(2) Training. Given the infancy of the U.S. military integration of UAS 
technology, training systems and methods are still very early in their development. 
Emphasis on the Training domain will ensure that this newly established group of 
specialized operators, maintainers and support personnel are efficiently and effectively 
trained. 
(3) Human Factors Engineering. The application of Human Factors 
Engineering will be critical as the system design matures. As UAS and shipboard systems 
strive to become more autonomous and allow fewer humans to control greater capacities 
of assets, the human/system interfaces must be engineered to allow for efficient and 
accurate interactions. Engineering usability is an immensely important aspect of UAS 
control design. 
(4) Environment, Safety, Occupational Health (ESOH), Survivability and 
Habitability. While a great deal of the design focuses on unmanned systems and a move 
towards varying levels of system autonomy, the human will never be left entirely out of 
the loop. Therefore, ESOH, Survivability and Habitability will always play crucial roles 
in system design. These domains address a wide range of design aspects ranging from 
ergonomics and providing comfort to ensuring a safe work environment on the flight 
deck. Investing time on ESOH, Survivability and Habitability will pay dividends in the 
long run by reducing medical and disability payments that lead to substantial future cost-
burdens. 
3. C4I 
A serious challenge exists in regard to electronic warfare and the ability to utilize 
the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. Modern command and control systems rely heavily 
on the EM spectrum and are integral to the success of the overall force structure. While 
273
communications challenges were discussed throughout the project timeline, a more in 
depth study should be conducted to consider solutions to this type of denial in regard to 
the force structures posed within this study. 
4. Foreign Policy
A key enabler for the DAWO concept is having close foreign allies that will allow 
the United States to build and utilize bases of varying size, location and capacity. That, 
however, is not a certainty. Going forward, regional foreign policy and relation experts 
should explore the feasibility of making basing arrangements and develop a long-term 
strategy to building the relationships necessary for the concept’s success. By doing this 
now, foreign relationships can be strengthened through the construction of dual-purpose 
infrastructure and military-to-military training. This will allow the DAWO assets to flow 
into and out of theater when the time is right instead of waiting for lengthy political 
negotiations to conclude.   
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APPENDIX A. FACTOR RANKING DEFINTIONS AND CHARTS 
This appendix includes recaps of the four scenarios generated, the factor rankings 
calculation tables for scenario selection, and factor definitions, referenced in Chapter IV 
Sections A-B. 



















































Timeliness 3 4.5 5 3 3.88 12
Communications 5 3 3 5 4.00 8
Comm. Range 4 2 4 5 3.75 13
Comm. robustness/redundancy
5 3 3 5 4.00 8
Comm Security 5 4 1 4.5 3.63 14
Intelligence 4.5 5 4 4.5 4.50 2
Organic ISR  4.5 5 4 4 4.38 3
External Intelligence 4.5 5 5 5 4.88 1
Force Readiness Capability 5 4.5 3.5 4 4.25 5
Training 5 5 3 3.5 4.13 7
Manpower 5 4 4 4 4.25 5
Accessibility and Availability of 
Deployable Assets 5 4 3.5 5 4.38 3
Long Range Logistics  5 2 5 4 4.00 8
Theater Logistics  4 3 5 2 3.50 15
Force Scalability 4 3.5 3 3 3.38 16
Force Distribution 5 4 3.5 3.5 4.00 8
Scenario Average 4.6 3.8 3.7 4.1
Scenario Ranking 1 3 4 2
Weapons/Warfare Requirement 
Factors
Electronic/Cyber Warfare 4.5 3.0 1.0 4.0 3.13 3
Close Air Support 2.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 2.13 7
Anti Aircraft Capability 4.5 2.0 1.0 3.0 2.63 5
Anti‐ Missile Capability 4.0 5.0 1.0 3.0 3.25 2
BMD and Anti‐Ballistic Missile 
Capability 4.0 5.0 1.0 5.0 3.75 1
Deep Strike Capability 2.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 2.88 4
MIW Capability 2.0 4.0 1.0 2.0 2.25 6
Scenario Average 3.3 3.6 1.0 3.5
Scenario Ranking 3 1 4 2
Geo‐Political Scenario Factors
Geography, Oceanography, 
Environmental Factors 4.5 4.5 4.0 5.0 4.50 1
International and/or Joint 
Cooperation and Support 4.0 2.5 4.5 4.0 3.75 2
Govt. Interoperability withother 
Govt/ NGO agencies 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.5 3.63 3
Scenario Average 3.8 3.3 4.2 4.5
Scenario Ranking 3 4 2 1
Overall Scenario Average 4.2 3.7 3.0 4.0
Overall Scenario Ranking 1 3 4 2
Scenario
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APPENDIX B. EAB PROTECTION FIGURES AND RESULTS 
In this annex the figures for the EAB layout that were tested in Chapter VII 
Section B.4 are shown. Each Blue dot in a plot marks the location of an aircraft. Note that 
in some plots not all six aircraft are visible within the area shown in the plot. However, 
all six are accounted for in the simulation.  
The red dots mark the strike points of incoming missiles. 2000 of these locations 
are shown to allow the reader some intuition as to the distribution of the strikes. 
The yellow circle marks the center of the nine-point square that the enemy uses 
for targeting. It is essentially the center of the distribution of incoming missile strikes. 
A. EXAMPLE GRAPHICAL RESULTS (FIGURE 3, 4, AND 5 OF 25 TOTAL) 
 
Figure 3: Single row A/C parking design without camouflage (enemy targets 







Figure 4: Single row A/C parking design without camouflage (enemy targets A/C). 
Aircraft spacing is 100 meters. 
 
Figure 5: Single row A/C parking design without camouflage (enemy targets A/C). 





B. EAB PROTECTION SIMULATION CODE 
The following code was developed to create the Simulation model described in 
Chapter VII Section B.4 for locating the incoming strikes in a salvo, and comparing it to 
the layout of an EAB. This code was implemented in R. 
 


















#all units are meters 



























salvo=10 #salvo size 
X=15 #aimpoint x 
Y=200#aimpoint y 
lethalradius=575*.3 #lethal radius of missile (206 for unitary, 575 for bomblets) 
targeting_range=3000 
targeting_accuracy=50/1000*targeting_range #targeting accuracy 
















#find how many hits have been suffered 
x=strikepoints[,1]+lethalradius>runway[1] & strikepoints[,1]-lethalradius<runway[3] 






x=strikepoints[,1]+lethalradius>ac1[1] & strikepoints[,1]-lethalradius<ac1[3] 






x=strikepoints[,1]+lethalradius>ac2[1] & strikepoints[,1]-lethalradius<ac2[3] 






x=strikepoints[,1]+lethalradius>ac3[1] & strikepoints[,1]-lethalradius<ac3[3] 






x=strikepoints[,1]+lethalradius>ac4[1] & strikepoints[,1]-lethalradius<ac4[3] 






x=strikepoints[,1]+lethalradius>ac5[1] & strikepoints[,1]-lethalradius<ac5[3] 






x=strikepoints[,1]+lethalradius>ac6[1] & strikepoints[,1]-lethalradius<ac6[3] 






x=strikepoints[,1]+lethalradius>truck[1] & strikepoints[,1]-lethalradius<truck[3] 






x=strikepoints[,1]+lethalradius>personnel[1] & strikepoints[,1]-lethalradius<personnel[3] 
























#chance for at least 1 ac to be hit 
1-(1-phit_ac1_salvo)*(1-phit_ac2_salvo)*(1-phit_ac3_salvo)*(1-phit_ac4_salvo)*(1-
phit_ac5_salvo)*(1-phit_ac6_salvo) 
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APPENDIX C. GAMS CODE 
A. GAMS CODE: MINIMIZE RISK  
This appendix includes the GAMS code for the minimize risk ILP described in 
Chapter X. 
$TITLE South China Sea Basing Optimization Model 
 
$Offlisting 
$set datapath %gams.user1% 
*----------GAMS AND DOLLAR CONTROL OPTIONS-------------------------- 





   LIMROW   =  0 
   LIMCOL   =  0 
   ITERLIM  =  1000000 
   RESLIM   =  100000 
   SOLPRINT =  OFF 
   DECIMALS =  2 
   LP       =  cplex 
   RMIP     =  cplex 
   MIP      =  cplex 
   OPTCR    =  0.0 




        Authors : E. Wolfe, M. Ng, I Bar-Ilan 
                  Systems Engineering and Analysis 
                  Naval Postgraduate School 
                  Monterey, California 93943 
                  ewolfe@nps.edu 
 
        Original: January 2014  E. Wolfe 
 
        Description: The South China Sea Basing Optimization Model prescribes an optimal 
basing plan for the Navy by determining the quantity and locations of Aircraft Carriers 
(CVNs), Light Aircraft Carriers (CVLs), UAV Carriers (Sea Scout) and expeditionary 







         i hexagonal regions of South China Sea /1*4266/   ; 
 
ALIAS    (i,j)   ; 
 














SET      iLand(i) subset of regions containing land suitable for EABs; 
 




































































Table            isrA(i,j) the amount of ISR coverage provided by an EAB in region i to 




$offdelim   ; 
 
Table            isrB(i,j) the amount of ISR coverage provided by a CVL in region i to 




$offdelim   ; 
 
Table            isrC(i,j) the amount of ISR coverage provided by a CVN in region i to 




$offdelim   ; 
 
Table            isrD(i,j) the amount of ISR coverage provided by a Sea Scout in region i 




$offdelim   ; 
 
 
Table            strikeA(i,j) the amount of strike capability provided by an EAB in 




$offdelim   ; 
 
Table            strikeB(i,j) the amount of strike capability provided by a CVL in region 




$offdelim   ; 
 
Table            strikeC(i,j) the amount of strike capability provided by a CVN in region 




$offdelim   ; 
 
Table            strikeD(i,j) the amount of strike capability provided by a Sea Scout in 




$offdelim   ; 
 
Table            dcaA(i,j) the amount of defensive counter air provided by an EAB in 




$offdelim   ; 
 
Table            dcaB(i,j) the amount of defensive counter air provided by a CVL in 





$offdelim   ; 
 
Table            dcaC(i,j) the amount of defensive counter air provided by a CVN in 




$offdelim   ; 
 
 
SCALAR   CostA cost of an expeditionary base [$ billions]     /1.31/ ; 
SCALAR   CostB cost of a CVL [$ billions]                     /7.27/ ; 
SCALAR   CostC cost of a CVN [$ billions]                     /10.95/ ; 
SCALAR   CostD cost of a Sea Scout [$ billions]               /0.66/ ; 
 
SCALAR   TotalCost total allowable expenses [$ billions]       /30/ ; 
 
SCALAR   crewA the number of personnel at risk at an EAB       /100/ ; 
SCALAR   crewB the number of personnel at risk on a CVL        /940/ ; 
SCALAR   crewC the number of personnel at risk on a CVN        /4450/ ; 





         A(iLand)   1 if there is a expeditionary base in region i (0 otherwise) 
         B(iSea)    1 if there is a CVL in region i (0 otherwise) 
         C(iSea)    1 if there is a CVN in region i (0 otherwise) 
         D(iSea)    1 if there is a Sea Scout in region i (0 otherwise) 
; 
 





                 Z 
                 =E= 
                 sum((iLand),A(iLand)*riskA(iLand)*crewA) + 








                         B(iSea)+C(iSea)+D(iSea) 
                         =L= 
                         1; 
 
*Constraint2: No ships placed on land 






                          sum((iLand),A(iLand)*CostA) + sum((iSea),B(iSea)*CostB) + 
sum((iSea),C(iSea)*CostC)+ sum((iSea),D(iSea)*CostD) 
                          =L= 
                          TotalCost; 
 






                         sum((iLand),A(iLand)*isrA(iLand,j)) + 
sum((iSea),B(iSea)*isrB(iSea,j)) + sum((iSea),C(iSea)*isrC(iSea,j)) + 
sum((iSea),D(iSea)*isrD(iSea,j)) 
                         =G= 
                         ISR(j); 
 





                         sum((iLand),A(iLand)*strikeA(iLand,j)) + 
sum((iSea),B(iSea)*strikeB(iSea,j)) + sum((iSea),C(iSea)*strikeC(iSea,j)) + 
sum((iSea),D(iSea)*strikeD(iSea,j)) 
                         =G= 
                         STRIKE(j); 
 





                         sum((iLand),A(iLand)*dcaA(iLand,j)) + 
sum((iSea),B(iSea)*dcaB(iSea,j)) + sum((iSea),C(iSea)*dcaC(iSea,j)) 
                         =G= 
                         DCA(j); 
 
*Constraint6: All DCA requirements are met in each region 
 
 
MODEL BOM /ALL/; 
SOLVE BOM USING MIP MINIMIZING Z; 
 
* Add display for objective variables and vectors of variables you used 
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APPENDIX D. EXAMPLE CALCULATIONS 
This appendix includes example calculations for risk and effectiveness for a CVN 
described in Chapter X Section C. 
























APPENDIX E. COST APPENDICES 
A. TOTAL FORCE COSTS 
Appendix X. depicts the total unit cost of the force structure the team chose to combat the 



















B. SURFACE, SUBMARINE, AND AIRCRAFT UNITS COSTS 
Appendix B displays the unit costs of each surface vessel, submarine, and aircraft that 


















C. EAB COSTS 




D. CVL COSTS 
Appendix D displays the cost breakdown of the CVL and the aircraft required to support 




E. SEA SCOUT COSTS 
Appendix E represents the cost breakdown of the Sea Scout Platform and the aircraft 




F. ALTERNATIVE COMPARISONS 
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